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THE WORLD WAR

HOW IT LOOKS TO THE NATIONS INVOLVED AND WHAT IT MEANS TO US

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BY

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THE WORLD WAR

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THE WORLD WAR

HOW IT LOOKS TO THE NATIONS INVOLVED AND WHAT IT MEANS TO US

BY

ELBERT FRANCIS BALDWIN

New York

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

1914

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TO
M. B.

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THE WORLD WAR


EUROPE
Scale of Miles
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
Cities with over 1,000,000 London
Cities with 500,000 to 1,000,000 Naples
Cities with 200,000 to 500,000 Leipzig
Smaller Places Venice
Capitals with less than 200,000 BERNE
Capitals Other Cities
ARCTIC
ARCTIC CIRCLE
ICELAND
FAROE ISLANDS
SHETLAND ISLANDS
ORKNEY ISLANDS
HEBRIDES
BRITISH ISLES
SCOTLAND
IRELAND
NORTH SEA
ATLANTIC OCEAN
BAY OF BISCAY
FRANCE
SPAIN
PORTUGAL
DENMARK
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
BALTIC
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
ADRIATIC SEA
AFRICA
London
Paris
Berlin
Vienna
Budapest
Madrid
Naples
Rome
Barcelona
Marseille
Lyons
Bordeaux
Leipzig
Dresden
Breslau
Prague
Hamburg
Bremen
Hanover
Amsterdam
Rotterdam
Stockholm
Gothenburg
Christiania
Bergen
Trondhjem
Christiansund
Stavanger
Christiansand
Upsala
Sundsvall
Lulea
Tromso
Edinburgh
Glasgow
Aberdeen
Dundee
Dublin
Belfast
Liverpool
Manchester
Birmingham
Sheffield
Leeds
York
Hull
Bristol
Plymouth
Cork
Limerick
Waterford
Queenstown
Londonderry
Brest
Cherbourg
Havre
Nantes
La Rochelle
Rochefort
Limoges
Orleans
Tours
Dijon
Toulouse
Geneva
Zurich
Milan
Turin
Genoa
Venice
Leghorn
Florence
Bologna
Trieste
Lisbon
Oporto
Vigo
Bilbao
Valladolid
Cordoba
Seville
Cadiz
Malaga
Gibraltar
Cartagena
Valencia
Tangier
Algiers
Oran
Tunis
Palermo
Messina
Catania
Taranto
Brindisi
Cagliari
Danzig
Lodz
Stettin
Nuremberg
Brunn
Longitude West
0° 10° 20° 30°

FIG 1



Tundras
Ob R.
Samarovsk
Tobolsk
Chelabinsk
Ufa
Kazan
Samara
Orenburg
Ural R.
Kama R.
Volga R.
Nizhni Novgorod
Tver
Moscow
Tula
Penza
Saratof
Kursk
Don R.
Tsaritsyn
Astrakhan
Kharkof
Kiev
Ekaterinoslav
Rostof
Odessa
Kishinef
Galatz
Sevastopol
Ekaterinodar
Mt. Elburz
Tiflis
Baku
Mt. Ararat
Trebizond
Constantinople
Kaisarieh
Mosul
Aleppo
Smyrna
Adrianople
Bucharest
Kronstadt
Debreczin
Lemberg
Lublin
Pinsk
Minsk
Vilna
Kovno
Riga
Reval
Helsingfors
St. Petersburg
Lake Onega
Lake Ladoga
Lake Peipus
Tornea
Uleaborg
Archangel
Dwina R.
Petchora R.
Kola Pen.
Kolomeu
Abotsu
Cirkle
White Sea
Dnieper R.
Vitebsk
Duna R.
Don R.
Volga R.
Ural R.
Caspian Sea
Aral Sea
Black Sea
Sea of Azof
Crimea
Caucasus Mts.
Trans-Caucasia
Balkan Mts.
Sofia
Bulgaria
Turkey
Turkey in Asia
Cyprus
Russia
Asia
Arabia
Persia
Rumania
Hungary
Austria
Sweden
Norway
Finland
Lapland
Kovno
Vilna
Lemberg
Ekaterinoslav
Kishinef
Galatz
Bucharest
Kronstadt
Adrianople
Smyrna
Aleppo
Longitude 40° East from Greenwich 50°

1.

THE WORLD WAR

I

AUSTRIA AND SERVIA

[BAD-NAUHEIM, *28th July, 1914.*]

THE Johannisberg is the easternmost foothill of the Taunus range. The Taunus forms a delightful highland for health-getting and an appropriate background for such famous baths as Schlangenbad, Schwalbach, Wiesbaden, Homburg and Nauheim.

As we were coming down from the Johannisberg this afternoon and reached the Kurpark, we noticed that a crowd had gathered around one of the little newspaper kiosks. Stepping nearer, I saw that a placard had been put out. The placard read: "Austria declares war on Servia."

The sun was setting. About us lay the serenity and repose of perhaps the loveliest little Kurpark in Europe. All nature—and, at that hour, all mankind too—seemed at peace. Yet here was the alarum of war.

A curious history has led to this pass. Just a month ago, namely on June 28th, the Archduke

Francis Ferdinand and his wife were murdered. The tragedy occurred at Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia. The event shocked the world as have few assassinations.

The Prince—the nephew of the venerable Francis Joseph, Emperor of Austria-Hungary—was heir to the throne. His wife, though not of royal rank, had already been chivalrously treated as an equal both by the German Emperor and by the King of England. Some impetuous Hungarians even declared that, if Francis Ferdinand became King of Hungary, she must be their Queen. Even in the conservative Court of Vienna, where she was less liked, there were here and there a few furtive signs of breaking down the bars of rigid etiquette. Certainly, there was a realization there as elsewhere that much of Francis Ferdinand's greater popularity latterly could be ascribed to his clever wife.

For he had not been a popular Prince. Some persons did not like his supposedly Jesuit leanings; others did not like presumable militarist prejudices; still others did not like his policy with regard to the Slavs in Austria-Hungary. And right here was the sticking point—the Slavs.

Some time ago, with statesmanlike and creditable prevision, Francis Ferdinand pointed out to his compatriots that the Dual Empire should be transformed

into a Triple Empire. Why? Because there ought to be, he thought, official recognition of the fact that the Empire consists of Austrians, Hungarians *and* Slavs. There are immense numbers of Slavs in the Empire; for instance, the Bohemians, the Croatians, the Slavonians, the Serbs. As to the Serbs, their number in Austria-Hungary was considerably augmented when, after a generation of efficient and epoch-making military control, authorized by the Treaty of Berlin (1878), the Dual Empire annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina (1908). These provinces once belonged to Turkey but had been settled largely by Serbs.

Now in no region of the world has there been greater progress in civilization since 1878 than in these very provinces. But, while inspiring Austro-Hungarian pride, the progress only excited Servian jealousy. If everyone admits the fact of this exemplary progress, everyone must also admit that it was only natural for Servia to long to have all the Serbs under her control, whether they were Servians proper or whether they were Serbs in the wider sense—that is to say whether they lived under King Peter or whether they were under the Turkish Sultan, or under Francis Joseph. The Balkan war had liberated those under the Turk in Macedonia. Justly fired with this success Servia of course turned more than ever toward those in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For the Serbs in Mace-

donia there was a liberation, in the proportion of any Servian advance on Turkish civilization. But to exchange Austro-Hungarian for Servian civilization might be regarded as a decided step backwards; one has but to compare the relative literacy of the two countries to appreciate this.

This fact of course did not disturb the Servians. They went right ahead in their attempt to unite all the Serb race. Great patriotic societies were organized, whose methods were murder when necessary. Francis Ferdinand and his wife fell as martyrs to this propaganda. The Serbs had finally struck at the very heart of the Dual Monarchy.

Of course Austria immediately began an investigation. The alleged facts, as brought to light by it, showed that the murder had been plotted by Servian agents on Servian soil, that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were provided had been given to them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana, the most important of the Slav societies, whose aim was the collapse of Austria-Hungary. These societies worked not only by argument in newspapers and pamphlets, but also by bomb and revolver. The evidence accumulated by Austria seemed serious enough.

Long before the investigation was completed, the Servians knew that the facts, as elicited, pointed to

their criminal complicity and that they would be held responsible. There was thus the greater reason why the Servian Government should voluntarily have instituted an independent investigation. Not only had the Government omitted to do this; it had given little indication that any sympathy or help in the matter would come from it. This hardly accorded with the Government's friendly note to Austria in 1909 following the Bosnian annexation. In deference to counsel from the great Powers, the note read thus:

> Servia undertakes to renounce henceforth the attitude of protest and of opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation ever since last autumn and she undertakes furthermore to change the course of her present policy regarding Austria-Hungary so as to live in future on good neighborly terms with the latter.

Diplomatic dealings having failed to rouse the Servian Government to a proper appreciation of its attitude regarding existing conditions, the Austro-Hungarian Government reminded Servia of the promise of 1909, adding:

> The history of recent years and notably the painful events of June 28 have shown the existence in Servia of a subversive movement, whose aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy certain parts of its territories. This movement, which had its birth under the eye of the Servian Government, has manifested itself beyond the

Servian border by acts of terrorism, by a series of outrages and by murders.

Far from carrying out its formal promises contained in its declaration of March 31st, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to suppress this movement. It has tolerated the criminal activity of various societies and associations directed against the Monarchy; it has permitted unrestrained language from the newspapers, the glorification of the perpetrators of outrages, the participation of officers and functionaries in subversive agitation, an unwholesome propaganda in public instruction; in short it has allowed all possible manifestations which could induce the Servian people to hate our Monarchy and to have contempt for our institutions.

This in general. As to the Sarajevo murder in particular, there followed the now famous ultimatum of July 23d from Austria. Its principal demands were:

That the Servian Government should condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary.

That it should deplore the fatal consequences of the criminal activity above mentioned.

That it should publicly issue an expression of regret that Servian officers and functionaries participated in the propaganda and thus compromised the good neighborly relations to which the Servian Government was pledged by its declaration of 1909.

That it should proceed with the utmost rigor against persons who might be guilty of subversive activity.

That it should suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

That it should immediately dissolve the society called "Narodna Odbrana," confiscate all its means of propaganda, and proceed in the same manner against other societies in Servia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

That it should eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia everything that serves or might serve to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

That it should remove from its military service and from its administration in general all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Austro-Hungarian Government reserving to itself the right of communicating the names and deeds of such persons to the Servian Government.

That it should accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

That it should take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of June 28th who are on Servian soil.

Perhaps never before had one State addressed to another independent State so drastic a note. Not only were the demands peremptory in themselves, but the language used seemed unnecessarily brusque. It looked as if Austria wanted to make war inevitable. The calmer, however, showed to the excited Servians that there was no use in reading into the text any meaning not necessarily contained therein; this being especially true of the clause which, more than any

other, became the centre of discussion, namely the demand that the Servian Government should accept the collaboration of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government in the suppression of the subversive movement, the Servian press being inclined to read into the text an indication that these representatives should find their place also in judicial and administrative proceedings.

A time limit of only two days had been given by Austria for Servia's reply; this was couched in the usual diplomatic language, namely that "the Austro-Hungarian Government expects the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by six o'clock on Saturday evening, July 25th."

The reply came. The Servian Government frankly condemned all propaganda which might be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say all tendencies which aimed at ultimately detaching any territories from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. In particular:

It expressed its regret that certain Servian officers and officials should have taken part in the above mentioned propaganda, thus compromising the good neighborly relations to which the Servian Government had solemnly engaged itself by its declaration of 1909.

It would consider it a duty formally to warn officers, officials, and the entire population of the kingdom that henceforth most rigorous steps will be taken against all persons guilty of such acts.

It would introduce at the first regular session of the Skuptchina (the Servian Parliament) a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of any provocation to hatred or contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

It would, though possessing no proof that the Narodna Odbrana and other similar societies have up to the present committed any criminal act of this nature, comply with the demand that the Narodna Odbrana should be dissolved, as well as any other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

It would undertake to remove without delay from the public instruction in Servia everything that serves or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

It would in the same spirit remove from military service those persons whom judicial proceedings should prove to have been guilty of acts directed against the integrity of Austro-Hungarian territory.

It had not clearly grasped the meaning or the scope of the demand that Servia shall accept the collaboration of Austrian representatives upon its territory, but it agreed to admit such collaboration in so far as it is responsive to the principles of international law and criminal procedure as well as to good neighborly relations. In this connection the Servian Government would now begin its own investigations concerning any persons implicated in the murder in question, but, as regards the participation of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities in this inquiry, the Servian Government could not accept such collaboration and arrangement, as it would be a violation of the constitution and of the law for criminal procedure.

This was the crux of the whole matter, namely, whether Austrian agents might fulfil their functions

on Servian soil. Austria demanded that they should. Servia replied that they should not, but, with great credit to herself, added an expression of willingness to refer the question either to the decision of The Hague Court or to the great Powers.

Those Powers at once advised Servia to make friends with her adversary quickly lest a worse thing happen. Chief among the Powers in this respect was England; the influential London "Telegraph" under date of July 27th went so far as to say:

> In this country we have no sympathy whatever with Servia. We reprobate all the crimes which are associated with the Servian military party. On general grounds we are inclined to believe that Austria-Hungary is justified in demanding full and prompt repudiation of all those nefarious schemes which have politics as their excuse and murder as their handmaid.

So much for English public opinion. As for English Governmental opinion, Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary, has declared, as reported, that "the merits of the dispute between Austria and Servia are not the concern of his Majesty's Government" and, in particular, advised Servia that, if the participation of Servian officials, however subordinate they might be, were proved in the Sarajevo murder, Servia should give Austria the fullest satisfaction and certainly should express concern and regret. (Confirmed by British White Paper, Despatch 12.)

Considering Servia's reply disingenuous, Austria remained firm. The Servian press showed some signs of compliance, but, on learning that Russia was mobilizing became obdurate again. Austria recalled her Minister from Belgrade, the Servian capital, after the expiration of the time limit. Servia began to mobilize and removed the Government archives from Belgrade on the border to Nish, further south. She had ample reason, I believe, to fear a revolution, should she accept the Austrian demands in their entirety or fail to put up a warlike front.

But was all this a sufficient reason for Austria to declare war? It almost looks as if she had made up her mind to crush Servia at all costs.

Both in its application to Servia and in its far wider application to Europe such a declaration of war from a supposedly intelligent power to one less intelligent is simply stupid.

In its application to Servia, it is perhaps no more incredible than have been other unfortunate acts of Austrian foreign policy, especially the treatment of Italy half a century ago.

But in its application to Europe the act is dreadful beyond words. For Austria has struck the match which may light the flame of a European conflagration.

II

RUSSIA

[BAD-NAUHEIM, *31st July, 1914.*]

A WEEK ago a Russian general left Bad-Nauheim saying that he feared war might be coming to his country. People laughed.

But the old Russian general was right and the people have stopped laughing.

For the past three days, they have been saying: "What is Austria going to gain by war with Servia?" and "What is Servia going to gain by war with Austria?" There has been little satisfactory answer to these queries. To-day they were superseded by another query: "Will Russia go to war?" The general conclusion seems to be that she will. For it has only just become known that the announced partial mobilization in Russia is really a general mobilization of all the Russian land and sea forces! And how often has such a mighty mobilization taken place without war?

Russia thus indicates that she expects to maintain her leadership of all the Slav States outside of Austria-Hungary in upholding the Servian cause by armed

forces. In this Russia is consistent. She has long protected Montenegro, Servia, Bulgaria. Particularly, in 1908, she approved the union of all these States with Greece, of course under her own patronage, a union directed against Turkey.

In 1912 it had a great and deserved success. It expelled Turkey from most of her European possessions. This success, however, was largely due to the fact that Venizelos, the Greek Prime Minister, had succeeded the Russian Prime Minister as an organizing force.

It was natural for Russia thereupon to prepare totally to subject weakened Turkey to Muscovite pressure and at last to realize the dream of Peter the Great. He wanted to capture Constantinople. Since then Russia has always wanted to capture Constantinople. And not only it, the vision was larger. What Russia really wanted to do was from Constantinople to rule the Balkans.

Alas for Muscovite ambition! One Russian *protégée*, Bulgaria, was already defying other *protégées* over the question of the division of Macedonia. Hence the second Balkan war (1913).

This was enough to cause a quick change of base on Russia's part. No longer could she call Balkan union into existence against Turkey. Why? Because Bulgaria had been defeated by Servia and Greece

and was seemingly on the point of turning even towards her ancient foe, Turkey, for alliance. Bulgaria would not join a union directed against Turkey. What then would unite the Balkan States? One thing would, so Russia believed—their fear of Austria.

It was easy for Russia to bend her efforts in this direction. It was easy to urge Servia to cede to Bulgaria certain parts of Macedonia in exchange for Bosnia and Herzegovina, to be taken from Austria, thus delighting those Servian politicians, who had long been trying to undermine the loyalty of these provinces. It was easy to indicate that Montenegro might add North Albania to her kingdom and Greece, South Albania, to hers. Finally, it was thought that Rumanian adherence might be secured if there were a prospect of detaching those Austro-Hungarian provinces which have a large Rumanian population.

Now all this assumed, that at the first blow from the combined forces of Russia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro and Greece, the Dual Empire of Austria-Hungary would fall to pieces like a house of cards.

Perhaps it will yet. We shall see.

But whether or no, all patriotic Slavs long to show some outward expression of their sympathy with all branches of their race.

For this reason, Russia has been mobilizing her

armed forces on the Austrian border. Regarding the Servian dispute as a mere pretext for increasing Austrian influence in the Balkan peninsula, Russia wants to show herself in earnest, in order to impress and, indeed, to overawe Austria—otherwise Austria, she thinks, might go to any lengths!

Another reason for Russian military activity is the fear of losing valuable support against the ever threatening revolution at home. The Romanov dynasty itself might be in danger!

If a mobilization along the south-west border, facing Austria, cannot fully appease her people at home in Russia, then, as revealed to-day, Russia must have mobilization along her whole border, and that means mobilization against Germany as well as against Austria.

But suppose even this general mobilization be insufficient. Then there must be war in order to satisfy the demand for Slav prestige in general and Russian in particular.

And yet, so recently as July 25, the Russian Government declared that it had no aggressive intentions. (Confirmed by British White Paper, Despatch 17.)

It was careful to add, however, that Austria's course was really directed, not so much against Servia as against Russia; that Austria sought to take Russia by surprise (see Russian Orange Book, 4, 7, 8, also

British Blue Book, 161); that Austria aimed to overthrow the present equilibrium in the Balkans and establish Austrian leadership there.

On this Austria declared that she did not expect to seize Servian territory. (Confirmed by British White Paper, Despatch 18.) Yet even so Austria might turn Servia practically into a vassal State, say the Russians here, though no territory be actually seized.

To-day there has openly come upon the stage the next actor in the drama—Germany. All along, of course, Germany has been a powerful force, probably the most powerful force, behind the scenes. But Germany does not, it would seem, come on the stage of her own accord. She is apparently compelled to appear by Russia's general mobilization. As Austria's ally, Germany may be supposed to help Austria as against any Russian attack. Hence the Russian mobilization on the German as well as the Austrian frontier. According to all accounts, Germany has only just learned that the rumors of such mobilization are proven facts. Accordingly, indignant Germany is warning Russia to stop and to demobilize, adding that, if she does not, a general German mobilization must follow. (Confirmed by German White Book, Exhibit 24. Also by a letter dated July 31 from a German lady living near the Russian borders. She says: "The whole frontier is full of Russian soldiers and

we do not even mobilize! What is the Government doing to protect us?")

Will Russia stop? Will she demobilize? The Russians here say that she will on three conditions. First, if all the Powers do likewise. (Confirmed by the British White Paper, Despatch 126.) Second, if Austria stops invading Servia. Third, if Austria will submit those of her demands, which Servia has not accepted, to the Powers for discussion. (Confirmed by British White Paper, Despatch 120.)

But Austria has already declined these propositions.

Meanwhile, how is the German Emperor getting on with his mediation at Vienna? The Russians here scoff at it, though their Tsar invited it. (German White Book, Exhibit 21.) They think that the Kaiser is really exerting no pressure for peace on his ally, that Herr von Tschirsky, the German Ambassador in Vienna, remains openly anti-Russian (confirmed by British White Paper, Despatch 95) and may be at the bottom of this latest imbroglio, and that, if it were not hatched in Berlin, at all events Germany is secretly upholding Austria's irreconcilable attitude.

This may be true. It may be of a piece with Germany's successful course in 1909 in upholding the Austrian annexation of Bosnia as against the rest of the Powers. But most observers outside of Russia, I think, really believe that the German Emperor is

honestly trying to mediate in the interests of peace, even though loyally bound to defend his ally. (Confirmed by German White Book, Exhibits 22, 23, 26 and also William II.'s despatch of July 31.) His is a terrible responsibility for on his mediation the peace of Europe depends.

Somehow, in any question between Russia and Germany, one is tempted to take the same attitude as in any question between Servia and Austria. There is a similarity in the relative literacy, intelligence and civilization. And yet, the nation which has the greater literacy, intelligence and civilization has the greater responsibility.

Responsibility rests upon Russia but pre-eminently upon Germany. She should check the rising tide of war. What she does now or leaves undone will involve the fate of other nations as well as her own. For, if Russian intervention entails German, German will entail French, and French possibly British. That would mean a European conflagration.

Something even worse than this might follow, for, when one considers the colonies depending on the European Powers, there might be a world-conflagration.

But if Russia precipitates it we may hope for two good results—the deliverance of Poland and Finland from her yoke.

III

GERMANY: THE GOVERNMENT

[MUNICH, *2d August, 1914.*]

THIS is the first day of the mobilization of the German Army. One would hardly realize it unless in visiting the railway station, now taken over by the Minister of War, who is in charge of all the train service.

It is appropriate that there should be comparatively few military indications in Munich, far away as it is from East Prussia, the home of excess militarism. For Bavaria, Wurtemberg and Saxony speak in gentler, humaner tones. And Munich, one of the most democratic communities in the world and enjoying a peculiarly progressive municipal government, is pre-eminently a pacific city.

But it knows how to express its opinion. In it are published those illustrated papers which have justly, fearlessly and pitilessly exploited the Zabern incident. If the military officers at the little Alsatian town of Zabern could brutally bully the civilians on the street and contemptuously set at naught civil law, what might not be expected elsewhere in Ger-

many? The people hereabouts do not endorse such Junker arrogance. They believe that the soldiers should be the servants, not the masters of the nation. They indignantly disclaim any responsibility for military excesses and properly regard them as a menace on popular rights.

The Reichstag at Berlin also promptly took up the fight for the civilians. For months the struggle went on between the extreme military and the civic-commercial elements in German public life. At first it looked as if the civilians would surely win. In the end, however, incredible as it may seem, the militarists won. It was a blot on civilization.

Now this does not mean that the German Army won. The Army represents the German people and, like it, is not a force of offence but of defence, though most Germans, I fancy, believe that, but for their Army's aggressions in 1864, 1866 and 1870, the German Empire would hardly have been created. The Army represents the highest type of organization, discipline and readiness because, as history shows, the Germans must always be prepared to fight more than one adversary. The militarists who ultimately won in the Zabern issue represent a proportionately small number of army officers belonging to the Bernhardi school, that is to say, who disregard international ethics, certainly who have a chip on their shoulders

and who are looking for trouble. If these extremists could not stir up some kind of trouble over the Russian or French borders they would not object, as the Zabern incident shows, ruthlessly to trample on the rights of their fellow-countrymen and prejudice the whole nation in the eyes of all foreigners.

To these extremists, the murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and the Austrian ultimatum to Servia came like grist to a mill. These things came with special impact indeed, because the Austro-Hungarian attitude was not only that of the Government but emphatically that of the people. Both Austrians and Hungarians genuinely feared Servian intrigue and aggression. This popular feeling played right into the hands of the Austrian military extremists, and, following them, the German. It was their great chance.

According to all accounts, however, the extremists had against them no less a person than the German Emperor. Only last month some very jingo officers said openly at a country house: "We want a war. But the Kaiser blocks the way. He is really our greatest foe." They found fault with him because he was not another Great Elector, another Frederick the Great, and because he would not emulate his own grandfather! They forgot that these times are not the times of the Great Elector or of Frederick the

Great or of William I., and that they demand a different attitude.

But, as with apparent disregard for the right of a weaker nation to exist, Bismarck forced the pace in 1864 in the Danish War, in 1866 in the Austrian and in 1870 in the French, so the Prussian jingoes pressed forward in 1914, and finally had their way, monarch or no monarch. If the war party in Russia forced the present conflict on an unwilling Tsar, the war party in Germany apparently forced it on an unwilling Kaiser. The Kaiser's greatest pride is supposed to have been that for twenty-five years he has kept peace between Germany and her neighbors. Why should he break it now? Of course the Kaiser's is the ultimate sanction. But the real blame, so far as Germany is concerned, rests, I believe, with the little knot of militarists who have long wanted a scrap with Russia. The supposedly strong Kaiser was, apparently, after all, not strong enough to withstand them.

The German war party made much of two facts. First, the Austrian alliance. After the Franco-German War and especially in the late seventies there grew up a feeling in this country that there should be greater union between Germany and Austria in the defence of common Teutonic interests in Europe. This union would be most readily clinched by an

alliance. It was so clinched. Germany must now keep faith with her ally. Germany must, the military authorities urged, indicate that her own armed strength would be used, if necessary, to deter Russia either from a complete mobilization or from war. Austria's need of Germany is of course the greater since she must now use part of her own forces against Servia and hence has fewer to use against Russia.

The second established fact upon which the military authorities laid weight was that the general mobilization in Russia indicates that, if a Slav country were attacked by a Great Power, the only Slav Great Power would go to her assistance. The moral effect of Russia's mobilization among all Slavs, whether in the Balkans or in Austria-Hungary, must necessarily be tremendous. But there is also the material side. Servia can, she claims, put 400,000 seasoned soldiers into the field, men all aflame with successes won in the two Balkan Wars. Everyone knows that Russia's figures, on paper, are prodigious. But suppose them to be justified. The combined forces of Russia and Servia would be more than enough to overwhelm the forces of Austria-Hungary. A Slav success would at once prejudice the position of the Teutonic race in Europe; indeed, it might make it untenable!

Hence, the larger issue—Teuton versus Slav. In the final analysis that means all the Teutons against all

the Slavs. If so, then Germany must mobilize quickly and come to her ally's defence.

Thus the ultimate cause of the present conflict is not the Sarajevo murder. That was full of sinister significance for Austria, it is true, but the real cause lies far deeper. It may be discovered in the profound differences which divide the Slav race from the Teutonic.

That is the issue. What civilization is to be supreme on this Continent, the Teutonic or the Slavic? On this issue will depend the future trend of European progress.

During these days that question is being decided. The two principal antagonists are no longer Austria and Servia. By Germany's declaration yesterday of war upon Russia the chief antagonists are now Germany and Russia.

During the past 43 years Germany has apparently shown over and over again that she did not want war for herself. Several times, indeed, it certainly looked otherwise. The "mailed fist" was in evidence. But when the clouds cleared away, the general purpose underlying the particular acts in question, was assumed by most to have been pacific, despite appearances to the contrary.

If this has been true with regard to Germany in her

own foreign relations it has, I think, been true with regard to a general desire on the part of the German people that the world shall be at peace. Yet an ultimately very violent break in unsettling peace, was made by the Congress of Berlin under the leadership of Bismarck and especially of Beaconsfield, when the latter went home to England with his much vaunted "peace with honor." Russia called it anything but that and will never forget how the Congress of Berlin tore up the Treaty of San Stefano (1877), which she had made with Turkey at the close of the Russo-Turkish War. The Congress substituted therefor the Treaty of Berlin (1878).

Nor will Russia forget another cause of offence, namely, how in 1909, Europe, led by Germany, allowed Austria to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus lessening Slav influence and Russian prestige in the Balkans.

In 1878 Russia felt like fighting Germany, in 1909 also and now in 1914 she has begun the fight.

As to Germany's rumored connection with the outbreak of the Austro-Servian conflict, the German Foreign Office openly declared that it had not known beforehand, and had no more than other Powers to do with, the stiff terms of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. (British White Paper, Despatch 25.) This, some say, is doubtless true as to the highest authorities

but, add these critics, it is hardly true of some of the German agents in Austria.

Moreover, Germany declared that the conflict must be limited to Austria-Hungary and Servia. (German White Book, Exhibit 13.) As to such limitation, all the Powers except Russia were supposed to have taken the same view. Though Germany thought Russia would stand aside (British Blue Book, Despatch 161), Russia, assuming that the German Emperor, with his quarter-of-a-century peace record, would never declare war and, relying upon support from France and England, prepared to defend Servia. Accordingly, she replied to Austria's partial mobilization by her own so-called partial mobilization, namely, a general mobilization in the districts on the Austrian frontier (confirmed by German White Book, Exhibit 24) and which indicated that she would not permit the conflict to be limited to Austria and Servia.

When the news of this preparation reached Germany, the Government at Berlin warned St. Petersburg that these measures against Austria would certainly find Germany on the Austrian side; furthermore, that any consequent military preparations against Germany would oblige her to take counter measures. (German White Book, Exhibit 24.)

Russia quickly assured Germany of her own desire for peace, adding that she was making no military

preparations against her. (Confirmed by British White Paper, Despatch 120.)

Both England and Germany were persistently trying to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

On July 26th Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Berlin, Paris and Rome, enquiring if the German, French and Italian Ambassadors in London might meet him in conference at once for the purpose of discovering an issue to prevent further complications and suggesting that active military operations in Servia, Austria and Russia should be suspended pending the results of the conference. (Confirmed by British White Paper, Despatch 36.) While accepting in principle mediation by the four Powers and with an assurance that she was not failing to exercise a moderating influence at Vienna, Germany declined this particular form of conference because she did not want to place her ally before a European tribunal (confirmed by German White Book, Exhibit 12) and also because she felt that it would be ineffective, it having the appearance of an "Areopagus," consisting of two Powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining Powers. Indeed, fearing Italy, she might have considered it three against one!

The German Emperor had become a mediator at the Tsar's direct and urgent appeal.

But, scarcely had the Kaiser's mediating action begun when, as we have seen, Russia mobilized her forces along the Austrian border. Austria had mobilized only eight army corps, not too great a number, in the words of Sir Edward Grey, against the Servians.

During this time Russia renewed her assurances that she was making no military preparations against Germany. But, according to German testimony, Russia was mobilizing her *entire* army and navy. While the Kaiser was mediating in Vienna in compliance with Russia's request, the Russian hosts, the Germans claim, rose along the German frontier. On July 31st, therefore, Germany demanded from Russia a cessation of every measure of war against herself or Austria as the only means to preserve the peace of Europe. The warning was added that, if the demand were not favorably answered within twelve hours, Germany herself would mobilize.

And not only this. Six days before England had warned Russia not only that a German mobilization would follow the Russian, but that Germany would not be content with mere mobilization or give Russia time to complete hers, but would probably declare war at once. (British White Paper, Despatch 17.)

The telegraphic correspondence meanwhile between the Kaiser and the Tsar is illuminating. The

accent of sincerity marks both correspondents. On July 28th the Kaiser telegraphed:

I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression caused by Austria-Hungary's action against Servia. The unscrupulous agitation, which has been going on for years in Servia, has led to the revolting crime of which the Archduke Francis Ferdinand has become a victim. The spirit which made the Servians murder their own King and his consort still dominates that country. Doubtless thou wilt agree with me that both of us, thou as well as I, and all other sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that all who are responsible for this horrible murder shall suffer their deserved punishment.

On the other hand I by no means overlook the difficulty encountered by thee and thy government to stem the tide of public opinion. In view of the cordial friendship which has bound us both for a long time with firm ties, I shall use my entire influence to induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia. I hope confidently that thou wilt support me in my efforts to overcome all difficulties which may yet arise. (Confirmed by German White Book, Exhibit 20.)

The Tsar telegraphed on July 29:

I am glad thou art back in Germany. [The Kaiser had been in Norway.] In this serious moment I beg thee earnestly to help me. An ignominious war has been declared against a weak country and in Russia the indignation, which I fully share, is tremendous. I fear that very soon I shall be unable to resist the pressure exercised upon me and that I shall be forced to take measures which will tend to war. To prevent such a calamity as a European war would be, I urge thee, in the name of our old friend-

ship, to do all in thy power to restrain thy ally from going too far. (Confirmed by German White Book, Exhibit 21.)

On the same date the Kaiser replied:

I have received thy telegram and I share thy desire for the conservation of peace. However, as I told thee in my first telegram, I cannot consider Austria-Hungary's action as an "ignominious war." Austria-Hungary knows from experience that Servia's promises, as long as they are merely on paper, are wholly unreliable.

In my opinion, Austria-Hungary's action is to be considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that Servia's promises are effectively translated into deeds. In this opinion I am strengthened by the Austrian cabinet's explanation that Austria-Hungary intended no territorial gain at Servia's expense. I am therefore of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to remain a spectator in the Austro-Servian war without drawing Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen. I believe that a direct understanding is possible and desirable between thy Government and Vienna, an understanding which, as I have already telegraphed thee, my Government endeavors to aid with all possible effort. Naturally, military measures by Russia, which Austria-Hungary might construe as a menace, would accelerate a calamity which both of us wish to avoid and would undermine my position as mediator which, upon thy appeal to my friendship and aid, I willingly accepted. (German White Book, Exhibit 22).

At 1 A. M. July 30, the Kaiser added:

My ambassador has instructions to direct thy Government's attention to the dangerous and serious consequences of a mobilization. I told thee the same in my

latest telegram. Austria-Hungary has mobilized only against Servia and only a part of her army. If Russia—as seems to be the case according to thy advices and those of thy Government—mobilizes against Austria-Hungary, the rôle of mediator with which thou has entrusted me in such a friendly manner and which I accepted at thy express desire, is threatened if not made impossible. The entire weight of decision now rests on thy shoulders. Thou hast to bear the responsibility for war or peace. (German White Book, Exhibit 23.)

Twelve hours later on the 30th the Tsar wired the following:

I thank thee from my heart for thy quick reply. I am sending Tatisheff tonight with instructions. The military measures now taking place were decided upon five days ago and for the reason of defence against Austria's preparations. I hope with all my heart that these measures will not influence in any manner thy position as mediator which I value very highly. We need thy strong pressure upon Austria so that an understanding can be reached with us. (German White Book, Exhibit 23 A.)

On the 31st the Tsar added this dispatch:

I thank thee from my heart for thy mediation, which leaves a gleam of hope that even now all may end peacefully. It is technically impossible to discontinue our military operations, which are rendered necessary by Austria's mobilization. We are far from wishing for war. So long as the negotiations with Austria regarding Servia continue, my troops will not undertake any provocative action. I give thee my solemn word upon it. I trust with all strength in God's grace, and hope for the success of thy

mediation at Vienna, for the welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe. (German White Book, p. 12.)

To this the Kaiser replied:

In answer to thy appeal to my friendship and thy prayer for my help I undertook mediatory action between the Austro-Hungarian Government and thine. While this action was in progress thy troops were mobilized against my ally Austria-Hungary, in consequence of which, as I have already informed thee, my mediation was rendered nearly illusory. Nevertheless I have continued it. Now, however, I receive trustworthy news of thy serious preparations for war, even on my Eastern frontier. The responsibility for the safety of my Empire compels me to take definite retaliatory measures. My efforts to maintain the peace of the world have now reached their utmost possible limit. It will not be I who am responsible for the calamity which threatens the whole civilized world. Even at this moment, it lies in thy power to avert it. Nobody threatens the honor and power of Russia, which could well have waited for the result of my mediation. The friendship which I inherited from my grandfather on his deathbed for thee and thy Empire has always been sacred to me. I have remained true to Russia whenever she has been in sore straits, especially during her latest war. The peace of Europe can still be maintained by thee if Russia decides to cease her military measures, which threaten Germany and Austria-Hungary. (German White Book, p. 13.)

Two hours after the expiration of the twelve hour time limit the Tsar telegraphed thus:

I have received thy telegram. I comprehend that thou art forced to mobilize but I should like to have from thee

the same guaranty which I have given thee, namely that these measures do not mean war and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With God's aid it must be possible to our long tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence thy reply. (German White Book, p. 14.)

The Kaiser answered:

I thank thee for thy telegram. I showed yesterday to thy Government the way through which alone war may yet be averted. Though I asked for an answer by today noon, no telegram from my Ambassador has reached me with thy Government's reply. I therefore have been forced to mobilize my army. An immediate, clear and unmistakable reply from thy Government is the sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this reply I am unable, to my grief, to enter upon the subject of thy telegram. I must ask, most earnestly, that thou, without delay, order thy troops to commit, under no circumstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers. (German White Book, p. 15.)

Five hours after the expiration of the time limit given, namely at 5 P. M. August 1, no reply having been received from the Russian Government, the German Kaiser ordered the mobilization of his entire army and navy. (German White Book, p. 15.)

But already on the same afternoon Russian troops, the Germans claim, crossed the frontier and marched into German territory. (German White Book, p. 15.)

Hence, close on the heels of the mobilization order, Germany declared war against Russia.

Was Germany justified in that declaration? Yes, of course, says the German Government, pointing to Russian double-faced diplomacy as regards mobilization and the violation of German soil.

It may be permitted, however, to the friends of the German nation to deprecate so sudden a declaration.

This for two reasons.

First, the declaration of war did not give any chance to German mobilization to exercise its moral effect. The Russians knew the staggering cost of such a mobilization. They also knew that Germany would never mobilize until the last minute. Indeed, they may have doubted whether Germany would mobilize at all! If so, to-day's transportation of troops (an instantaneous and orderly exhibition of German armed strength, ever prepared for possible war) must impress them as much as would an actual battle. For, with characteristically thorough prevision, the military trains have left the Munich railway station to-day on the exact minute fixed years ago by the General Staff for their departure.

To be ever ready, however, does not necessarily mean that one seeks trouble any more than the ever ready policeman, standing at the street corner, seeks

it. But it may be forced upon him. He may even have to show his billy in order to overawe the offender. If that suffices, he should not strike, even if the offender may have trodden on official toes!

That is Germany's position. Day before yesterday she declared that she might mobilize, yesterday she declared that she would and to-day is only the first day of actual mobilization. Meanwhile, yesterday she declared war! What chance then has the moral effect of mobilization?

Replying to our criticism of a too sudden offensive, our German friends admitted that the Kaiser surprised them also by his quick declaration but, as they were careful to add, the real initiative was Russia's, in secretly mobilizing her whole force, by crossing the German border and by committing deeds of war. The Germans justify their Government's action by saying that she struck abruptly lest a worse thing befall from Russia and that the blow, to be effective, must be quick.

This is military strategy, of course, and Germany is at the head of the world in that strategy. But it disregards the moral equation.

In the second place delay might have saved what now may become a European conflagration. For, with the irony of fate, Austria has at last conceded the point which she has hitherto stubbornly refused to

concede! Last week she "banged the door" on compromise, as the saying goes. To-day, if reports be true, she consents to submit to mediation those points in her ultimatum to Servia, which had seemed to Servians incompatible with their independence. (British White Paper, Despatch 135.) Nor is this all. Russia accepts the proposal on condition that Servia be not actually invaded. (British White Paper, Despatch 139.)

Now, in explanation of this contrary course by Austria, it may be said that perhaps she went ahead blindly, expecting to repeat her stroke of 1909 when, with Germany behind her, she defied all Europe and especially Russia by annexing Bosnia. The Austrians may have reasoned from this that Russia would again stand aside. When, however, they perceived that she would not, they made belated offers of concessions. If they had been made in the first place they might have saved the peace of Europe.

But a cynic says: "No, all this conciliation is timed so as to be too late! For Austria's whole rôle has been conceived in Berlin and dictated from Berlin."

Another observer protests that the attempts at conciliation were sincere. Only they happened to be ignored by Germany in the final rush of events!

A third observer concludes: "if any State could be presumed to know about another, one might predicate

that of Germany concerning Austria. And yet, see what a wrong conclusion it reached when a sudden State policy by Germany was based on a supposed knowledge of the *continuing* policy of the other State, Austria!"

In any case, the German Government's responsibility is heavy enough. It rejected Sir Edward Grey's offer to hold an immediate Four-Power conference. By its sudden declaration of war it has now doubtless defeated the final negotiation between Austria and Russia.

No matter how we foreigners feel, the German Government enjoys popular support for three reasons:

(1) In any event the Germans always show *a confiding trust in their Kaiser and his councillors.* But in the present crisis, even the Social Democrats—men who remained in their seats or actually left the Reichstag rather than cheer the ruler, are now enthusiastically lining up under his command. Indeed, "to the last man," as one of the Socialist papers puts it, they, as well as other Germans, are entirely convinced that they are fighting the fight of Teutonic civilization against Slavic barbarism. When the Slavic wave overlaps the German frontier as it did yesterday war, they say, must follow. For they fear that a Slav advance westwards would be in such overwhelming num-

bers as actually to wipe out the German speech itself in the lands through which they spread.

(2) As a great and growing power Germany must expand somewhere. She must get her "place in the sun." This means a colonial Empire, enabling her to plant her surplus population under the German flag, but especially giving to her an enlarged outlet for her manufactures and oversea trade. That is all taking care of itself, especially in Asia Minor. No man with whom I spoke allowed that this legitimate expansion had anything to do with the present war, which they insistently declared to be *a war of self-protection only.*

Some foreigners assume that the German people have been taught to think only of such a war, to talk of it, to dream of it, and to prepare for it to the exclusion of all other subjects, until the whole nation is now possessed by the demon of conquest. I have heard well authenticated statements of the thirst for conquest of the small neighboring lands by the so-called Pan-Germans but no German here in Bavaria with whom I have talked—and I have talked with many—has seemed a militarist or even hinted that Germany wants to wage an offensive war, a war of conquest, or that she wants more land from her neighbors. When I queried: "Would you like a slice of Russia, the ports of Libau, Riga and their provinces for instance?" they said, "We have all the Baltic

ports we need. Even if they do speak German in Libau and Riga, the back country is not German."

(3) Finally here, as in every nation, the Government is enjoying plenty of the patriotism of the My-Country-right-or-wrong-but-my-Country sort. But there is also something apart from nationalism, a longing for liberty—for yet greater liberty at home and for a deliverance of the two peoples whom Russia has oppressed on her western border. "We ought to do more than merely thrust Russia back where she belongs," a German acquaintance said to me. "We ought to force Russia to make Poland independent—indeed, in my opinion all Poland ought to be independent. And, if Poland, why not Finland? Think of her betrayal! This ought to be not only a war of defence but, like our war a century ago against France, a Befreiungskrieg—*a freeing war!*"

IV

GERMANY: THE PEOPLE

[PARTENKIRCHEN, *23d August, 1914.*]

ALL about Partenkirchen there reigns a Sabbath stillness. From the Zugspitze—the highest mountain in Germany—down to the valley where the Partnach goes tumbling along, there is nothing to suggest aught but serenity. The air is charged with the odors from field flowers, from new-cut clover and hay, from fresh-cut wood piled along the path, finally from the beeches and firs of the forest. One would like to stay a long, long time in such a place.

And, down the valley from Partenkirchen, throughout this blessed Bavarian high country the red-tiled hamlets nestle in the rich fields and against the dark woods. The whole land spells repose to body and spirit.

Go into some of those little towns hereabouts. You see old men and women and children there. Where are the young men? Gone. The peasant of yesterday, the tiller of the soil, the woodsman in the forest, is the soldier of to-day.

He was not dragooned to the colors; he went will-

ingly. He went gladly. He went with a look of resolve lighting his face—aye and lighting this land. For his was the high resolve to do or die for his country. And not only the out-door man. With the same spirit have the workmen laid down their tools; the students their books.

The English and French who will oppose the Germans on the battle-field will have their high resolves too. Who shall say who has the right in the matter? The only thing to remember just now in Germany is that the spirit of outrageous excess of militarism, recently shown at Zabern, seems no longer characteristic of anyone—as it was then characteristic only of a minority. Instead, on the part of the active soldier or the reservist or the volunteer or the citizen left behind, there is only the spirit of absolute, enthusiastic, everlasting devotion to "Das Vaterland."

Some of the men from the little towns have gone to the front; others have been detailed in the reserve ranks. The reservists of the second line have latterly been arriving in Munich. They came with bags and satchels and bundles of clothes in their hands and dressed in all kinds of queer-looking, vari-colored, travel-stained and dusty apparel. Rather clumsily they lumbered along through the streets at first, and then with an increasingly springy step, as they were cheered on every hand. Most of the faces were con-

fident; occasionally, however, one noted the frightened countenance of some boy who perhaps already saw Death beckoning horribly and certainly.

A day or two later they reappeared, now in uniform and in ranks. A drill-master was trying to make them march smartly. Already they were marching with a steadier, sturdier swing. Their feet beat time over the resounding pavement.

And then the singing! Every day in Munich I looked under the red geraniums in the balcony window-box out through the iron grating into the court and through the wide passage leading from it to the street and saw the blue coats passing by. There was color for you! There was movement! And there was sound, too; for, as they march, the soldiers sing in their glorious baritone as were it one great voice, "Heimath," "Die Wacht am Rhein" and "Deutschland, Deutschland, über Alles." It is not generally known among us foreigners, I think, that the soldiers are also regularly drilled in singing. Music helps the march. The march becomes less clumsy.

And then the women! Every day, wives, mothers, sisters, sweethearts festoon the soldiers' guns with flowers. The women themselves move along the sidewalks, keeping step with their menfolk in the streets, while sympathetic faces, stamped with emotion, appear at every window and handkerchiefs and flags are

waved by eager hands. The women go to the railway station because they want to make the parting easier. They try to make it appear like an everyday parting. A mother cries to her boy: "Keep your feet warm," and the boy cries back: "Be careful not to be run over as you go home." Yet the hearts of both are heavy with foreboding while they actually smile bravely each to the other. It is the stranger within their gates who is in danger of sobbing.

The cook in our *pension* has given every one of her eight sons to the war and is proud of it. She only wishes she had more to give. At the same time those sons are her very life, and she says: "Something is wrong somewhere. It took the pains of life and death to bring each of those boys into the world. Did God intend them to be only *Kanonenfutter*—food for cannon? Ach nein!"

Yesterday a note came from a mother and daughter with whom we had an engagement to-day. The note read as follows: "We have just learned that our precious Hans has passed away on the field of honor. We are proud in the midst of our pain! They say that he was instantly killed. We are glad to think that he suffered little. As you will see, it is better that we should not meet our engagement to-morrow." No complaint. And yet those devoted women had lost their all.

Not only are soldiers continually marching through the streets of Munich. Little boys are playing at soldiering. They march up and down with laths for guns, with bits of string tied tightly around their waists to hold their tin swords in place and with their caps cocked as nearly as may be to look like helmets.

With the young men at the front, the old gather nightly in one another's houses or in the cafés and compare the events of 1914 with what they saw in 1870. Especially is the talk to the point when the events of to-day occur at places made historic in the former war, or in former wars. Take Longwy for instance. The Germans have captured the place four times: twice in the days of the first Napoleon, once in 1870, and now again.

Meanwhile, the streets of Munich look like one great bouquet. From poles on the tops of the buildings the Bavarian or the Imperial flag is waving. From the cornices other poles jut out and from them depend streamers reaching from the roof to the top of the first story. These streamers generally bear the Bavarian colors, blue and white. Think of a city of six hundred thousand people one mass of blue and white! One does not tire of the combination. Every day only makes it seem more beautiful. As with the flags, so with the streamers. The Imperial black-white-and-red is everywhere intermingled with the blue and

white, while now and then come the municipal colors, orange and black. Munich waited until she heard of the first great German victory before decorating herself. But when the news came—to every Bavarian doubly important because their Crown Prince won—the city burst in a trice into all this lavish color.

It is in curious contrast with the people. One fancies the Bavarians as the most emotional of all the German peoples as they are the most "live-and-let-live" sort. But the war has brought out an underlying quality, self-restraint. Look at the crowds reading the posters in the streets. The posters frankly announce that the Russians are over-running East Prussia twenty miles this side of the border, but they also announce German and Austrian successes further south and German victories on the French frontier; as a whole, therefore, the poster gives opportunity for yells and jodels. One might reasonably expect some jubilation. But there is comparatively little shouting. Your Bavarian reads the news once and then, because it is so important, once more. He reads it slowly. When he has taken it all in he looks proud, but he looks intensely serious. For, appreciating all the information just received and feeling patriotic pride in it, he has yet always before him the vision of the future. A man turned towards me the other day after reading one of the posters announcing a new triumph.

He did not say "Hurrah" or "Hoch die Armee," but simply "Wir werden schwere Kämpfe haben—we have hard fighting ahead of us."

And this is what the Prussian sometimes calls "der dumme Bayer"—the stupid Bavarian! The Bavarian may not be as clever as the Prussian, but he is kinder. Certainly he is quick and intelligent enough to realize that, when Germany is attacked on most sides, there is slim chance of the return home of many of those at the front, no matter how encouraging the early victories.

If enthusiasm for the Fatherland characterizes the reservists and the volunteers whom we now see, how true it was of the regulars whom we saw go to the front three weeks ago. Some of them have now arrived again in Munich, wounded and carried through the streets by ambulances and tram-trains fitted out with beds. There are already hundreds of wounded in the hospitals. But the men have not come back for good, they say. Ask them about it and you will hear on every hand an expression of longing to return to the front. "Ach, ich möchte wieder dort sein" you hear. The atmosphere is full of the contagious spirit of defence.

Defence, not offence. Say what you will as to the hidden causes of this increasingly ghastly war, all men must acknowledge that the Germans with their con-

fident strength and inflexible will are united and persistent in it. No matter how sharply we and they may differ as to the rights and wrongs involved, no one can see such sights as these without being convinced that, in the opinion of the German people, the fight is one wholly to defend their existence. "Das Vaterland" has entered into their inmost fibre. They are, therefore, protecting their most sacred possession. Their aim will be realized only when they become convinced that their whole country is verily "ein' feste Burg." To this end—defence—their purpose is adamantine.

This idea of defence, not offence, is everywhere present. It may be, as has been alleged, that certain secret and unworthy ambitions and aggressions are at the bottom of the war. Of them, however, there is no indication in this part of Germany at least. Only yesterday a Bavarian said to me: "It cuts us to the quick to have to fight France and England, simply because they are bound to Russia. Our quarrel is not in the least with them, but entirely with Russia. Had we the Russians alone to deal with we could have whipped them in a week and sent them about their business."

German patriotism stands at a high level. There is no need to stimulate it. Indeed there is rarely any need to use those devices which we use at home in our

political party campaigns—the mass meetings, the flag wavings, the torchlight processions. The German may not be emotionally patriotic in the same way that we are. But his emotion lies quite as deep as ours and is always at hand for steady use. The German's love of country is a *religion*. He may not show his respect for the Church in the same way that we do. But the country of Luther is the country of an abiding faith both in the Fatherland and in the living God.

Usually a Munich Sunday is officially begun by a chorale played by an orchestra from one of the church towers. Last Sunday, however, for the benefit of the whole city, the Oberbürgermeister directed the band to play from the Rathaus tower such patriotic and religious hymns as these:

Dankgebet.
Die Wacht am Rhein.
Deutschland, Deutschland über alles.
Die Königshymne.
Nun danket alle Gott.
Grosser Gott wir loben Dich.

A vast crowd collected before the Rathaus in the Marienplatz. During the singing every man uncovered. After each hymn there were three Hochs. The whole affair typified the simple, lofty spirit, the soul

of the nation, uniting Germans in unflinching strength.

Such a nation's leaders may lead nobly or ignobly. The main thing to remember is that the people, the nation, constitutes the ultimate power.

V

GERMANY: THE FOREIGNERS

[MUNICH, *26th August, 1914.*]

THE war is now over three weeks old. Its history has not only been remarkable with regard to the progress of German arms; it has been more remarkable because one after another Power has declared war upon Germany. This, instead of dampening German ardor, has stimulated it to a high pitch, although your average German preserves his equable manner. Indeed, further declarations of war would probably be received with something like equanimity. There is almost a sense of humor in the situation, as was shown the other day in the building of the General Staff at Berlin, where there is a large board on which notices are placed. Taking advantage of a momentary dearth of such notices, an official, moved by many declarations of war, wrote the following: "Hier werden weitere Kriegs-Erklärungen angenommen." (Further declarations of war received here.)

During the first week of the war Germany seemed suddenly to awaken to the realization of a fact which she had not before appreciated, namely that she has

been honeycombed with Slav spies, especially Russian spies. It is of course easy to see that, especially among the throngs of Slav cure-guests at the various German baths, there might be spies, even of royal blood. But it seems a pity for instance so to regard the quiet, dignified man who sat next me at table in our hotel at Bad-Nauheim. He is a cousin of the King of Servia and yet, as such, he may very well, for aught I know, be a prize spy!

But the Germans have latterly taken an even greater interest in English-speaking than in Slavic-speaking foreigners. We have been interested in the various reports published in American and English newspapers, in which mistaken notions concerning the treatment of English speaking travellers and residents in Germany seem to prevail.

It might be expected that the English would receive rougher treatment than the Americans. Probably they did. I know of one English lady arriving at Partenkirchen who had difficulty in persuading any hotel to receive her. But I have heard of no really rough treatment except some noise made by a lot of young fellows in front of the British Consulate here, when the news came that England had declared war on Germany, the report of the throwing of stones and the breaking of glass at the English Embassy in Berlin and the rumors of individual cases of revolting

and incredible treatment of the English at the frontiers.

As to the general treatment; however, three public testimonials are of interest as indicating one kind of English sentiment on this subject.

The first is published by the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and is from the English colony in Frankfort. We read:

As we are about to leave Germany we beg, through your newspaper, to express our sincerest thanks to the railway, military, and police officials for the great politeness and prevision with which they have provided for our journey. Especially in Niederlahnstein, where we had to spend long weary hours, and here in Cologne, we have been treated by all the officials and by the people with the greatest courtesy. In expressing our heartfelt thanks we wish to assure all Germans that, on our part, we shall do our utmost for any Germans with whom we may be brought in contact in England.

The second testimonial is from the English chaplains at Baden Baden and Freiburg. It reads as follows:

At the outbreak of the war British subjects in out-of-the-way places were given safe conduct to suitable centres, such as Baden Baden, and there allowed to choose places of abode according to their tastes and means. Such restrictions as are put upon their movements are in their own interests. The Authorities have exhorted the inhabitants publicly, as well as by house to house visitations, to treat foreigners with respect and courtesy, taking pride in thus proving their claim to a truly high standard of civilization,

and the people have responded nobly to this appeal. Not only have the hotel and pension keepers done everything in their power to accommodate their visitors at the most reduced prices, giving credit in many instances, but several cases have come to our notice in which Germans have housed and fed English women and children who were perfect strangers to them out of pure humanity and good feeling.

The third testimony is from the English chaplain in Berlin. He says:

At the outbreak of war it was of course the duty of the German police to protect their country against suspicious strangers on German soil. To this end, all strangers, including British subjects temporarily or permanently residing in Berlin, had to be brought under police supervision. In our opinion, the police magistrates of Germany, in carrying out this task, tried to perform their duty, not only with thoroughness, but also, at the same time, without detracting from the traditions of justice and courtesy worthy of a great modern state.

We desire further to affirm that the general attitude of the populace, especially the middle and cultivated classes, towards the British subjects here has differed very little in friendliness and politeness from their attitude in time of peace; in short, in this crisis, German laws, justice, and courtesy have shown themselves worthy of the nation.

Finally, as showing the spirit animating the Bavarian officials, I may mention a case of a young English girl, left alone here after her compatriots had gone away on special Government trains. The Government was now about to provide other special trains,

this time for the large American colony in Munich. The trains were through trains, with sleeping coaches and dining cars, from Munich to points in Holland. Places could only be had by those who had registered at the American Consulate and who had made good their allegations of American citizenship. The English girl was most anxious to get to Holland and from that neutral country to England. But how? No more English people could be provided with transportation. So she came to the American Transportation Committee and offered to take service with some American family as governess, paying for all her expenses, if only the American family would take her along and pass her off as an American citizen. The case was pathetic. The plan seemed plausible.

Fortunately the presiding genius of our Committee had tested the best German official fibre. So he said to the girl: "Do nothing of the kind. Go to the proper official at the Hauptbahnhof. Show him your British passport. Tell him that you are a British subject and are proud of it. Tell him that you have plenty of American as well as British friends and that we want you to go on our train. We will accompany you, if you wish. The official knows us. He likes us and we like him. Now let's see what will happen."

The frightened girl did as she was told. She went on our train.

It is said that the Munich colony fared better than any other American. One of the chief points in the treatment was the Bavarian Government's act in putting three through trains a week from Munich to points in Holland. It was by no means a commercial venture. These trains, proceeding north with a full complement of American passengers, have to return empty. The Government's enterprise costs it much more than any financial return from us, although some twelve hundred Americans have already been transported in this way. The act is thus one of genuine international courtesy and kindness.

There is another thing to say about these trains and that is that they have left the station at Munich exactly on time and with a grateful lack of excitement and hurry. Some of the passengers have been railway men, familiar with all the operations of trains, men who could fully appreciate the great detail involved in arranging the operation even of a single train. They observed the systematic railway management of the Bavarian Government with admiration. This admiration was doubled as they considered that this particular management was in evidence at a time when one might easily imagine the railway stations and the railway service in a topsy-turvy condition. But a remarkable organization characterises everything connected with the

Bavarian or any other of the German Governments.

When England declared war, the Munich authorities advised that the use of the English language be avoided as far as possible on the streets. Yet beyond one or two arrests of suspicious characters, no one suffered much inconvenience, so far as I know. Young American and English girls were able to go about the streets alone and even in the dense throng in the Marienplatz, when the news of the great battle near Dieuze arrived, English-speaking persons were undisturbed.

This condition indeed quickly gave place to a distinction between the English and the Americans though I have heard of one instance where even an American passport did not suffice to save a former American Minister from inexcusable delay and inconvenience at the frontier, and of another instance where well known Americans were persistently regarded as spies and outrageously searched.

Such cruelties are in marked contrast to the treatment of Americans here. The other day one of our countrywomen entered a shop where just once before she had bought a large bill of goods. She was personally unknown to the proprietor but when she returned he remembered her face and inquired:

"Are you not the lady who bought so-and-so and so-and-so recently?"

"Yes."

"Well, we have heard that you Americans are having difficulty in getting enough money from the banks. Will you not permit us, therefore, to return to you the cash you paid us? We shall be glad to accept your cheque instead."

And this is no isolated case. Many hotel and *pension* keepers spontaneously made the same proposal to their guests.

An American flag in the buttonhole was a welcome sight to the citizens of Munich and an open sesame not only to conversation but also to an entire liberty of criticism on the part of the foreigner. The German would begin: "We have always been friends, haven't we? Do not let our occupation of Luxemburg and Belgium make any difference. We did not want to do it. But the Government says it had to do it."

Indeed, the Government's violation of neutrality pledges does not necessarily mean a unanimous approval by the people. This was disclosed as follows: We foreigners protested against the violation, enquiring, "What is international law for if not for use in time of temptation? But even the excuse of sudden temptation fails if years ago, your General Staff de-

cided to invade those countries with or without permission. Our Government, we hope, has protested." The Germans acquiesced. They said: "We do not defend the act as ethically right for we know that it was ethically wrong. But our necessity knows no law, the Government thinks. Our necessity!—do you understand that it is now a life-and-death struggle for us? We want to live and not die. But we hope that the Government will never have to act that way again."

We hope so too. Yet, if critics suppose that Germany thinks it not ethically wrong to break her word, they might well make a distinction as to whether this is the opinion of the military extremists, at present in the saddle, or whether it is the opinion of all the people.

At the same time the violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium, as our German friends admit, does not make the war look like a *Befreiungskrieg* on the western border, though they hope it may ultimately be such on the eastern.

The popular confidence in the Government's superior wisdom if not superior morality is, however, entirely subsidiary and subservient to the German's basic, passionate devotion to his Fatherland, no matter what the Government of the day may do.

We foreigners too may well be loyal to that Father-

land. It constitutes the background of our friendliness for this people. It means first of all the Protestant Reformation but it also means the inspiration to research which thousands of American students have imbibed in German Universities, the moulding of our thought by German philosophy, the shaping of our American systems by German pedagogues, the specializing by scientific methods, making a practical and serviceable basis of education for all forms of social and industrial development; above all, the profound influence upon us of German poetry and music. As we think of these things, there pass before the mind's eye the figures of Luther, Melanchthon, Schleiermacher; of Fichte and Hegel; of Froebel and Paulsen, of Ranke, Mommsen and Curtius; of Lessing, Schiller and Goethe; of Bach, Beethoven and Brahms.

VI

FRANCE

[The Hague, *28th August, 1914.*]

The Paris streets are desolate. They are unlighted. There are long empty distances in Paris; there are closed doors and cellars; there are vacant hotels. The cafés close at 8 o'clock and the restaurants at 9.30. At 10 all is quiet and deserted.

The most valuable pictures in the Louvre have been packed in fireproof cases and the famous Venus de Milo is enclosed in a heavy steel safe. The art treasures from the châteaux of Compiègne and Chantilly have been removed so as not to be in the path of a German army approaching Paris.

Why should France be involved in this war?

Is it because she wants revenge for Alsace-Lorraine taken from her by Germany in 1871? That motive doubtless actuates very many Frenchmen.

Certainly, during the first period after the war of 1870–71 it seemed to be the great motive behind the enormous grants made by the French Parliament to increase the army strength. If Bismarck started the whole modern movement of militarism by bringing

about the Franco-German war, certainly from 1871 to 1904 France directly led the way to the fearful burdens involved everywhere in Europe by augmented arms.

For instance, the law of 1886 raised the French Army's peace footing to 500,000 men at a time when the German peace footing numbered only 427,000. In contrasting the tempers of the two peoples, one notes that the German Government was able to respond to the French increase by one of but 41,000 men and was able to get this indeed only by dissolving that Reichstag which refused it and by making a strong appeal to its successor.

Seven years later, namely, in 1893, the period of compulsory German service was reduced from three years to two and the German peace footing raised to 479,000 men. Like the previous German Army Bill, this was only carried through the Reichstag after a severe struggle with the representatives of the people.

In 1899 the German peace footing was raised to 495,000 men, a total still below the French 500,000.

Not until 1904,—three-quarters of the period from 1871 to the present time—was a law introduced to increase the German peace footing beyond the French total, and then only by 5,000.

The French thereupon reduced their period of service from three years to two and, as in Germany, while the people gladly accepted this reduction as

lightening the burden upon the individual conscript, they hardly realized that it meant an increase in the number of those who were to pass through military training and hence a proportionate numerical increase in the army itself.

Since then France has raised her peace footing to 545,000 men and her war footing to 4,000,000.

Germany has now gone far ahead of these totals. Her realization of the possibilities of the pan-Slav movement caused last year's sudden demand, resulting in the provision for the increase of her peace strength to 870,000 men and of her war strength to 5,400,000.

The main, steady argument for all the German increases has been effective. It was that there should be a constant ratio between the numbers of the army and the numbers of the people. Since the Franco-German war the French population has remained practically stationary. Not so the German. It has increased from 38,000,000 to 65,000,000. Should not the army be made larger proportionately?

France was alarmed at the announcement of this latest German army increase for she could no longer augment her own forces. However, the French Prime Minister afforded about as much of a motive to the German Reichstag members to pass the German Government's Bill as a French army increase, authorized

by the French Parliament, would have been. He announced that he would keep with the colors those who were completing their second year's service. Yet, even with this incitement, five weeks elapsed before the representatives of the German people passed their Government's Bill.

As Russia, not France, was the cause of the bill, however, the Germans were not surprised that Russia should reply to their army increase by raising the term of service in her own army from three to three and a quarter years, by grouping greatly increased forces upon the Russo-German frontier, by pushing strategic railways thither and by re-equipping the border fortresses.

Meanwhile, the German aggressive naval programme had far outstripped that of France or of any other Continental power.

Yet even with all this militarism the motive of revenge in France for Alsace-Lorraine has lessened in expression at least. Some years ago the eloquent Socialist orator, Jean Jaurès, recently assassinated, proclaimed in the Chamber of Deputies that France should now turn her attention to other and worthier aims than revenge. For this he received emphatic applause from the minority members.

If revenge for Alsace-Lorraine and resentment at some exasperating frontier incidents and threats do

not fully explain why France is involved in the present war, what does? The Franco-Russian alliance.

After her defeat in 1871 France naturally felt herself isolated in Europe. She looked about for a friend. Finally she found one, Russia.

This might have been foreseen. In the first place, French civilization had always appealed most of any civilization to Russia. The Russian educated classes speak French as well as do the French themselves. Not so long ago, indeed, the aristocratic Russian classes spoke French among themselves to the exclusion of their own language and with a resultant complacency over those who spoke Russian. A gratifying nationalistic sentiment has now brought about a change in this respect.

A second reason why one might have foreseen that France would find a friend in Russia was because Russia always needs money. Who could supply it so well as France?—that is to say, the ultimate economic source of Europe, the French peasant. His traditions and customs form a constant source of wealth.

On her part France wanted Russian support. One of the French shortcomings is vanity. Now vanity had received a blow by the Franco-German war and still more by the isolation which followed it. France longed for a friendly hand. She was overcome with

joy, therefore, when in 1875 the Russian Emperor Alexander II. stretched forth his and protected France from the alleged hostile German aggressions of that year.

In 1879 another cause came about to lead France and Russia to throw themselves into each other's arms. If we find one far-away source of the present war in Russia's resentment at the Congress of Berlin (1878), so in 1879 we may find another in the union between Germany and Austria. This union was to lead as we are now seeing, to some over-confidence on the part of those allies. But the union immediately led to alarm in both France and Russia at an alliance caused by the fear of Slavism—though some silly Frenchmen chose to think that they themselves constituted an equal danger. It is no wonder then that there was a yet more rapid drawing-together of Russia and France.

In 1882 Italy began to approach the Austro-German union, and then joined it thus forming the Triple Alliance—Germany, Austria, Italy.

It is now opposed by France, Russia and England in their Triple friendly understanding or Entente—to give it its French name, now generally used.

This Entente, however, has referred to colonial affairs rather than to a common European policy. With France, it has referred to Morocco and dates from

1904. With Russia it has referred to Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet and dates from 1907.

The Entente between France and England arose in this way. The exclusive English occupation of Egypt, begun in 1882–83, was, and until 1904, continued to be an offence to France. Though in the eighties, as now, Egypt was nominally bound to the Turkish Sultan as overlord, it had become necessary, in the interests of civilization, for England and France, financially and economically to administer the Egyptian Government. When, however, it came to a question of armed interference to deliver Egypt from anarchy, France showed herself unready. So England had to accomplish the task alone and the condition of Egypt to-day shows how well she did it. Naturally the French became both increasingly out-of-sorts with themselves and jealous of England's success in the light of their own Government's unwillingness to act.

Meanwhile their increasing interests in Morocco were concentrating their attention in another part of Africa. King Edward VII. saw in this a chance to conclude a mutually desirable compact. For French interests in Morocco were apparently growing to be as great as were English interests in Egypt. Hence the clever King and his clever Foreign Minister, Lord Lansdowne, brought about an agreement with the French Government. By it England promised not to

impede the extension of French influence in Morocco. In return, France formally recognized the English occupation of Egypt. Moreover, the two Powers promised each other diplomatic support in case of objections from other Powers.

An objection quickly came. It was from Germany, who, after approving the new Entente, took the occasion of the Russian defeat by Japan in 1905 to object that no provision had been made to protect the important German commercial interests in Morocco. In 1905 William II. went to that country and made an announcement at Tangiers itself concerning German interests. The German Government thereupon demanded a conference of the Powers to consider the whole question. Then, as now, M. Delcassé was French Foreign Minister. He demurred to this proposal. Finally, however, the French Government consented. M. Delcassé resigned. In 1906 the Conference met at Algeciras, Spain. While satisfying German objections, it practically confirmed France in her dealings with Morocco. Our Ambassador at the Conference was Henry White, long First Secretary of our Embassy at London, later Ambassador to Italy and then to France.

That England steered a proper course throughout the Moroccan affair was disclosed by the German Chancellor's generous statement to that effect: he

added that "Germany bore England no ill will because England and France had come into closer relationship."

In 1911 that relationship was suddenly put to a severe test by the abrupt German occupation of the Moroccan port of Agadir. War was averted, largely through the British Government's prompt diplomatic action. Henceforth France and England felt themselves threatened by the menace of Germany. The Entente thereupon inevitably expanded itself from a colonial to a European content. This is shown in the interchange of letters between Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary, and M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador in London. Sir Edward wrote:

> I agree that if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them. (British White Paper 105, Enclosure I.)

On the following day M. Cambon replied that he was authorized to accept the arrangement. (British White Paper 105, Enclosure II.) It will be noted that

this arrangement bound neither France nor England to co-operate, even diplomatically; it simply bound them to discuss any menacing situation and, if they agreed as to the necessity of taking common measures, to take them.

When the Servian conflict began, France naturally sympathized with her ally, Russia, whose prestige in the Balkans was directly affected. England, on the other hand, refused any solidarity with France and Russia on this question. (British White Paper, Despatch 6.)

As we have seen, France agreed to Sir Edward Grey's proposal of July 26th to bring about a Four-Power Conference.

On July 27th the German Government received its first intimation concerning French military preparations; a French army corps had discontinued its manœuvres and returned to its garrison. (German White Book, Exhibit 9.)

On July 29th the German Government discovered the rapidly progressing preparations by France both by water and on land and threatened, as a counter-measure, to proclaim a state of "drohende Kriegsgefahr" (imminent danger of war). (German White Book, Exhibit 17.)

In reply to this, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, informed the German Government

that the French had done nothing more than the Germans had done, namely, to recall officers on leave. (British White Paper, Despatch 98.)

Also on July 29th, Germany assured England that Germany "aimed at no territorial acquisition at the expense of France," should Germany prove victorious in any war that might ensue. (British White Paper, Despatch 85.)

On July 30th the French Government informed the English Government that France would not remain neutral in a war between Germany and Russia (British White Paper, Despatch 105) and asked England to range herself on the side of France.

On July 31st England replied that she would give no pledge, while admitting that "if France and Germany became involved in war, we should be drawn into it." (British White Paper, Despatch 119.)

On the same day the German Government asked the French Government if it would remain neutral in a Russo-German war. (German White Book, Exhibit 25.) The reply was that it would do what its interests dictated. (German White Book, Exhibit 27.) This was regarded in Germany as a subterfuge, as another way of saying that France would support Russia. Thereupon the Kaiser gave the order to mobilize along the French frontier, but to respect it.

France, mobilizing at the same time as Germany

did, assured the German Government that the French would respect a neutral zone of ten kilometres (six and one-quarter miles) on her frontier. (British White Paper, Despatch 140.) Yet, in a number of instances, the German Government claims, France broke the peace across the border before the opening of actual war.

According to the official *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, on August 1st Sir Edward Grey asked Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London, whether, if France remained neutral in a Russo-German war, Germany would promise not to attack her. Prince Lichnowsky replied favorably and the Kaiser telegraphed to King George that, while the mobilization order on Germany's east and west frontiers, issued that afternoon, could not be countermanded, if France offered to remain neutral and the English army and navy should guarantee it, he would not attack France and would turn his troops in another direction.

Alas for this last opportunity for avoiding war between Germany and France. The English statement, according to Prince Lichnowsky, had been made without previous consultation with France.

The English position with regard to France was thus becoming increasingly interesting. In the Moroccan quarrel, England had been definitely pledged

to side with France. But the present quarrel had nothing to do with anything on which England had a special agreement with France. What then was England to do? Did it have no duty in the matter?

In the opinion of some Englishmen, England would never have interfered by force of arms on behalf of France if the question concerned France alone.

In the opinion of others, she would and for this reason.

The Anglo-French Entente had brought about a feeling that there would be more or less material co-operation between England and France in any menacing situation. Hence France had allowed her northern and western coasts to become practically undefended; the French fleet has been concentrated in the Mediterranean, thus allowing the English fleet to be more and more concentrated in the English Channel where it could serve both England and France. Under these circumstances, if the German fleet should come down the English Channel and bombard the practically unprotected coast of France, would England stand aside and do nothing?

England might not have declared war. But that she would not stand aside is seen in her action on August 2d.

The prophecy of many observers concerning English aid to France would seem to have been borne out

on that date when England definitely promised that, "if the German fleet should come into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power." (Sir Edward Grey's speech of August 3 in the House of Commons.)

Is it then just to assume that up to the actual violation of Belgian neutrality on August 4th the English Government had no intention of becoming involved in the present struggle? Is it not rather true that King Edward's act of 1904 has now borne fruit in a very material as well as moral mutual aid between England and France?

On August 2, Germany and France had already begun hostilities. A patrol of the XIV German Army Corps crossed the frontier. However, if we may believe the Chief of the German General Staff, "long before this instance occurred, French aviators had thrown bombs on our railway tracks far into Southern Germany, and French troops had attacked our frontier guard on the Schlucht Pass."

LATER

Conditions in France have become specially interesting because Paris is now added to Belgrade and Brussels, Antwerp and Ostend, in the list of cities from which the Government has had to flee. Among

the Ambassadors who were in Paris, there is one who has emulated the fine example of Elihu Washburne, American Minister to France in 1871, when the Germans besieged Paris. Our efficient Ambassador, Myron T. Herrick, remains in the capital and is the one Ambassador who did remain.

The new Spanish Ambassador has now arrived there, however. On this hangs a tale. His predecessor at the time of the French Government's flight to Bordeaux did not agree with his own Government as to the desirability of remaining in Paris. His resignation, therefore, was accepted and a new Ambassador appointed, General Valtierra, who at that time had no intimation that he was being considered for the post. One day, when asked where he thought the Spanish Ambassador should be in the present crisis, in Paris or in Bordeaux, answered: "Paris; there is nothing to do in Bordeaux, but Paris is the theatre of action. In any crisis the Ambassador should be the instrument and not the ornament of his Government." Thereupon he was told that he was to represent Spain at Paris. He went thither at once.

One thing which may be immediately done by the representatives of the neutral Powers in any city, besieged by belligerents, is the exertion of an influence in restraining those belligerents from the destruction of historic monuments and works of art. Quite

aside from the pressing exigencies of the moment, the general statement may be made that while some one nation may have the physical ownership of these historic monuments and works of art, they really belong to the world.

In speaking of the work of neutral nations, the Red Cross should by no means be omitted. While the German Red Cross, the French Red Cross, and the British Red Cross have each labored nobly in the present war, special mention should be made of the American Red Cross. More than any other, I believe, our own society adheres to the fundamental doctrine of the Red Cross as founded at Geneva in 1864, namely, that it must be absolutely international both in scope and function.

Moreover, while, in the light of late developments it seems one's first duty to give money and assistance to the Belgian Relief Fund and while one would like to help various other societies, it should not be forgotten that the Red Cross is the only *official* society created for neutral relief in time of war; it is the only one that is permanent and not composed of a temporary committee; the only one whose receipts, records and reports remain on permanent official file; the others are expected to go out of existence at the close of the war. Furthermore, it is the only organization fully equipped not only to receive contributions

but to expend them; the only one with a rich fund of experience behind it, which can tell it instantly how to work economically and efficiently, and finally, it may be the only one which understands the art of making a correct re-accounting to its patrons.

The American Red Cross work in Munich, as I observed it for a month, deserves particular mention. It was under the efficient charge of Frau Dr. Nordhoff-Jung, who has seen fifteen years of Red Cross service in Washington. The large hall of the Christliches Hospiz was scarcely adequate to contain the enthusiastic assemblage, mostly American, it is true, but also representative of other nationalities. Lecture courses took place three times a week and enabled amateurs to aid the professional nurses with efficiency. The subsequent demonstrations, of course fundamental and elementary, constituted an intrinsic and available proportion of the volunteers' new working knowledge. Many of those volunteers had already some preparation for the work, by virtue of their knowledge of languages; for the others, lessons in it were given by a department of the Red Cross.

A chief object of the Red Cross work in Munich, was the establishment near the city of a Convalescent Hospital, to be known as the American Red Cross Hospital and to enlist in its service those persons who were willing to nurse permanently. The work was

the more appealing because of the early arrival at Munich, as a great hospital centre, of wounded Germans from the battlefield, and not only Germans but also the wounded soldiers of other nationalities.

In Paris a similar endeavor has been in progress. An American Hospital has been established in the Lycée Pasteur in Neuilly, a new building, large and well adapted to the purpose. The Lycée is a secondary school just built but not yet occupied. To American initiative the French owe that provision was made at a critical moment impartially for all the wounded. There was room for a thousand beds. The difficulty was to obtain enough doctors and nurses. Eminent surgeons from America and American doctors in Paris worked all through the nights. Dr. Dubouchet, Dr. Blake and other surgeons performed wonderful operations and gave marvellous object lessons in surgery.

Another thing: The response to the calls for money has been good, but the needs of the Institution are destined to be great. The management has determined that its expenditure shall not exceed its receipts. That is Mr. Herrick's special advice and care.

During the disorganization which followed the retreat from Mons, the hospital was an infinite blessing to the French and English. But after the battle of Meaux, near Paris, they recognized that a particular defect lay in the absence of motor ambulances. The

Americans in Paris quickly mobilized their own cars. They took the wounded from Meaux and brought them back to the American Hospital. They did more. They equipped a fleet of ambulances, of light cars which could be driven across country away from the road, when the need arose. And these were driven by young Americans who quickly became expert stretcher-bearers.

In no country has the religious result of this war been more apparent than in France. Before the war there was conflict between the Church and the State. Before the war there were on the one hand, "the clerical terror" and "the scarlet woman;" on the other hand, there were rank infidelity, scepticism, atheism. But now! The bravery shown by the sons of the Church has at least for the moment reconciled their opponents to them. Everywhere priests have been distinguished for their heroism and their devotion is shared by many members of religious Orders, both men and women. For instance, the Abbé Luchat became a sergeant in the cyclist corps and was killed on the field of battle. The Abbé Monbru, a lieutenant of Infantry, fell at the head of his company. Another, Abbé Grenier, was struck down while leading his men in a charge. Abbé Fumin, an ensign, died also in battle. There are already a dozen Abbés either officers, non-commissioned officers or private soldiers, who have

given their lives in this war for their country. One of them, Abbé Buscog dashed to the attack with his men while crying "I am a priest. I fear not death, *En avant!*"

All religious quarrels are now forgotten. In the provincial French towns the Mother Superior of the Convent may actually be seen in the "cantine scolaire laïque" side by side with and talking in a friendly manner with the mistress of the lay school!

VII

LUXEMBURG AND BELGIUM

[UTRECHT, *29th August, 1914.*]

THE German attack on France was subject to the following conditions. Half the Franco-German border is protected by the Vosges mountains. Just north of the Swiss frontier is the opening known as the Trouée de Belfort through those mountains, an opening commanded in France by the well-nigh impregnable fortress of Belfort. Stretching to the north is a line of redoubtable French ramparts, the line marked by Epinal, Toul and Verdun, extending behind and beyond the mountains to the point where the territories of France, Luxemburg and Germany come together. North of this the French frontier faces two neutral states, namely, the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg and the Kingdom of Belgium. Convinced that England was as much interested as herself in preventing the invasion of Belgium, the Franco-Belgian frontier is only slightly fortified in comparison with the fortifications on the border facing Germany. Thus if a German army, intending to attack the French, could cross

those neutral territories, an entrance into France ought to be comparatively easy.

When the present exigency arose, the German army, to the complete surprise of us foreigners, was directed to cross Luxemburg! And this, despite the neutrality treaty which we supposed would protect its territory.

On August 2d the German Imperial Chancellor telegraphed to the Luxemburg Government that the military measures to be taken that day did not constitute a hostile act against Luxemburg, but were only intended to insure against a possible French attack; moreover that full compensation would be paid to Luxemburg for any damage caused by using the railways which were leased to the Empire.

The Luxemburg Government protested but did not appeal to the Powers as it might and should have done. In his speech of August 4th to the Reichstag Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, the German Chancellor, acknowledged that Germany had been acting contrary to International Law. He said:

> We are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps are already on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, that is contrary to the dictates of international law. . . . The wrong—I speak openly—that we are committing we will endeavor to make good as soon as our military goal has been reached. Anyone who is threatened as we are threat-

ened, and is fighting for his highest possessions, can only have one thought—how he is to hack his way through.

Before the French Revolution the Duchy of Luxemburg had been subject to Austria. At the Peace of 1814 it was given to the King of Holland, as an offset for the ancient possessions of his family in Nassau. The Congress of Vienna (1814–15) decided that, on behalf of the Germanic Confederation, just formed, all the lands between the Meuse and the Rhine should be held by Prussian troops. Later the Grand Duchy also joined the Prussian Customs Union.

In 1866 the Germanic Federation came to an end. Though Napoleon III. proposed that Luxemburg should be annexed to France (in 1871 Thiers made the same proposal), the little State was already more German than French. Austria suggested that it be united with Belgium, which, in its turn, might cede a small section to France. This arrangement would have been accepted by both France and Germany and might possibly have averted the war between them four years later. But it was not accepted by the Belgian King who would not part with any of his territory even if he might gain other equally good territory. Accordingly, Prussia, acknowledging that her troops should now be retired, proposed an arrangement which did her great credit, namely, that the Grand Duchy should be perpetually neutralized

under the Powers' collective guaranty. This was done in 1867 by a treaty signed at London by England, Austria, France, Prussia and Russia.

Until the violation of Luxemburg's neutrality by the very Power which brought it about, the only similar occurrence took place in 1870 when the German Government called attention to the fact that, though a neutral state is bound to refuse to grant a right of passage to a belligerent, both France and Luxemburg had violated the neutrality by giving facilities to French soldiers to return to France.

Why is not the violation of Luxemburg territory just as much a cause for war as the violation of Belgian territory? Why is it not really more of a violation?—since Luxemburg is helpless and cannot defend her rights?—a striking plea for the strong man armed!

Why did not England, a signatory to the Luxemburg neutrality treaty, immediately protest? Why did not France, another signatory, protest?—especially France, Luxemburg's next-door neighbor and the Power most immediately concerned. France had thus cause for proceeding to war, even if on that very day she were not directly proceeding to it.

Finally, why did not our own Government protest? It was a signatory to the Hague Convention which promised that the territory of the neutral powers should be inviolable. Did we not consider ourselves

also bound to see that the regulations were actually observed? Or did we think that the later clause as to our freedom from entangling European alliances excused us?

Now as to Belgium.

In 1830 Belgium revolted from Holland and established her own independence.

In 1831, England, Austria, France, Prussia and Russia declared, by the Treaty of London, that Belgium was not only an independent but also a neutral state. This was reaffirmed in 1839.

In 1866, so it was alleged, M. Benedetti, the French representative in Prussia, proposed that, as an offset for the Prussian conquest of Schleswig, Prussia should assist France in acquiring Belgium! This proposal however had the effect some years later of bringing about a new Treaty (1870) by which it was agreed that if either France or Prussia violated Belgian territory, England would unite with the other in its defence. A cartoon in *Punch* for August of that year shows England, armed, encouraging Belgium with the words "Trust me. Let us hope they won't trouble you, dear friend. But if they do——"

The Treaty of 1870 guaranteeing Belgian neutrality laid a duty upon England which the Luxemburg Treaty did not. The Belgian Treaty guaranty is an

individual one, by which England binds herself to co-operate with the one contracting Power when the other contracting Power violates Belgian territory. The Luxemburg Treaty on the other hand was a *collective* contract, by which England with certain cosignatories agreed to protect Luxemburg's neutrality.

Finally, in addition to the above Treaties, the Hague Convention of 1907 reaffirms these principles concerning "The Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in War on Land":

(1) The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable.

(2) Belligerents are forbidden to move across the territory of a neutral power troops or convoys, either of munitions of war or supplies.

Despite these Treaties, on July 24th, Belgium valiantly made preparations to meet a possible invasion. (Belgian Grey Book, 2.) Germany said that "it depended on the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but that when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany." (British White Paper, 85.)

When our own Government learned this, why did it not immediately protest under the Hague Convention? Did it abstain, also under that Convention?

On July 31st innocent Belgium declared that she would do her utmost to defend her neutrality. (Belgian Grey Book, 11.)

On the same date England asked France and Germany if they would respect Belgian neutrality. (British White Paper, 114.) The reply of France was as follows:

> The French Government is resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure the defence of her security, to act otherwise. (British White Paper, 125.)

The reply of Germany was the expression of a doubt as to whether any answer could really be given at all, because any reply would not fail, in the event of war, to disclose to a certain extent part of the German plan of campaign! This was as much as to say that the German Government expected the German Army to cross Belgium.

In truth, neither the French nor the German assurances respecting Belgian neutrality indicated that there had been any realization that the promise to respect neutrality might be supposed to be absolute, not relative. Indeed, the question was, in the minds of some: Who would get there first?

Though I have as yet seen no documentary proof,

the Germans claim that the French got there first, that the French troops crossed into Belgium on August 1st—while on the 2d Germany was requesting Belgium's permission to cross a part of her territory—and that French officers were later captured by the Germans at Liège.

The German request to the Belgian Government was, however, both an ultimatum and a menace to inoffensive Belgium—a country which only asked to be let alone. It was for a free passage through Belgian territory, Germany promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, but threatening, in case of refusal, to treat Belgium as an enemy! An answer was requested within twelve hours. (Belgian Grey Book, 20, 22, 24.)

The Belgian Government categorically refused this insulting request, justly deeming it a flagrant violation of the Law of Nations.

On August 3d, King Albert of Belgium telegraphed to King George of England as follows:

> Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium. (British White Paper, 153; Belgian Grey Book, 25).

On the same day the German Chancellor said in his address to the Reichstag:

We have informed the English Government that, as long as England remains neutral, our fleet will not attack the northern coast of France and that we will not touch the territorial integrity and independence of Belgium. These assurances I now repeat before the world and I may add that, as long as England remains neutral we would also be willing, upon reciprocity being assured, to take no war-like measures against French commercial shipping.

The German Government also instructed Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London, as follows:

Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. . . . Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance. (British White Paper, 157.)

On the same day, Sir Edward Grey thus telegraphed to the British Minister at Brussels:

You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart

from neutrality, His Majesty's Government expect that they will resist by any means in their power, and that His Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that His Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guaranty to maintain their independence and integrity in future years. (British White Paper, Despatch 155).

Sir Edward Grey instructed Sir Edward Goschen, British Minister at Berlin, to present this ultimatum:

We hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.

We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning be received here by 12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves. (British White Paper, 159.)

Now what are Treaties? Promises to be kept in fair weather and not in foul? Apparently, if we may believe Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg's words as reported by Sir Edward Goschen on learning the British Ambassador's instructions:

> He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word—"neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. (British Blue Book, 160.)

A scrap of paper! The words will return to plague him who uttered them. And they will return to plague every Government and individual that takes advantage of the infamous old adage, "Might makes Right."

The German Army has invaded Belgium. It has captured Liège, Brussels, Namur and other places. In all this, as we foreigners in Germany at the time openly charged, it has defied international ethics. Our German friends mournfully admitted the truth of all this, explaining on behalf of the Government that dire necessity forced it to such action.

Perhaps the German militarists might have thought twice had they realized what was to follow. Though sympathizing with France, England, so long as Belgian neutrality was kept inviolate, made no declaration of

war. But the moment when that neutrality was violated then England's duty, in the opinion of practically every Englishman, was clear. England could not permit a great Power openly to tear up the solemn promises which it had made with the rest of the Powers. With all his bluntness would Bismarck have broken Belgian neutrality? He did not do so in 1870 and why now?

If Germany is fighting to stem the tide of Slavism, so England is equally fighting for a great principle. If England wins, international law and international ethics will win.

But something else has come—inhumanity.

If the Germans had merely taken a small strip of Belgian territory at the south without injuring the inhabitants or being injured by them, the case for humanity would have been different. But, as in Germany we read of revolting outrages wreaked by Belgians on wounded German soldiers, here we read also of revolting reprisals wreaked by unwounded German soldiers upon Belgian men, women and children all over the kingdom. We hear of the bombardment of undefended towns. We hear of dreadful pillage, of the destruction of many unoffending homes; of churches, museums, schools, universities; of notable memorials of architecture, sculpture, painting and

stained glass. We hear of the levying of staggering contributions, of the seizure of funds belonging to private persons and local authorities, and of collective penalties for individual acts. Above all, we hear of the attempt to terrorize a country by bestial and brutal cruelty to its non-combatants.

And yet each of these things is prohibited by The Hague regulations as well as by common decency.

Doubtless most of the stories of atrocities, submitted by either side are exaggerations. But, even if a quarter were true, there would be the necessity for a tribunal (which we should convoke) of neutral judges to decide, after hearing evidence, as to the accuracy of the facts alleged and to take whatever action might be necessary to vindicate the authority of international law.

We thought the atrocities in the Balkan wars, whether committed by Turk or Bulgarian, incredible, and yet these committed in Belgium, are hardly characteristic even of the Gothic invaders of the Roman Empire. Of course, the responsibility rests upon the invaders of the Belgian Kingdom. The position of that Kingdom was likened the other day to that of a little boy who owns a boat. A rough fellow, who has agreed not to bother him, steps up and says: "Will you let me have your boat to row across the stream? No? Then I'll take it away, and if you interfere, I'll knock you on the head."

VIII

HOLLAND

[VLISSINGEN (FLUSHING), *30th August, 1914.*]

ARRIVING at The Hague in these days the first duty and privilege of most Americans is to go immediately to their Legation.

The Legation is no longer in the little house on the Lange Voorhout, next to the Hôtel des Indes, but further along and on the opposite side of that delightful drive, in a splendid mansion, with a charming garden at its back.

The spacious rooms of the Legation are full to overflowing with secretaries, clerks, stenographers, typewriters, messengers. At least six times their number of eager American travellers confronts them. All the travellers are bent on obtaining the very latest information concerning ways and means to get home. As in other cities on the Continent, there is, of course, a great rush of our countrymen and women to obtain information as to how to get their letters of credit and travellers' cheques cashed, and, if deprived of financial resources, how to "raise the wind." But the financial situation has now very much improved.

About everyone seems to have been provided for in some way or other. In its turn, the transportation situation has been improved and there is proportionate satisfaction.

It is noteworthy how, in a very short time, Dr. Henry van Dyke, our Minister to this country, has gathered about him a large and fine staff of young men. They are as busy as bees. They are working cheerfully and patiently from morning to midnight.

Indeed, the story of this war will not be entirely told without reference to the services rendered to the English and French and Germans and other nationals in belligerent countries by our Ambassadors and Ministers and Consuls in affording them protection as well as to our own countrymen and women there. Secondly, there must also be mention of the services rendered by the large number of unselfish Americans abroad who have spent themselves in personal service so that others might be benefited. Though Holland is belligerent territory for no one, the Legation at The Hague has been as overworked as has any Embassy or Consulate anywhere, this chiefly because of the many thousands of Americans who have come northwards into this happy neutral land with its neutral ports.

Arriving in Holland from Germany we expected that, because we were entering a neutral country,

we would not see much military activity. Quite the contrary was the fact. There seemed, in proportion, just as much as in Germany. For Holland, though not at war with anyone, has been mobilizing too—against a possible emergency—and the mobilization has been carried out with efficient energy. In a week's time, the active force has been trebled.

So far so good, though here, as in Germany, one quickly distinguishes the reserve troops from the regulars by their less soldierly air and, as is natural, also by a less aloofness from the civilians.

It seemed necessary to the Dutch Government to mobilize without delay. We learned about this at first hand for into the first-class compartment of our railway carriage to-day there came officers and soldiers too. If the soldiers are too many for the third class, then they overflow into the second, and if too many for the second then into the first. It is always more interesting to me, however, when travelling alone, to go third class, both for economy and because one learns to know the people better.

We talked with the soldiers and the officers and so got acquainted with the Dutch nation in arms. Should it come to war between Holland and any other country, the Dutch, I have no doubt, would show themselves worthy of their heroic history. As far as readiness is concerned, they have already done so.

The feeling here is fierce for defence against any violation of Dutch neutrality, whether of territory or trade.

If, for instance, Germany or England should act out of harmony with The Hague Convention by sowing mines in the North Sea without regard for the rights of neutral commercial shipping, but especially if Germany should repeat in Holland her action in Belgium of violating neutral territory, the Dutch course would be indicated by the words of Dr. Colenrander, the historian, in the current *Gids*. He says:

Deeply shocked, Holland extends its sincerest sympathy to Belgium, so heavily overtaken in defending a right for which we also, in the event of that right being contested, must stand or fall. Hostile bullets shall torture our flesh less if we defend our principles than would remorse of conscience, should we forsake our duty. For our part we can still say "Peace and Right," while standing armed.

But there has been something else than violation of Belgian territory and concerning it Dutch opinion is justly no less stern. We find it expressed in the leading weekly paper of Amsterdam, the *Weekblad voor Nederland:*

Louvain, the wonderful Louvain, has been devastated and the people have been slaughtered or driven away, devastated by the German army, whose business, we are told, is to defend *Kultur* against Russian barbarism.

Dear good German friends, we weep for wonderful Lou-

vain, we weep for the Belgians, but we weep still more for you. If the Russians in the north-east of Germany were now to take vengeance, a town for a town and a peasant for a peasant—why, it would be terrible for the whole civilized world, and the very thought makes us shudder. But you, what would you be able to say?

An equally grim course may be expected by England, should she, in line with her long ago oppression of Holland, molest Dutch commerce by any unwarrantable stopping of Dutch passenger steamers to search for contraband. Of course, with such a case as has been recently reported, when it was known that German army reservists were on board a Dutch ship, Holland has nothing to say. But she has something to say whenever she thinks her trade-rights unreasonably affected, as, for instance, when the English papers demand that Holland should not sell grain to Germany. The Dutch resent this. If a Rotterdam merchant gets grain from America, they say, why should he not resell it to some German client for the use of the German people? Incidentally, both England and Germany are relying on regular supplies of Dutch cattle, sheep, eggs, and butter, and this year Holland's wealth in all these commodities is fortunately unusually great.

But this is not the only irritation from England.

The suggestion has actually been made there that the English should send troops to Belgium through

the mouth of the Scheldt, which belongs to Holland, up the river to succor Antwerp, which of course belongs to Belgium. The Dutch monopoly of navigation on the Scheldt was admitted by the nations as far back as the Treaty of Münster (1648) and when, in 1792, France attempted to throw down her gauntlet to England by opening the river to all nations, William Pitt thus replied:

> With regard to the Scheldt France can have no right to annul existing stipulations, unless she also have the right to set aside equally the other treaties between all Powers of Europe and all the other rights of England and her allies.

And, incredible as it may seem, the further suggestion has been made that the English might protect Dutch neutrality as against a possible German attack by sending their own soldiers thither—hardly realizing, of course, that if they are now avenging the German violation of Belgian neutrality, their own proposal would violate Dutch neutrality.

Accordingly the Dutch have seen that it was high time to be ready to resist either German or English interference. As to the English, the Dutch Government has placed the whole coast in a condition of complete defence and is now about to emphasize it by declaring as in a state of siege this very port of Vlissingen (Flushing), where a fine large German steamer is lying moored, and also the ports of Texel, Terschelling,

Harlingen, Hellevoetsluys and part of the port of the Hook of Holland. The object of this action is to prevent the departure from these ports of ships owned or chartered by belligerent Powers when there is intention to use those vessels for war purposes; such departures would infringe on Dutch neutrality.

In the same way, as against any possible continental aggression, the famous waterlines can be used. The line nearest Germany is known as the Grebbe. It runs due south from the Zuiderzee through Amersfoort to the river Waal; it is some ten miles wide and about seventy long. The other similar line runs from the Zuiderzee through Utrecht to the Meuse—the Maas, as they say here. The territory covered by these lines can quickly be flooded as a whole or by sections. There should also be mentioned the water defence of Amsterdam, a place, because of this, in perhaps the strongest military position of any city in the world.

All these waterlines are defended by inner forts. In case of flooding these forts would emerge like so many islands. And the flooding would leave North Holland as one great island. In its turn this region itself could also be flooded by sections. Speaking of North Holland, who can forget that chapter in Motley's History which describes the raising of the siege of Leyden (1574) by means of the cutting down of the seaward dykes?

And, speaking of forts, as we crossed the border into

Holland from Germany, the windows of our railway carriages were closed and kept closed while we passed through the Dutch frontier forts, lest something should be thrown out of those windows!

Again, yesterday, for miles outside the fortified city of Utrecht, we noted that the Government had forced the people in all the surrounding territory to abandon their homes and that the noble old trees had been cut down all along the highways so that from his fortress the Dutchman might have a wider view of the immediate countryside. In order to have an entirely unobstructed space the houses had been mined and could be quickly blown to pieces by underground signal lines from the fortress.

England's interference, if any, with Dutch affairs, would be largely of the commercial character above indicated. But Germany's interference, it has been said, might have land-hunger and sea-facilities as a motive.

Yet it is difficult to see just why Germany should want Holland. The Fatherland needs an additional outlet to the sea, but it needs it on the Adriatic. As to the Baltic and North Seas it has all the necessary frontier and harbor facilities. Especially is this true of the mouths of the Rhine. Any extension of her North Sea frontier would only expose Germany the more to a possible attack from the greatest sea-power,

Britain. Holland now shields Germany from that Power.

The English grant all this, but they do not fail to point out that Germany, if in possession of Holland, would have certain strategic advantages which might partially offset the certain strategic disadvantages above noted—that is to say Germany might use the Frisian Islands as a screen, from the rear of which torpedo craft could issue to damage the British fleet, and that the flat country of the mainland would make an ideal landing place for aircraft.

So much from the military point of view. But there is another point of view than the military, and that is the racial. Has not Germany had enough experience in trying to rule the Danes, Poles, and French within her borders? Why should she want the Dutch too?

Either English or German interference would immediately and permanently exasperate the hardy Dutchman, jealous of his rights, dearly won against both man and nature.

All nations should keep their hands off Holland. The Dutch may be a small folk in quantity. But they are high in quality. In the days of William the Silent they showed of what mettle they were made. And now their spirit is, I believe, as independent, resourceful, and heroic as ever.

IX

ENGLAND: THE ARMY

[OXFORD, *7th September, 1914.*]

TO-DAY I entered Balliol Quadrangle. I saw a sight which I can never forget. That College is supposed to be the most intellectual of any here. It was long presided over by the great Jowett, the Vice-Chancellor of the University in my day.

To-day on the grassy plot surrounded by beautiful Gothic architecture—seemingly the serenest spot in Oxford—one no longer sees a Don in cap and gown crossing from one side to another. Instead, there is a group of young men drilling so that they may become soldiers. What likely lads! As I attempted to cross the "Quad" a sentry challenged me and said: "Very sorry, Sir. Visits no longer permitted. College is under military rule."

In busy, noisy London it seems appropriate that there should be numerous recruiting stations and that drilling should be going on briskly. But here, in quiet, academic old Oxford! At first one does not get accustomed to it, but, before long, one begins to see that Oxford is peculiarly the place for the acquirement,

not only of privates, but of officers for the British Army.

Indeed, as fine work has been done here in strengthening the Army as anywhere. There is a popular supposition that the Universities may be expected to produce officers rather than privates. Surely in a country justly priding itself on its love of outdoor sports and especially here at Oxford, where we see fine types of youth, there should be very many young men well capable of being trained as soldiers and officers. Now the need of officers is specially great and will continue to be great as long as the war lasts. Hence, a University Board was organized to deal actively with the situation. The Board is composed of the Vice-Chancellor (Dr. T. B. Strong of Christchurch) and four other members. Three of these are also members of the Oxford University Officers Training Corps—a permanent institution. The members have been sitting every day to interview and report upon any candidates for a commission, and have been in daily communication with the War Office in London. The Training Corps has already done good work under peace conditions, and now, under war conditions, it is, with the Vice-Chancellor's approval, urging every able-bodied undergraduate to join it. Thus from time to time relays of men will be produced qualified to receive a commission and to take part in

the training of Lord Kitchener's successive new armies. Since the beginning of the war the Board has already nominated about twelve hundred men. Some thirty of them are destined for the Military School at Sandhurst, about fifty for commissions in the regular army, over two hundred for the Special Reserve, over four hundred for the Territorial Forces, and between four hundred and five hundred for Lord Kitchener's new army.

This quota does not, of course, exhaust the number of University men who have now joined the army; some have enlisted and some were already holding commissions in the Territorials when the war began.

Suggestions have been made to the Vice-Chancellor to close the University of Oxford entirely and so turn all the men into the ranks of the new army now being enrolled. But the Vice-Chancellor contends, first, that this would make an unappreciable difference to the recruiting now and, second, that it would extinguish for good all hope of a succession of officers. Turning to Cambridge the same opinion is found. The Cambridge University Board of Military Studies writes:

> We submit that it is one acknowledged duty of the Universities to furnish officers for the Army, and they are amply fulfilling that duty. The closing of the Universities would only increase the difficulty of training and selecting

the officers of the immediate future, and the supply of such officers would be seriously imperilled if young University men were indiscriminately encouraged to join the ranks.

To show the enthusiasm among Oxford men, I would add the report of a special inquiry made at Oriel College. Of 129 men in residence there last term, nearly 100 have volunteered in some form or other, and of those who have not, some are Rhodes Scholars who have already gone home, some are on the sick list and some are in Holy Orders.

The War Office has now sanctioned the formation of units in which the so-called Public School lads may enlist under conditions similar to those in the Regular Army. In England these schools are not the common schools we know at home but are great institutions like Eton, Winchester, Rugby, Harrow, Westminster, Marlborough, Uppingham, Clifton, Rossall, Bedford. The "old boys" from these institutions have made a splendid response. They have been gathered—nearly 1,000 of them—at the town of Epsom, famous hitherto for the "Derby." The paddock has seen many assemblages of race horses on Derby day and the appurtenances on the Downs have hitherto known only stable boys and trainers. Another kind of trainer has now come to the fore. The paddock is now transformed into a camp. The equipment on the rolling

uplands is now used not to make horses but to make men robust. As soon as the lads number 1,100, they will have become a unit which, when trained, will be available for service at home or abroad. Their name is to be the Special Public School Corps.

It is to be hoped that certain battalions will be identified with certain schools. Thus the competition which has always obtained, would be put to good use. Winchester, for instance, would not expect to be a whit behind Eton in smart appearance or marching, any more than it has ever supposed itself to be behind Eton in anything!

If this be true of the public school battalions, it is also true, on a larger scale, with provincial representation. The various old territorial designations of British regiments have also had a distinct sentimental and material value in rousing enthusiasm. This should be made the most of at the present time. No one who has visited the various districts of the United Kingdom can be in any doubt that a prime cause of the success of the recruiting so far has been the appeal to very local patriotism, to the emulation between district and district, between town and town. In addition, it is only natural that men from the same part of the countryside should wish, if possible, to serve together; hence the pleasant name one hears nowadays, "Pals' Battalions."

The scene in Balliol "Quad" reminded me of a similar one I saw the other day in Lincoln's Inn, London, that quiet oasis between Holborn and the Strand. Lincoln's Inn has always been associated in my mind only with young men quietly studying law and with older men as quietly administering it. But the splendid Library and the long rows of chambers now look down on squads of lads drilling in the open. Some of them are already in khaki; others only in their shirt sleeves.

In many other places in London drilling is in progress; on Somerset House Terrace, at the Horse Guards Parade, at the Knightsbridge and at the Albany Barracks, for instance. In Tottenham Court Road, too—that symbol of the purely commercial and the non-military—there is one great mark of the uncommercial and the military. It is found in and about the massive Young Men's Christian Association Building. That building has become a centre for the Territorials—those Volunteers who, in any event, go into camp every year. But specially this year! The Young Men's Association is offering special facilities for training to men who have tried to enlist in the Army and have been rejected because their physical development has not been up to the required standard. Special classes are therefore held in the Association Building in the evening, and any

man may get his training in them without charge if he can produce satisfactory evidence that he has been rejected and if it is thought that, with training, he would be likely to reach the required standard.

You pass through Tottenham Court Road into Oxford Street and Regent Street. In many of the shop windows and on all public taxicabs and 'buses are such printed appeals as these, in large letters:

A CALL TO ARMS.

TO ARMS FOR KING AND COUNTRY!

YOUR COUNTRY NEEDS YOU!

ENGLAND EXPECTS EVERY MAN TO DO HIS DUTY.

LORD KITCHENER WANTS 100,000 MORE VOLUNTEERS.

JOIN THE ARMY TILL THE WAR IS OVER.

And then, more rarely, such a pithy, appealing notice as this to any Britisher of backbone:

UP TILL NOW YOU HAVE LOOKED ON AT THE GAME. WE CALL UPON YOU TO PLAY IT NOW. FORWARDS WANTED! NO BACKS! PLAY UP!

And then, above all, this one:

COME NOW, DON'T HAVE TO BE FETCHED! THE PEOPLE WILL LOOK AFTER YOUR HOMES.

Just how any Englishman, who believes in his

country's cause, can withstand this last appeal is beyond me.

However, that sharp critic among weekly papers, *Truth*, warns thus:

The average Briton, especially of the working class, is rather a shy and wary bird, extremely suspicious of anything resembling chaff. He mistrusts attempts to work upon his feelings by high-sounding phrases; and he is accustomed to size-up posters at election times. "Your King and country need you" frequently leaves him unmoved, occasionally even evokes derisive retorts; I am sorry to say I have heard them. If you want to influence such a man you must use other methods than those of the patent medicine vendor. You must approach him as a reasonable being through his understanding and his deep convictions. In that way you will not approach him in vain. The people of this country have as strong a sense of community of interest and mutual dependence as any in the world, and are as capable as any of heroic sacrifices in a cause which they understand. They are all of the same flesh and blood and spirit as our soldiers and sailors who are bearing themselves so bravely on land and sea. They will not fail to respond to any call of duty when it strikes the right note; but they will not dance if you pipe to them in the wrong tune.

Then there are other and rather more commercial appeals in the shop windows. In a Piccadilly cigar emporium there is this:

ALL TOBACCO AND CIGARS FOR THE CONTINENT ARE NOW DUTY FREE. REMEMBER OUR MEN AT THE FRONT.

And then there is still another kind of appeal:

YOU DON'T WANT US TO CLOSE UP BECAUSE OF THE WAR, DO YOU? 250 EMPLOYEES ARE DEPENDENT FOR THEIR DAILY BREAD ON THIS ESTABLISHMENT. PATRONIZE US INSTEAD OF BUYING GOODS "MADE IN GERMANY."

But the recruiting's the thing. It is going bravely forward and an additional fillip is given wherever a band is present outside the Recruiting Office, playing patriotic airs. Several orchestras make a point of accompanying, without charge, the various contingents from the London Central Recruiting Depot in Great Scotland Yard to the railway station.

Yet with all the recruiting, there come to us who have been in Germany two convictions.

The first is that these preparations are being made much too long after the war has begun. For London differs patently from Berlin in this, that all its young men have *not* been sent to the front.

The second is that the preparations are meeting with inadequate response. Day before yesterday was London's largest recruiting day—four thousand men joined the ranks!—and there has been fatuous self-complacency in consequence. Though the total of recruits will doubtless in a few days exceed half a million, this is small compared with the number in Germany.

The conditions of recruiting in England of course bring up the question of conscription. The advocates of that system declare that it is the only way to make "every man do his duty," but that nothing less than the imminent and vital danger of the present crisis will burst the bonds of the old voluntary system. That system, say the conscriptionists, simply means that English manhood is resolved not to defend England and even to contribute as little as possible towards paying others to undertake that duty. Hence, if we may believe this, the English are both poltroons and mean men. The conscriptionists repel the insinuation that they would bring England under the despotic Prussian militarism. No, the conscriptionists are moved, they say, only by the double consciousness of a great national danger to be faced and a great national advantage to be gained.

Moreover, they add, the organization, discipline and success of the German army during the century from 1813 to the present time is due, not to "machine methods" but to a realization of such a national danger to be faced and a national advantage to be won.

The party in favor of conscription is led by Britain's most famous soldier, Earl Roberts. Every word which he has spoken for years past about the menace of war has now come true. Every warning he has given has been justified.

All will agree with him that it is the duty of every man, high or low, rich or poor, to defend his country in case of national danger. But not all Englishmen have agreed with him that, to prepare for this duty, there should be universal training for military service in time of peace; that there should be not only physical training in all the schools but that all boys up to the age of eighteen should undergo some military discipline. Still fewer Englishmen have believed with Lord Roberts that for all able-bodied youths between eighteen and twenty-one there should be a continuous training of at least four months for the infantry, with longer periods for other arms and that, after this training, the men should serve in the Territorial Force for three years. But now, Lord Roberts is magnanimous enough not to say "I told you so," though the extra strain on the nation, because it had not a large enough trained force at the start, has cost thousands of lives and millions of money.

More and more the weight of Lord Roberts's opinion is being borne in upon the English people. And yet they are still standing loyally by their voluntary system.

The advocates of that system point to the fact that already not only have a very great number of men enlisted, but that because they have spontaneously done so and have not been dragooned into it, there is

a resultant quality of enthusiasm which makes each volunteer worth any two conscripts. Is not this shown, they urge, by the fact that the British turned the tide of German advance in France?

Furthermore, these advocates add, the Government's call for another half million men has a moral ring impossible to obtain by the conscript system.

However this be, the desirability of giving city lads out-of-door training, whether by the conscript or the voluntary system, is evident. It is a pleasure to see in Hyde Park or Regent's Park the pale counting-room faces becoming rosier. When we speak of British lads, we generally think of a ruddy-faced Rugby boy or of a stalwart young Guardsman; we do not always remember the lads bending over ledgers in the City.

And there is another thing. Under Lord Kitchener's expert yet elastic guidance, the War Office is showing an unheard-of adaptability to circumstances. We have seen this in its relations to the Universities and to the Public Schools and to the recruits in general.

Finally, any account of present conditions here would be incomplete without mention of its most picturesque element—the Boy Scouts. They have suddenly leaped into the limelight. They occupy the very front of the stage. Their unostentatious behavior and yet their eager thirst to "do something" has

endeared them both to the civil and to the military elements of the population. No one can walk from St. James' Palace across the Park to Wellington Barracks and thence to Whitehall Place without being convinced that in the Boy Scouts England possesses the very kernel of her next army.

There are something like 4,000 Scouts in London alone. They lend a hand in practically every activity. Their charming uniform is the most welcome sight in any street and redeems instantly whatever there is of the dingy in it. One looks up and down the street nowadays, indeed, to see if he cannot discern some lithe figure approaching in slouch hat and colored neckerchief and khaki shirt—a bit of ribbon floating from the shoulder—and then the bare knees to give the last touch to the picture. The Scout seems the cheerfullest thing in England.

The Scout system means discipline as well as cheer. The other day a gentleman attempted to cross a bridge in the country. Beside the bridge stood a Boy Scout. He warned the gentleman not to cross. But the gentleman was not to be held back.

The boy objected: "I have orders to prevent anyone crossing this bridge."

"But how are you going to prevent me?" said the gentleman.

Instantly the boy whipped out a whistle and blew

it, and in less time than it takes to tell it, Scouts began to appear from all quarters until forty of them had gathered on the spot.

The gentleman did not cross the bridge.

X

ENGLAND: THE GOVERNMENT

[LONDON, *14th September, 1914.*]

WHY is England involved in this war?

She went far in agreeing to protect France. But that led to no formal declaration of war.

She is now going farther in the fulfilment of her treaty to protect Belgium and about that there was indeed a formal belligerent statement.

But, treaty or no treaty, England is really at war, I believe, because she could not sit with folded arms and see a small, next-door neighbor oppressed.

From her enviably insular vantage-point, England always takes a wide view of any continental situation. She enjoys a peculiarly proper perspective. It is true, that she does not always act wisely upon it, as, for instance, in the cases of Denmark, the Crimean War, Armenia. But she generally does.

Hence, England was not blinded by the immediate cause of the present conflagration. She did not minimize the far-reaching effect of the murder at Sarajevo of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir

to the Austrian throne. She knew that the murder struck at the very heart of the Dual Monarchy.

But the conflagration had had other causes—causes to be found as far back as the Prussian seizure of Schleswig (1864), as the Italian redemption of Venetia (1866), as the Franco-German war (1870), as the Russo-French mutual-aid society (1875), as the Russian resentment at the action of the Congress of Berlin (1878), as the Austro-German alliance (1879), as the Triple Alliance (1882), as Bismarck's fall (1890), as the Anglo-French Entente (1904) and as the Anglo-Russian Entente (1907).

So much for the causes of the conflagration in general. As to the particular countries involved—Servia, Austria, Russia, Germany, France, Belgium—England has really cherished few illusions. Her geographical position, added to that poise in her best statesmen, which prevents their being swept off their feet, gives to her a peculiar advantage in dealing with the nations of Europe. They have been to her, like the inhabitants of so many rooms in a house, the wall of which has suddenly fallen down, leaving the occupants of the various chambers exposed in all their simplicity of action or intrigue.

In Servia, for instance, England sees a small but energetic state. In it regicide seems a profession. Its policy for a decade has been, by methods of con-

spiracy and assassination, to wrest from Austria-Hungary all the Serb lands in her dominions.

In Austria-Hungary England beholds a power which, as an offset for the loss of Venetia, had long been looking southward, expecting to develop the region from her boundary to the Ægean port of Salonika. But this hope had recently been disappointed, first by the plan of Servian transportation East-and-West, instigated by Russia, and, second, by the expansion of Servian territory, the result of the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913. And now was added the murder of the heir to the Austrian throne, alleged to have been committed by Servian agents. Could Austrian foreign policy, often ill-advised, be trusted to treat with this trying situation?

In Russia, England sees the only Great Power in Europe standing for a retrograde, autocratic and despotic civilization, as shown by the Cossack with his whip, by the Jewish pogrom, above all, by the smothering of rights solemnly assured by successive Tsars to the Finns. Of what greater value then, is Russia's promise, *after* this conflagration breaks out, to revive the Kingdom of Poland, which she destroyed in the eighteenth century? The move is more likely an attempt to incite Austrian and Prussian Poland to rise. On the other hand, England does not forget that the present Tsar proposed a Peace Conference at

The Hague and that Russia is the recognized head of the Slav nations. To the British the value of these facts cannot be changed by unjustifiable aggressions, by Russia in the Far East, not even by Russia's practical transformation of North Persia into a Russian province—consequent upon the Anglo-Russian Entente itself! Britons also take note of the fact that the Entente has somewhat overcome anti-British sentiment in Russia, but that anti-German sentiment has been increasingly evident since Bismarck's fall from power in 1890; indeed, it was evident enough in 1872 when, by the Dreikaiserbund, he united Russia, Germany, and Austria; in 1888, however, when William II. became Emperor, Germany's policy became ever more closely in touch with Austria's and proportionately less with Russia's.

In Germany England sees a Power which has made strides second to none in the domains of philosophy, science, art. Germany's advance in trade has also latterly been prodigious, not only at home but in many parts of the world where German commerce has outdistanced British commerce—even in the British Colonies themselves. German manufactures have come into such competition with the British as in certain instances successfully to invade its very home market. German passenger steamers between Europe and America have been doing a larger business than

have the British. In short, Germany has made the greatest proportionate progress in material prosperity ever achieved by any nation. But, hardest of all for Britons to bear is the fact that the German naval advance has severely tested the resources of the British Navy in maintaining a British sixty per cent. superiority over any other. The aggressive building of a great German navy could of course not be ignored by the mistress of the seas. One reason for a greater German Navy was to protect German colonies, the chief of which was to be that in Asia Minor. To this end the development southward of Germany's ally, Austria, was all to the benefit of such colonial ambition. Thus Germany had an additional reason to stand alongside her ally at the time of the Bosnian annexation. In Germany England also beholds a Power which has practically doubled its population since the Franco-German war, while that of France has stood still. Germany needs room for expansion. Finally, in Germany England sees for the most part a powerful bureaucracy limiting individual liberty. Germany, England thinks, would impose her organization on the rest of the world by force, no matter how any other nations might want to maintain their individual institutions. In particular, England fears that the Pan Germans, in their dream of world dominion, would supplant the British Empire, with its popu-

lar institutions, by the rigid undemocratic Prussian system now fastened upon the German Empire.

In France, England now beholds a *preux chevalier*. The history of modern France with America, Greece, Italy, shows how she has, from time to time, defended the cause of smaller states. But England also beholds a Power with whom, during the last generation, she has been at very close range, first in a friendly way, then in an unfriendly, and, finally, in a friendly way again. In the common exercise of financial and economic authority in Egypt, England and France had worked hand in hand. Then came the Arabi rebellion. It was necessary to display the mailed fist. The French Government refused to work with the English. The English accomplished their task alone and France remained in a condition of pout for twenty-two years! At first there were ominous signs that the French were not going to remain satisfied with mere diplomatic dealings, and yet, by their increasing interest in another part of Africa, the French were to be brought to a full recognition of England's present position in Egypt. Never cherishing any illusions as to French frailties of temperament, the English did conclude with France an entente which has nobly stood the test of time.

Finally, in Belgium, England sees a little country, but proportionately the most populous, wealthy

and industrious in Europe. In Caesar's time it was one of the parts of Gaul. When Holland attained an acknowledged independence in 1648, Belgium was known as the Spanish Netherlands, and in the eighteenth century, as the Austrian Netherlands. In 1815, however, Holland, confirmed by the Powers, received the Austrian Netherlands back into the Dutch fold and the new kingdom was known as the United Netherlands. In 1830 Belgium revolted, and in 1831 and 1839, at London, were framed the treaties guaranteeing Belgian neutrality which have formed the cause of England's going to war. To England Belgium herself means no more, indeed, I think, not as much as does Holland. But, when one speaks of Belgium nowadays, one thinks of *Treaty* and that is what England, from her vantage point, recognizes as Belgium's present significance to the world.

England has thus a detached, all-round view of European past history and present politics. Her Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, has steadily aimed, not only to compose immediate quarrels, on the Continent, whenever he could, whether racial or territorial or commercial, but, if possible, to remove the roots themselves of certain evils. What is now about to be written, therefore, is for the most part a eulogy of one of the great men of our time.

Sir Edward's aim was particularly evident at the

end of 1912, at the Congress held in London, to settle the Balkan dispute. His statesmanlike compromise pacified both Austria and Servia—and, for Servia, read Russia! The partial mobilizations of Russia and Austria were thus not increased to general mobilization, and the German Chancellor's generous praise of Sir Edward Grey was well in place:

> Europe will feel grateful to the English Foreign Minister for the extraordinary ability and conciliatory spirit with which he has conducted the discussions of the ambassadors in London and which constantly enabled him to bridge over difficulties.

When the present conflict began, Sir Edward Grey's efforts for peace were no less clever and strenuously urged, as was their due. And yet, despite them, some critics, roundly condemning Austria and Germany, in more mildly condemning the others, do not leave England entirely untouched.

Because, to go no further back, when the issue between Austria and Servia became acute, during the Bosnian annexation crisis, England, in the opinion of such critics, should have made a stiffer stand against Austria.

Because, in the Servian crisis of 1914, when Russia said to England: "We assume that you will not delay definitely to take your stand by the side of Russia," England did not commit herself by taking sides. In-

stead, she said that "it would be difficult to keep out if the war became general." (British White Paper, 6.) As a member of the Triple Entente, however, Russia must have surmised that England would eventually be found on the Russian side and hence may have felt that England was in a sense behind her when she crossed the German frontier.

But England did express the hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilizing. The Russian reply was the expression of a disbelief that Germany really wanted war, and the expression of a belief that Germany's attitude would be decided by England's and that if the British took their stand firmly with the Russians, there would be no war. England thereupon gave Russia a piece of advice which, if taken, might have prevented war. As we have seen, he warned that, if Russia mobilized, Germany would not be content with mere mobilization or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. (British White Paper, 17.)

This was exactly what happened. Russia was thus amply counselled in time and the particular English service in this direction should not be forgotten.

After the failure of the proposition to hold the Four-Power Conference, proposed by him, Sir Edward Grey thus summed up his efforts in that direction:

The German Government had said that they were favorable in principle to mediation between Russia and Austria if necessary. They seemed to think the particular method of conference, consultation or discussion, or even conversations *à quatre* in London too formal a method. I urged that the German Government should suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable. In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would press the button in the interests of peace. (British White Paper, 84.)

Sir Edward Grey had explained that his idea was not arbitration but a private and informal discussion (British White Paper, 67), and the suggestion had been put before Count Berchtold, Austrian Foreign Minister, who replied that Austria must decline any suggestion of negotiations on the basis of the Servian reply, nor could Austria accept the idea that a Four-Power Conference should take place among the less interested Powers on this subject. (British White Paper, Despatch 62.)

Sir Edward begged for special German mediation to induce Austria to consider the Servian answer, as sufficient, despite the fact that three days before Austria had declared the Servian answer to be in-

sufficient and had withdrawn her Ambassador from Belgrade. Germany transmitted the request to Austria, but Austria replied that the English suggestion had arrived too late, hostilities having already been begun. (German White Book, Exhibit 16.)

Learning that Austria had declined Russia's suggestion that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should discuss the conflict directly with the Russian Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey declared that "if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it." He added:

> It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav—a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea has always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. (British White Paper, 87.)

But this was apparently not believed at St. Petersburg for, according to the official *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, the Belgian Minister reported to his Government of the assurance claimed by Russia that Great Britain would take part in a war against Germany. (British White Paper, 6.) Be it noted that Sir Edward Grey had also said that Germany must not be misled "into any sense of false security." (British White Paper, 87.)

On the same day the German Chancellor had made a bid for English neutrality. (British White Paper,

85.) Despite his constant attempts at peace, Sir Edward Grey showed himself no peace-at-any-price man. He replied as follows:

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.

From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.

Altogether, apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.

Having said so much, it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavorable and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates.

You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be *ipso facto* improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good-will.

And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. (British White Paper, 101.)

But Sir Edward Grey did not despair even after this. The very next day (July 31) he telegraphed to Sir Edward Goschen as follows:

The stumbling-block hitherto has been Austrian mistrust of Servian assurances, and Russian mistrust of Austrian intentions with regard to the independence and integrity of Servia. It has occurred to me that, in the event of this mistrust preventing a solution being found by Vienna and St. Petersburgh, Germany might sound Vienna, and I would undertake to sound St. Petersburgh, whether it would be possible for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided that they did not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory. As your

Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her willingness to respect them. Russia might be informed by the four Powers that they would undertake to prevent Austrian demands going the length of impairing Servian sovereignty and integrity. All Powers would of course suspend further military operations or preparations. (British White Paper, 111.)

Later in the day, however, all these pacific proposals came to an end.

The German Government stated its discovery that Russia had been secretly mobilizing her whole land and sea strength, and this of course could only be against Germany. (German White Book, 24.) As we have seen, Russia had been warned by England, but had not heeded the warning.

Austria and Russia now resumed "conversations." Russia declared that, "if Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian territory . . . Russia undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude!" (Russian Orange Book, 67.) On the next day Sir Edward Grey telegraphed as follows to Sir Edward Goschen at Berlin:

I still believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little respite in time can be gained before any Great Power begins war.

The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to accept a basis of mediation which is not

open to the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia originally suggested.

Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse, and I hope that German Government may be able to make use of the Russian communications referred to above, in order to avoid tension. His Majesty's Government are carefully abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters. (British White Paper, 131.)

And also on August 1 in the same spirit, Sir Edward Grey thus informed the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg:

Information reaches me from a most reliable source that Austrian Government have informed German Government that though the situation has been changed by the mobilization of Russia they would, in full appreciation of the efforts of England for the preservation of peace, be ready to consider favorably my proposal for mediation between Austria and Servia. The effect of this acceptance would naturally be that the Austrian military action against Servia would continue for the present, and that the British Government would urge upon Russian Government to stop the mobilization of troops directed against Austria, in which case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which have been forced upon Austria by Russian mobilization. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say that if, in the consideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austria, Russia can agree to stop mobilization, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace. (British White Paper, 135.)

Meanwhile the Austrian Government had announced that it had no intention to impair the sovereign rights of Servia or to obtain territorial aggrandizement, and that the door "had not been banged" on all further "conversations." (British White Paper, 137.)

But the German ultimatum of July 31 and the Russian refusal to reply cut all this short and, as we have seen, the news of the Russian violation of German territory on August 1 caused war. (German White Book, Exhibits 24, 25, 26.)

Russia had made no treaty not to violate German territory, but Germany had made a treaty not to violate Belgian. Moreover this had been in conjunction with the other Powers, especially with England, a country inspired by the memories of the occasions when she tried to protect the small states, for instance, Holland, from the tyranny of Philip II. of Spain (1555–1598) and of Louis XIV. of France (1643–1715) and again when she protected not only Holland but also Piedmont (1796) and Portugal (1807), from the tyranny of Napoleon; again, when there were popular British agitations in favor of the Polish (1772, 1793–5, 1830, 1863), Italian (1848, 1860, 1870), Balkan (1875–6) and Finnish (1888–9, 1905, 1909, 1912) national movements.

And yet England has not always defended the rights of smaller states. As she cannot be too self-

righteous in reviewing the conquests by which her Empire has been built up, so, with the small states in particular, she may remember that, in 1652, her unfair Navigation Act led to her war with Holland. She may also recall her action in this country in the wars of 1776 and especially 1812, when the burning of Washington had even less justification than has the destruction at Louvain. Nor is her history with regard to Denmark in 1807 and again in 1864 above reproach. Had she prevented Bismarck from despoiling Denmark of the province of Schleswig, Germany would assuredly have acquired an enduring conviction of British readiness to espouse the cause of small sovereign nations. This conviction would have deepened with the years and would have indicated absolutely what England's course would be when Germany tore up a treaty concerning Belgium.

Yet, despite the rough-and-ready conquests that have signalized her Empire-making, England is accustomed to count the cost before she signs a treaty. Let her example instruct other nations, ours particularly included, which may feel disposed to enter upon all-embracing treaties or which may dare to disregard the duties implied under the Hague Convention!

Having once signed a treaty, it has been, as a rule, England's tradition to honor her own signature. Let that be an example too!

In regard to Treaty obligations, British history in general is characterized by William Pitt's statement:

> England will never consent that another country should arrogate the power of annulling at its pleasure the political system of Europe established by solemn treaty and guaranteed by the consent of the Powers.

But to return to the question with which we started: Why is England involved in this war? Aside from any obligation to France, she began it for two reasons:

First, because of the principle of the protection to smaller and neighboring states.

Second, to compel the fulfilment of a treaty, no matter with what state.

But England now has a third reason, namely, to restore to Belgium whatever can be made good of all that has been sacrificed. Unless Belgium receives redress and an enduring assurance against any recurrence of those wrongs, our progress in the enforcement of international law has retrograded by so much, indeed is gravely menaced.

Hence England has three reasons for being involved in the present war: (1) protection; (2) treaty obligation; (3) humanity.

XI

ENGLAND: THE PEOPLE

[LONDON, *21st September, 1914.*]

As one walks about the streets of London one cannot help wondering if the English are taking the war seriously enough.

Especially in viewing London streets in general from the top of a 'bus—from Whitechapel to Richmond, and from the Elephant and Castle to Hampstead Heath—one realizes more than ever the fact that this is indeed a nation of shopkeepers. Everywhere, a lively business seems to be going on in the shops just as usual, though it begins later in the morning than in more wide-awake America. Everywhere the streets seem just as crowded as ever by shoppers and taxicabs.

Yet in regard to commerce history gives no example, so far as I know, of such a general interruption of international intercourse and international trade as we are now seeing.

As far as England is concerned, its outward aspect, save in the cotton industry in the North, remains much the same as in normal times. But there are great

gaps in its commercial life to be made good as far as possible. For over half a million of the most able-bodied men in the United Kingdom have now been withdrawn from their work-a-day life.

The effect of the war on prices, however, both in Germany and England is in general gratifyingly evident by its absence.

At the outbreak of the war I was in Frankfort. Some dealers began to put up the prices of food. The municipal government thereupon announced that any effort by shopkeepers abnormally to raise prices would be at once followed by a closing of their shops by the police. This was actually carried out in some instances. A similar course was pursued in other cities. According to latest advices, the result has been that prices of most foodstuffs have not advanced much in Germany. There is as yet no great scarcity of food and the Germans anticipate none for a long time to come.

Here, conditions have been similar. This is the more remarkable because, while Germany can supply herself with grain of one kind or another, four-fifths of the British consumption of grain must come over-sea. The outlook for the future is also good as to prices, indeed, the Agricultural Consultative Committee of the British Government has stated that there is no logical reason for any inflation of price in

any of the more important articles of food with but one exception, namely sugar, of which more than half of the British supply comes from Germany.

There has been an increase of price, however, in one important commodity, namely, boots and shoes. As the war has stopped several sources of supply there has been an advance in the cost of leather, and a further rise is anticipated. Hence boot and shoe manufacturers are unable to use the same quality of leather as hitherto except at a higher price.

In London the effect of the war is seen mostly in the building trade. When the war began the labor dispute, having involved six months of idleness, had just been settled. Building operations had broken into widespread activity—as seen by such important structures in course of erection as the Government Office extension, the London County Hall, the Public Trustee Office, the Park Lane and Regent Palace Hotels. Alas that much of the work on these buildings should again be checked, this time by the war. The check indicates the hold which Germany has obtained on this particular industry for she supplies to England, among other things, girders, cement, window glass, electric fittings, ready-made doors and painters' colors.

But, in general, the people of these Isles have been wonderfully protected in their trade and industry

and especially in their cost of living. Do they fully realize what has protected them? Had it not been for the weighty if unobtrusive influence of their fleet there would be no so-called "free breakfast table" in England to-day.

Consider what the British Navy has already done to date. It has inflicted this loss on the Germans:

It has captured 88 ships with a tonnage of 338,000.

It has detained in British ports 102 ships with a tonnage of about 200,000.

It has detained in American ports 15 ships with a tonnage of 247,000.

It has detained in the Suez Canal 14 ships with a tonnage of 72,000.

In addition, the Allies have disposed of 168 ships with a tonnage of 283,000.

There is thus a total of 387 ships with a tonnage of 1,140,000!

Whatever the damage—and it is large—done by the German Navy to Russia, the damage to England is trifling in comparison with what the British Navy has been able to accomplish in crippling the Germans. Something over a dozen British ships, as reported, have so far been sunk by German cruisers. To this number must be added 24 British fishing vessels sunk by the Germans in the North Sea and from 15 to 20 British and foreign vessels blown up by mines.

The above, however, is by no means a full record of the effect of sea power as developed by the greatest Sea Power.

Under the British naval shield English armies, trained in England, have proceeded abroad.

Again, most British merchant vessels have been pursuing their usual avocations much as though a German Navy did not exist.

Hence, whatever has been the cost of the British Navy during the past hundred years, it has paid for itself several times over, I believe, in keeping down the price of food.

It is reported that Napoleon once said:

> The only way to prevent the Continental Powers from bridling you is for England to proceed in her proper sphere as an insular Power, possessing the command of the sea. . . . Your marine is the real force of your country, and one which, while you preserve it, will always render you powerful.

Some years ago, when it was necessary to increase the appropriations for the British Navy, there was an outcry on the part of Little Englanders, just as, for the increase of the American Navy, there has been an outcry on the part of Little Americans. Nothing is now being said, as far as I know, about the enormous cost of the British Navy! English men and especially English women, the providers for the homes, are only

too glad to think that by this mighty naval protection, they are still enabled to live at the old rate.

But I do not think that this people or any people appreciate what it means to be a sailor in these days. Every night the English sailor must cross mine-sown seas. Already there have been cases of consequent insanity.

The sinking of three large cruisers by the German submarine the other day is regarded here as perhaps the most distinctive event of the war so far—a war to be distinguished over all that have preceded it by the fighting under the water and in the air. Certainly, the loss of the three cruisers indicates the growing importance and deadliness of the submarines. Mighty as is the British Fleet, as it rides the waves, it must reckon with an under-sea force possibly mightier still.

There was no "possibly" in the view of Admiral Sir Percy Scott on this subject as expressed in a letter to the London *Times* last June when he said: "The introduction of the vessels that swim under the water has, in my opinion, entirely done away with the utility of the ships that swim on the top of the water." Certainly the case of the Birmingham, of the Pathfinder, of the Hela, and now of the three Cressys support the above view. For the submarine is peculiarly dangerous for two reasons, first because it is generally invisible, and second because of the increased accuracy

and power of its torpedo. The importance of the submarine as a menace is being shown by this war to be far greater than was ever before appreciated; it may be doubted, however, whether it will entirely do away "with the utility of the ships that swim on the top of the water."

Such events as those to which reference has been made ought to be enough to sober anyone and yet—though the street lights are lower for fear of Zeppelins —by night as well as by day London seems much the same. The restaurants, music-halls and theatres are all going at full blast—although the Opera House is shut—and the general character of the entertainments offered hardly affords the notion that the whole nation is taking the war very seriously. Some twenty odd theatres advertise in the *Times* and *Telegraph* and doubtless double their number do not advertise. In the list of plays the only very serious soldier-like piece is "Drake." There should be many "Drakes." We note the contrast with Munich, where all the theatres were closed except four small ones generally given over to farces and light comedy; now, however, they gave only such very serious and soldier-like pieces as "Minna von Barnhelm" and "Wilhelm Tell."

Despite appearances, however, it is hardly possible that the seven millions of London men, women and

children are going about their ordinary affairs as if there were no war—as if the war image had found no place for itself in their brains or their hearts.

One is tempted to think the same about that praiseworthy and essentially British feature of life—outdoor sport, though one observes the holiday crowds on the Thames and the sports taking place in the suburbs just as at any time.

Near Twickenham yesterday I saw the golfers at play, and the mention of the name golf gives an opportunity of saying that the lovers of this game have apparently acted more patriotically with regard to recruiting than have the followers of any other sport.

In the first place, at the outbreak of war, the principle was established that play by young men who could enlist should be discouraged.

In the second place it was decided that competitions should be stopped—and the meaning of this can be gathered when it is realized that this is the first time since the Royal and Ancient Club's Competitions were established in 1806, that any of them have been abandoned.

In the third place there was the question of the caddies. Many clubs not only paid the caddies' railway fare but gave them bonuses to enlist; I heard of one club which offered a £3 bonus to every one of its caddies who joined any branch of the Forces. The

Royal St. George's Golf Club, where the Championship took place last May (one of the two leading Golf Clubs in England) has now issued this admirable statement with respect to caddies:

> Until further notice no man who is eligible for enrolment in the Forces of the country will be employed as a caddie on this course, or allowed on the Club property, unless he can supply satisfactory evidence that the country will not accept his services.

Only old men and boys now act as caddies at Sandwich!

The Club is not only looking after the wives and families of any of its caddies and servants who may have joined the colors, but has also been foremost in the movement to put Golf Club houses at the disposal of the Army and Navy. As a rule, such houses, situated as they are amid open and healthy surroundings, having large rooms with ample kitchens and excellent sanitary provision, are quite ideal for such a purpose. One of the foremost Clubs of the London district—that at Stoke Poges—has offered to take in 25 convalescent or wounded men right away and, what is more, to supply the necessary medical staff.

Would that football might have shown some such record. At Stamford Bridge, the other day, when Chelsea played Sheffield, a crowd of about 30,000

people gathered. It is contended that this very fact is reason enough why football should be continued. If it were closed down, it is said, much more harm than good would result. The good that always results is emphasized by the fact that, more than any other outdoor game, football helps the participant or the onlooker to forget that we are living in grim and awful days! As football represents the keenest kind of competition it distracts proportionately; it does away with the doldrums. Hence the Football Association has decided to carry through its usual programme for the season. It is a satisfaction to note how the *Spectator* thus comments upon the decision:

> The mere continuance of spectacular football will hold under its spell at home hundreds of thousands of young men who ought to be in Lord Kitchener's Army. Every one of those "sweet little men" (a reference to Holmes's verses on those who stay at home though able to go to the front) will be a shirker.

Perhaps the Football Association will also be impervious to the irony between the lines of the answer of the Army Council to the Association's letter. In the letter the War Office was informed that the Association was prepared to request its members to stop the playing of matches if the authorities were of opinion that such a course was proper. After acknowledging the Association's proffered assistance in plac-

ing football grounds at the disposal of the Army and in obtaining recruits, the letter reads:

> The question whether the playing of matches should be entirely stopped is more a matter for the discretion of the Association. The Council . . . would deprecate anything being done which does not appear to be called for by the present situation. Should your Association decide to continue the playing of matches, the Council trust that arrangements will be made so as not to interfere with the facilities at present afforded to the recruiting authorities.
>
> The Council also suggest that the Association might take all steps in their power to press the need of the country for recruits upon spectators who are eligible for enlistment, and they would further venture to suggest that some portion of the gate money might be set aside for the charitable relief of the families and dependents of all soldiers and sailors who are serving in the present war.

The Rugby footballers and the Association footballers, who are amateurs and not of the class from which the professional football recruits are drawn, are not to be included in the above. Their men have joined the colors and are an example to the country. Far different is the example set by the Association players. Their men, physically fit, should fight for their country, but their employers entrench themselves behind the sanctity of contract. Think of several thousand well-trained, plucky men, simply kicking footballs about at this time!

The same plea—that of decreasing the strain on the

nation—has been put forward in regard to the continuance of racing. In accordance with the decision arrived at by the Jockey Club the autumn season at Newmarket opens to-day, as originally arranged. Any other decision, we read in the *Telegraph*, is "unthinkable," for in view of the very large number of persons dependent upon racing for their livelihood, the interests of the nation showed that such persons should be retained, as far as possible, in their usual vocations, "as otherwise they might be compelled in the near future to apply for relief to funds which will be urgently needed for cases of unavoidable distress. . . . The stewards and members of the Jockey Club have a duty to fulfil. They have discharged it in the best possible way and a vast community is grateful to them."

Why not say frankly that many men prefer to play at home rather than fight abroad?

If the above is true of the great popular sports, it is also true of the more individual out-of-door amusements. Everyone knows that the English excel all the world in the hunting field, but not all were prepared to read Sir Evelyn Wood's appeal to the Masters of Hounds not to stop hunting,—on the ground that hunting is a very important training for British officers, the very dash of British cavalry being attributable to it. This is, of course, one of the causes of

British cavalry dash. But there is hunting and shooting to do for Britons on the Continent rather than in England just now!

The English are not, as some Germans like to claim, mere commercialists and materialists, existing only for trade and sport. Like the Germans they exist also for social and religious service.

First, social. The English or the German municipality, in its social and civic work is lessoning the world, and not only from the standpoint of efficient organization. The underlying spirit and attitude are equally admirable. The adjective to describe this spirit would be in English, "cheerful"; in German, *gemüthlich.*

One notices the note of cheerfulness all through the social work of England. One notices it first of all in the endeavors for reform and justice made by the Labor Parties—for there are now two, the Laborites, pure and simple, and the Independent Laborites, the latter led by Ramsay Macdonald, M. P., formerly the leader of all the Laborites in Parliament.

This contagious cheerfulness has also to do with the success of such endeavors as those of Toynbee Hall and the People's Palace, and especially with the endeavors made to relieve the wounded and the needy because of the present war. Chief among these endeavors is, of course, the British Red Cross.

In this connection one might add that the women of England, by their efficient committee work in many directions, have proved their fitness for the ballot, in a far more compelling way than that shown by Mrs. Pankhurst and her followers.

Of course the cheerfulness is evident in the Salvation Army work, whether social or religious. Last Sunday I went to the Army Headquarters at Clapton Common in the northeast of London where the social side is strongly to the fore in the neighboring buildings devoted to "The Training School for Women," "The Mothers Hospital" and other similar works.

The note of cheerfulness is also evident in distinctly religious work, of course in that of the Church Army under the direction of Prebendary Carlile, in Billingsgate; also at Oxford House and in the labors of "The Brothers of the Divine Compassion" in the Whitechapel district; and at Rowntree Clifford's Mission in West Ham. English clergymen are not all ascetic and pre-Raphaelite looking! Most of them are hardy looking, sometimes they are decidedly thick-set like the traditional John Bull. And generally they are cheerful.

The question is now being widely discussed as to whether the clergy should enlist. So far as the clergy of the Church of England are concerned, the Archbishop of Canterbury as Primate of that Church says:

"The position and duties of a combatant are not appropriate in the case of one who has received Holy Orders." Nonconformists do not all agree. A number of their ministers are joining the recruits, believing that they are not betraying a higher trust but are playing the man. This, however, they do without the slightest criticism of other clergymen who feel that they must confine themselves to their spiritual functions. The question is increasingly being discussed, however, as to whether the clergyman who faces death along with his fellow soldiers may not commend the message of Christ with a unique power.

But this discussion impresses the American in London very little compared with the daily impression he obtains from the multitude of services every noon for intercessory prayer. The services are attended by many devout people, and it is always evident that among them some mother, sister, wife, sweetheart, has one particular soldier at the front for whom she is praying. No one can be insensible to this appeal to the deepest emotions of the soul. While, in every country involved, such appeals are being addressed to the Almighty, the very large number of places for prayer here in England seems suddenly to have been emphasized. Outside the church there is this legend, to inspire those, even, who are mere passers-by and who do not enter the sanctuary.

A CALL TO PRAYER
AT 12 NOON EVERY DAY

REMEMBER IN PRAYER
THE KING AND ALL IN AUTHORITY
OUR SAILORS, SOLDIERS, AND ALLIES,
THE SUFFERING, THE ANXIOUS,
THE SORROWFUL.

"The Lord our God be with us, as He was with our fathers."

As to the causes of war, when facts become known praise and blame will be more evenly meted out among all the nations. But, as one cannot now live in Germany without realizing that the people believe themselves engaged in a war of defence, so one cannot now live in England without realizing that the people believe themselves engaged in defending the rights of the small nations.

In their respective aims, the two peoples are animated by a sincere fervor and conviction.

However fundamental the aims, the war may break of its weight. The horror which it has created may ensure peace.

The result of this war will be social as much as strategical. In Germany there will come in time a keener appreciation of what English social and

parliamentary progress means. In England there will be a greater recognition of what has been accomplished in Germany, especially in the direction of self-respecting, so-called State Socialism. Each should modify and influence the other to their mutual advantage. As to measures of military defence, in both countries, especially in this, there must be a keener appreciation of organization and discipline. And that means, not merely a clever plan and sticking to your plan. The lazy nation, like the lazy man, will be sent to the rear.

But first have a good principle underlying the plan!

In one respect the German and English peoples are alike, namely, in the way in which they receive the tidings of war, whether of victories or defeats. In both nations the underlying attitude is one of dogged, unruffled equanimity resting on a genuine social conscience and religious trust.

Admirable as this is, it is also the grimmest thing about the whole war. For it means determination. The temper of these two peoples, the English and the German, is such that no effort and no sacrifice will be too much until each shall have finished that to which each has set its hand.

Whatever their governments may do or leave undone, and whatever the physical results of the war

may be, these nations, as apart from their governments, are too sincere ever to allow themselves to suffer spiritual defeat. Such peoples realize that Japanese legend of the heroes who never die; though their bodies fall, the multitude of their souls continues the assault. It is a crime that such peoples cannot always be united. Why should not America unite them and stand with them to preserve the world's peace?

XII

THE ENGLISH AND GERMAN PRESS

I. The English Press

[London, *29th September, 1914.*]

Atrocities have now happened, committed not by half-crazed Belgian civilians, but by German soldiers. Unfortunately, however, the stories have excited the reporters and editors of English newspapers to an unnatural pitch. News is printed which often turns out to be mere rumor.

For instance, the other night the *Pall Mall Gazette* and the *Westminster Gazette* had a detailed report of a revolting atrocity in Belgium. It related to an English nurse, alleged to have been killed by Germans with bestial cruelty. The following night the papers stated that the story was a hoax, that the nurse in question was actually in England and had never been in Belgium!

The affair shows the need to confirm all reported facts. An English statesman said the other day: "I do not believe three-quarters of the stories I see about atrocities. Some of them may be straight lies. More

are probably due to an unhinged mind." This is doubtless true, but the trouble is that the publication of every rumor makes the confiding reader feel that all the stories of atrocities may be true.

While rendering great service, both in reporting and in interpreting war news, the English newspapers sometimes disappoint their readers, even more than do the German papers because one expects more of the English Press than of any other.

First, on the reportorial side, American readers do not expect to find misstatements in British newspapers. And yet, in the London *Times* for September 4th (the English having had full command of cable agencies and the German none) we read:

> German news gets a long start of the more sober and veracious British intelligence.

And in the London *Daily News* of the same date:

> Her [Sweden's] interest in Finland is limited to an intenser form of that desire shared by every free people to see the Finnish people free and happy under the Russian Crown.

Or this from the London *Spectator* of September 4th:

> The affinity of Englishmen to Russians is natural, and cannot be suppressed.

Or this from *Truth* of September 2d:

> In a fortnight the Cossacks should be knocking at the gates of Berlin.

Or this remarkable adverb from the London *Times* of September 4th:

Their [the German] losses infinitely outnumber the casualties among the Allies.

At a later date the *Times* announces:

The whole structure (of Rheims Cathedral) has been wrecked.

On October 3d the *Saturday Review* makes the following announcement:

That England is an enemy to be destroyed by war is a maxim now accepted by the whole German people. We are not fighting a few Prussian officers and bureaucrats. We are fighting a furious nation, of one mind and heart.

And why should the London *Telegraph* of September 20th print the title "German Hypocrisy" above the following doubtless sincere announcement:

Fifty members of the Reichstag, Privy Councillors, and other members of the German Centre party have addressed to the Cardinals a pamphlet containing an ardent plea for the German cause. It declares that for forty years Germany has been the apostle of peace in Europe, and that she was compelled to go to war to defend her territory and that of Austria. It was, they say, the schismatic Russians who desired war. The Cardinals are requested to act as agents of the truth among the nations.

Now the English case is strong enough in all conscience. Why compromise it by misstatements, either in text or title?

Or why compromise it by making caricature take the place of cartoon, as has *Punch* recently—*Punch* generally so admirable—showing the Kaiser as he is not! As the eloquent preacher, the Rev. F. C. Spurr, said yesterday: "That's un-English; that's hitting below the belt."

On the other hand, one often notices an effort to be fair in reporting the news. An evidence in this direction—and, as well, a fine example of reportorial enterprise,—is the column published daily by the London *Times* and entitled "Through German Eyes"; in it various bits of news and opinion are translated from German journals.

On the reportorial side, however, English papers have to struggle with the Censor. They are complaining about this. They are, they say, not treated fairly. The censorship suppressed, they assert, any mention of General von Hindenburg's victory over the Russians in East Prussia and the news only reached England through a casual letter printed in a provincial newspaper. Says the London *Daily News:*

Our own correspondents' accounts of the fall of the Liège forts were held up in London for days after the facts had been published both in Dutch and in German papers; on the other hand, other messages describing the heroic resistance of the fallen forts were passed, unchecked, on to an unsuspecting British public who alone in Europe was unaware that the resistance of which they were read-

ing had ended days before. All newspapers are anxious to co-operate with the Censor in the national interest. But we do desire very earnestly to urge that there are dangers in a censorship which irritates neutrals unnecessarily and conceals from the British public what is known to the rest of the world.

The same journal thus protests against the suppression of the war correspondent:

At the beginning of the war the Government devised a method of reconciling the nation's just demands with military interests, by accepting a list of war correspondents. These were to be under the control of a Press officer, and all their messages were to be censored before dispatch. They have bought horses, engaged servants, obtained equipment, and made all necessary arrangements. Two months of war have passed, but they have not been allowed to cross the seas. . . . The point of view of the public is that all news of the war should be published which is not injurious to military interests. That is not due simply to an idle curiosity, but it is a mere act of justice to our soldiers who are fighting so gallant and so arduous a fight, and to the nation at home which must sustain the struggle by sacrifices of money, and, as they are needed, of men. To keep the nation instructed is, therefore, as proper if not as important a part of strategy as to keep the ranks of our forces at full strength.

The papers, however, are not protesting so much because of particular facts as because of the general official attitude. As Mr. Arnold Bennett declares, this attitude discloses the same defect of mind which

makes Bernhardi's book such really comic reading just now—an incapacity imaginatively to understand human nature.

Now doubtless the War Office of such a country as Russia has a natural relation to the reactionary policies of autocracy and has, as well, forced militarism on other countries. Doubtless the Russian War Office deems the Russian public purely infantile. Yet the British War Office may consider the intelligent British public more or less infantile in all that concerns military strategy. Doubtless too the British War Office is kindly, not harshly, disposed and thinks that under any circumstances the public's nerves ought to be spared. The main reasons, however, why the authorities in any country do not want to tell all they know are doubtless first because they do not want to admit that their machine is not always triumphant, and second because, if they did admit it, the news would be taken advantage of by the enemy.

In its re-transmission of news, the censorship affects us in America. We have been deprived of direct cables from Germany. No one disputes the right of the British authorities to refuse to allow any messages from Germany to be forwarded to America over their lines. But—and this is a big but—does not such refusal indicate that the British would not only deprive America of receiving any communications from Ger-

many, but also that they will allow only such information concerning Germany as can filter through, colored by their Censor. Concerning the protest from America the London *Daily News* says:

> The reason of this outburst is not that news is suppressed—Americans generally are sensible and practical people perfectly aware that some news must be suppressed in war time—but that articles which can have no sort of military importance are censored for no other reason than that they give the views of the Allies' opponents. The Censorship, that is to say, has extended its sway from the supervision of reports of facts, where it is or may be legitimate, to that of expressions of opinions and fancies where it is unprofitable to intervene.

Now as to the editorial side of English newspapers. Here too there were certain miscalculations before the war began. Perhaps the principal one was the theory that because the German Socialists in the Reichstag, 110 strong and the largest body in that Parliament, had defied the Kaiser, therefore they would not fight under the Kaiser!

In the next place, as to religion, public opinion here has too long been fed by papers like the *British Weekly*, with which everything German seems anathema. To such papers the very name Germany is apparently only a synonym for rationalism.

Again, practically every English editor found in the name Nietzsche a synonym for German philosophy,

in the name Treitschke a synonym for German political ideals, and in the name Bernhardi a synonym for German military ideals. Yet has any one of these men affected more than one class in the Fatherland?—indeed, Nietzsche seems both disliked and despised by most Germans, and no German writer of the same class, it is held, not even Hauptmann, has been as much affected by him as has been the Russian, Merejskowsky.

As the war progressed, most editors seemed to be agreed as to the following conclusions:

1. Prussian militarism is striving to set its heel on the whole of Europe.
2. England, France, Russia, Belgium, and Servia have thrown their forces into the field in resistance.
3. German victory might mean the absorption of Holland, Belgium, and the northern parts of France into the vast German Empire.
4. It would also mean the ultimate disappearance of the British mercantile marine from the seas.
5. It might mean the loss of South Africa and India.
6. It might even result in the absorption of the British Isles into the German Empire.
7. Before that could come about England might have to witness the scenes at Louvain repeated at Canterbury or Cambridge and English villages would have the same tale to tell of murdered women and children and old men as Belgian villages have told.

With these conclusions in mind, English editors sometimes ride roughshod over little neutral Holland.

As to this, the London *Evening News* (not to be confounded with the London *Daily News*, a morning paper) thus declares:

It is urgently necessary that all correspondence with Holland should be opened by the Post Office authorities, and all goods consigned from America, which might be used by the enemy, should be held in this country.

As to revenge, though Field Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood has said: "There is no fear that our soldiers will ever descend to reprisals," of what avail is this if another high authority, as is reported, instructs British soldiers to keep from such deeds, as long as they remain in France and Belgium!

As in Germany there are those who would wipe out the British Empire entirely, so there are those here who would wipe out the German Empire and who counsel the crushing of Germany for good and all.

It is a satisfaction therefore to find this protest in the London *Times:*

To crush the Germans as a whole we must either kill them all or occupy their countries permanently. . . . We have to draw the teeth of this Prussian monster, to humble a military caste, and to leave Prussia herself at peace with the constitution which she has so long sought in vain. In these reasonable aims we shall sooner or later have large sections of the German people with us, and our ends can then be more quickly attained. But to kill or

everlastingly to police a nation of 60 millions of people is an extravagant proposition, and in war one must aim at what is attainable and not the reverse.

Especially fine is the London *Church Times* with regard to reprisals:

The war must not be allowed to degenerate into a meaningless struggle for mastery. That would be to fall into the worst faults of those among our enemies who prepared and forced on the war. Our contention is the exact reverse of their doctrine that force is the main reality in human affairs, and mastery the main thing to be sought by men or by nations. We are in the field to resist that doctrine.

A glimmering of the truth of this seems to be leading some German minds. England has never received a finer compliment than was paid unconsciously the other day by the *North German Gazette* in the remark that it was impossible to see what vital interests of the British Empire made it necessary for us to go to war. . . . There were no such vital interests at stake as the modern German philosophy understands.

We went to war, frankly and openly, for a "scrap of paper" with our plighted word on it, and for the defence of the weak against the strong. This being our purpose, it is right to announce that we intend, God allowing it, to go on fighting until an effective lesson has been taught the breaker of treaties and the bully of nations. If it be thought that no lesson can be effective which does not involve a serious crippling of the enemy's power, then that must be the object in view. The object may be avowed.

But the avowal should be accompanied by a modest acknowledgment that under the providential ruling of the world we may have to be content with a less brilliant

triumph, and a politic admission that a less drastic treatment may be found sufficient.

To meditate the gratuitous humiliation of a great people or a mere demonstration of our own power and glory would be to imitate the worst faults of our foes and to prepare for ourselves that recoil of outraged feeling, which in the long run proved fatal to the insatiable ambition of Napoleon.

Perhaps the most picturesque diatribe has come from Mr. Frederic Harrison. He writes thus to the London *Times:*

Be it understood that when the allies have finally crushed this monstrous brood, the Kaiser—if, indeed, he chose to survive—shall be submitted to the degradation inflicted on poor Dreyfus. In presence of allied troops, let his bloodstained sword be broken on his craven back and the uniform and orders of which he is so childishly proud be stamped in the mire. And if he lives through it, St. Helena or the Devil's Island might be his prison and his grave.

To this the London *Spectator* replies:

We have no objection to a little rhetoric, but here is a specific suggestion for committing a bombastic and theatrical personal outrage such as our forefathers, thank heaven, absolutely refused to allow in the case of a worse sinner, the Emperor Napoleon. Remember, too, how, when Blücher wanted to blow up the Pont de Jèna, and had actually mined it for the purpose, Wellington baulked him by putting a British sentry on the bridge and daring him to blow the gallant fellow into smithereens. Again, remember how John Lawrence met the wild proposals for

fantastic vengeance made to him during and after the Mutiny. He would have none of them on any condition. But if these reasons are not sufficient for condemning Mr. Frederic Harrison's outburst, surely he might remember that we have not yet beaten the Kaiser.

The main fact to be borne in mind in this country is that England's claim is the noble claim of fighting the fight of civilization against an excess of militarism. If this is really to be the fight of civilization there must be self-control shown in the repression of any desire for reprisals. Indeed, the British Government would be well advised, I think, if it instructed its troops in the direction of prohibiting any acts of initiative vengeance.

On the other hand, both reportorially and editorially there is often a distinct effort on the part of certain English journals to give a comprehensive picture, not only of the war but of opinion about the war. For instance, the other day the London *Times's* Washington correspondent reported the rejoinder of Herr Dernburg to England's invitation to the United States to "come in" and get a share of the trade of ruined Germany, Herr Dernburg saying that the invitation had been made "because Great Britain, with her usual perfidy, wishes to get the United States to take sides, so that America will not be able to act as mediator, and the war may thus be prolonged."

As the correspondent frankly admits, "Herr Dernburg has cleverly availed himself of the weak spot in our armor. The suggestion that the United States should come in and share the commercial spoils of war should never have been made and ought not to be repeated." Equally candid is the *Westminster Gazette*. It says:

Herr Dernburg is decidedly the most clever of the special pleaders for Germany in the United States. He has been dealing in the New York *Sun* with the suggestion that America should share in the process of picking up the trade lost to Germany. Obviously, as he hints, there would be more trade to pick up by the outsiders if the Allies were defeated. This is a clever turning of the tables upon a suggestion that had been better left unspoken.

This same spirit of fairness also animates the highest authorities in military and civil life. Let us take the military first as revealed by General Sir John French's report:

The Germans are a formidable enemy. Well trained, long prepared, and brave, their soldiers are carrying on the contest with skill and valor. Nevertheless, they are fighting to win anyhow, regardless of all the rules of fair-play, and there is evidence that they do not hesitate at anything in order to gain victory. A large number of the tales of their misbehavior are exaggerations, and some of the stringent precautions they have taken to guard themselves against the inhabitants of the areas traversed are

possibly justifiable measures of war. But at the same time it has been definitely established that they have committed atrocities on many occasions, and they have been guilty of brutal conduct.

In civil life, a notable example of fairness was that of Sir Edward Grey's speech of August 3d in the House of Commons. Though standing for the policy of rigidly supporting Belgian neutrality, and though doubtless surmising that it would be used against him by the Labor Party (as it was), he nevertheless quoted Mr. Gladstone's elastic opinion on the subject. Mr. Gladstone had spoken as follows:

I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to the assertion that the simple fact of the existence of a guaranty is binding on every party to it irrespectively altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guaranty arises. The great authorities upon foreign policy to whom I have been accustomed to listen, such as Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, never to my knowledge took that rigid, and if I may venture to say so, that impracticable view of the guaranty.

"Is there any man who hears me," exclaimed Mr. Gladstone in 1870, "who does not feel that if in order to satisfy a greedy appetite for aggrandizement, coming whence it may, Belgium were absorbed, the day that witnessed that absorption would hear the

knell of public right and public law in Europe?" So quotes the London *Daily Chronicle* and adds:

On those words "public right" and "public law," and on the ideas behind them, depend . . . all the possibilities of any sort of Internationalism. Erase them, and there is no bond left between nations but the sword. They are not yet erased; but they have been mortally challenged. If the challenger triumphed, if the unoffending little country that has been struck down by a perjured blow were left to bleed away and perish in the dust, the consequences would be no whit less than those which Mr. Gladstone described.

English editors are sometimes more than fair to their own Allies, in the sense that they hardly ever criticize any shortcomings of those Allies. And yet there are occasions when "faithful are the wounds of a friend." Such an occasion is the present with regard to Russia, and the London *Nation* is one of the few papers boldly to advise Russia, in her own interest as well, to range herself more nearly on a par with her Allies and to do a long needed service to humanity and civilization. The *Nation* says:

The news that the Russian Government had formally promised legislation to remove Jewish disabilities would be worth more to the Russian cause at this moment than a crushing victory over the German armies. . . . For the behavior of any Christian people towards its Jews is among the most searching tests of its civilization. . .

With regard to the Jews, the situation was what it had

been ever since the bloody policy of organized pogroms was abandoned for the dry terrorism of legal repression. . . .

What the bureaucracy has done through this series of years has been to tighten all the restrictions which weigh on the Jewish community, and to narrow the few apertures by which its more favored members might struggle upwards to knowledge and well-being. The professions which were open to Jews are now virtually closed. The schools which were grudgingly open to them, admit a smaller percentage and under harsher conditions. The wholesale expulsions of Jewish residents from towns and villages where they used to live freely, have grown steadily more frequent and more merciless. . . .

The system by which the great mass of the Jewish race in Russia is over-crowded and exploited within a closely-guarded "Pale" by which the fortunate few outside it are loaded with special taxes, by which knowledge is denied to the young and advancement to the capable, while the Government itself fans fanaticism by the legend of ritual murder—that system had seen no amelioration in recent years, and on the eve of the war it was being rather worsened than bettered.

And yet "Russia, the Imperialists of Petrograd proudly proclaim, must have an equivalent voice in the settlement," chronicles the Manchester *Labor Leader*, and asks: "How do our idealists like that prospect?" The *Labor Leader* quotes the opinion of an observer to the effect that "The war may last three years—eighteen months of which would find Russia and ourselves fighting Germany and the

other eighteen Germany and ourselves fighting Russia!"

Now, turning from the attitude of English editors toward Russia, let us observe their attitude towards France. I may be wrong, but so far as my observation goes during recent weeks, the newspapers, magazines, and reviews, published in these isles, are apparently characterized by an extraordinarily singular and strange silence—a quality, in this case, quite out of harmony, so it seems to me, with the traditionally typical English character as we know it. We have generally assumed that character, from our experience of it, to be spontaneously and generously appreciative of a neighbor's pluck and grit. In the case of France, the English attitude does not seem to be, as in the case of Russia, the one which hesitates to disapprove. It is still more unfortunate than that certainly unfortunate attitude for it seems to be, alas, the attitude which hesitates to approve! Perhaps many people hereabouts—even many editors—still fancy that the French are a wholly superficial, emotional, mercurial people. The old geography book of our fathers informed us, I have been told, that the people inhabiting France were a merry folk, fond of dancing and light wines! So they are, God bless them, but they are something more. To their Gallic gayety, vivacity, precision and charm, they add qualities which in our

prejudice, we may have thought too exclusively Teutonic and Anglo-Saxon. What English newspaper, magazine or review has shown a constant and adequate recognition of these qualities?—of the marvelous patience, poise, self-restraint, cheerfulness, dignity, which have distinguished not only the French people but also their Government and its representatives whether at home or abroad. The war has revealed nothing more admirable than the real French! I do not say that the English press has left unnoticed the splendid manifestation of these qualities. I only urge that the English press has not constantly and adequately recognized them, as it should have done and doubtless will do. In this connection it should be mentioned that all the English papers hope the early reports of inhuman treatment of their foe, whether wounded or non-combatant, may prove to be unfounded and that nothing in the demeanor of either the home or colonial armed forces of France will cloud the inspiring record furnished by her people in general.

Yet, contrary to German opinion, there is little tendency among British editors towards smug self-righteous swagger. When it bobs up now and then it is apt to be hit hard. In this connection the London *Church Times* pays its respects to a well-known and efficient young statesman. It admits that he has done his work well. But this makes the regret all the

greater for some of the expressions in his recent speeches.

Insulting references to the German Fleet are not needed. They are more objectionable since the officers of that Fleet have, with rare exceptions, shown a spirit which should shame their fellows of the Land Forces. The English Admiralty has once, at least, had occasion to acknowledge their courteous conduct of the war. . .

It was deplorable to talk about "digging out the rats." And seldom or never was swagger more signally rebuked. Even as he spoke, some of the skulking rats of his imagination were putting out to sea for an enterprise of conspicuous peril. On the day that his speech was reported we heard also the result of this high venture, mourning the loss of three fine ships and many priceless lives. Let us at least respect the courage of the men who could strike such a blow at our immense preponderance of force. As we brace ourselves for the stern prosecution of the struggle to a victorious end, let us be glad that some at least of our opponents are not unworthy of our steel, and that in Germany there is a nucleus of men whom in after years we may be proud to count as friends.

In such spirit, the best editors of England are inspiring the best men of England, quietly, resolutely to war.

English editors also feel for themselves and their readers that the times demand great expression—if possible, poetic expression. And so, as never before, they seem to be throwing open their columns to all who can rhyme—and to some who cannot! For, as

that satisfying sheet, the Manchester *Guardian*, puts it, peoples' minds are forced to the height and heat of emotion, at which the perfectly fit poem or the subject of their emotion would come to them with something of the power and charm of a great fulfilment or sudden release. And yet, as the *Guardian* adds, "the very heat that makes us thirsty makes the streams run dry."

Finally as to what is going to happen after the war is over, English editorial opinion is summed up in this statement from the Liverpool *Post:*

> In the negotiations following the war we shall be moved by a common impulse—the establishment of a Europe on the principle of nationality and with a tender regard for small nationalities; a Europe . . . free from the causes of hatred and unrest which have poisoned the comity of nations and ruptured the peace of Christendom.

II. The German Press

[London, *9th October, 1914.*]

The German newspapers are interesting reading. A careful perusal of them may clear away possible prejudices.

The first prejudice is that the German Press is muzzled. Now no one could have become acquainted with the South German Press in particular, recently; no one could have glanced at the illustrated pages

of *Simplicissimus* or *Jugend*, for instance, without realizing that these papers were anything but muzzled. Indeed, they seemed to enjoy a greater license than would be allowed in other countries. One thinks especially of that cartoon, summing up the Zabern incident, in which an enormous Germania, depicted as she is on the Niederwald monument, is shown weeping, and, in the corner, is seen the cause of her tears, the arrogant little figure of a Prussian lieutenant defying her—that is defying the nation, the German people!

So think the South Germans concerning any brutal excess of militarism as born in East Prussia and shown in Alsace-Lorraine. When the English papers unanimously declare, as they do, that force is the main thing with Germany, first, last, and all the time, they might well make a distinction as to whether this is the opinion of military extremists or whether it is the opinion of all the people. The persons temporarily "on top" should not mislead the world's opinion as to the real basic sentiments of the Teutonic race.

Indeed there seems to be an increasing appreciation by the German Press of the distinction to be made between the Government and the people, in speaking of their own or of any country. For instance, when we talk about Russia we always have to define whether our "Russia" means the Russian Government or the

Russian people, whether it means an oppressive autocracy or a furtively aspiring democracy. So now in Germany, although in a far less degree, of course. The newspapers, it is true, as soon as war began, "lined up" behind their Government's decisions, though the day before they might have been as fault-finding as are generally the Berlin *Vorwärts* or *Zukunft*. Speaking of *Die Zukunft*, its editor, Herr Maximillan Harden, said some time ago as reported here:

> You must never believe that Germany will attack any neutral country. No Power is more interested than Germany in respecting integrity treaties.

Would that Herr Harden's "Germany" meant the Government as well as the people!

There is another prejudice against the German Press, namely, that the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, a recognized official Government organ, and the *Kölnische Zeitung*, a semi-official organ, are, therefore, dry-as-dust reading. Are they! In the *Kölnische* we find the following vivacious bewailment:

> The sympathy which we showed towards the Boer States during their last war against England has borne evil fruit. For it repelled the English and finally the Boer States. We did not want a conflict yet wove the first strands of one; we wanted to please both parties and pleased neither. The Boers accepted our friendliness and were resentful against us when their foremost statesman,

on coming to Germany, was not received by the Emperor, though he had been warned in advance that he was asking something impossible and had been given a hint to avoid Berlin. England resented our attitude at the beginning of the war, though later we were the Power that dissolved the Franco-Russian coalition against her. Owing to our refusal to join, the attack planned against England, which was then so grievously embarrassed, came to nothing.

The only consolation the *Kölnische* can now find is in the thought that "the danger threatening the gigantic British Empire through its vast extent and great distances" is as potent as ever, and will be doubled in the event of England's defeat in the present war.

The war has brought out one main defect of the German Press—its strange lack of political acumen. This, after all, is not so surprising as it may seem at first; we do not always remember that German editors have not had the advantage of the practical parliamentary training which obtains in a country where the Cabinet is responsible to the legislative and not merely to the executive branch of the Government. No matter how minute the individual training of German editors, of what avail is it if they have not political prescience and, above all, if they cannot read human nature?

And yet they seemed, one and all, to be so im-

pressed with the fact that Austria, and Germany after her, had timed their war declarations so as to surprise Russia, France and England at embarrassing moments as not to realize that one cannot reckon without a basic factor—common sense.

For instance, the editors made much of the continual fratricidal feud between the Russians and the Poles and also of the fact that Russia just then was enduring at St. Petersburg an enormous Labor strike, which had even compromised the Imperial Police power; they did not grasp that internal disorders are sometimes lost sight of in the fear of external peril.

Again, they made much of the fact that France was still in the midst of the Caillaux excitement, for the trial had indeed ended in a travesty of justice. They made much of the fact that M. Humbert in the Senate had just revealed French unpreparedness for war, owing to defects in the Army and the lack of ammunition. They made much of the fact that the President and Premier of France were far away from Paris in St. Petersburg on a visit to the Tsar.

But far more strikingly than either Russia or France, they believed Great Britain unready for war. Was she not disunited? Indeed had she not generally been disunited in face of war? Had not history shown this? How about the Romanists in England who would have welcomed the victory of Philip of Spain and the Faith

he stood for as against Queen Elizabeth? How about those who, when England was fighting Louis XIV. in his attempt to tyrannize Europe, favored him because he would protect the Stuart exiles? How about those statesmen who opposed the British Government's struggle against Napoleon? How about those who opposed the Crimean War? And how about those who opposed the Boer War?

The next miscalculation of German editors had to do with the British Empire. There is something always wrong with the Empire, if we may believe those Britons not "in the saddle." They always love to berate the Government in power. And their particular method of attack is generally to declare the Empire doomed, simply because an unreasonable party is in control! With strenuous assertions and protestations of this sort made every day by the Opposition, it is no wonder that foreigners are deceived. The Germans, in particular, began to think that this party grumbling meant a real disintegration and that, after all, the British Empire might be only a mass of unrelated atoms.

Now the German mind is pre-eminently orderly and painstaking and its scholarship is the best in the world. But scholarship does not mean merely a collecting of facts. It means an interpretation of them in the light of history and psychology. One

must look *beyond* the facts. And this is just where the Germans made their mistake. They did not realize that sometimes sharp differences in home politics may make for the strong unity in foreign politics.

Hence, the very corner stone of their conviction with regard to British disintegration, namely Ireland, proved the greatest surprise. Why, was not England on the verge of an armed conflict in Ireland? It certainly looked like it, all must allow. Yet what happened when the foreign peril threatened? Ulstermen and Nationalists called a truce. Ulster quickly rallied to the support of the Empire. The other parts of Ireland gave signs of following though they hung back until the Home Rule Bill was passed; (until then Ireland was far behind the other parts of the United Kingdom in recruiting, her percentage being, as reported by the press, .93 as opposed to 1.94 for Wales, 2.41 for England and 2.79 for Scotland). But now that the Home Rule is on the Statute Book and satisfies the majority of Irish, Nationalist Ireland alone expects to raise 100,000 soldiers for the righting of Belgium's wrongs—for Belgium, a nation both small and Catholic, appeals strongly to the imagination of Catholic Ireland.

Again, the German papers prophesied that an outbreak of war would plunge India into rebellion. But

what happened? The Indian Rajahs remained finely loyal. The Empire called on India for 40,000 men. It is getting 70,000.

The German papers were also sure that the war would give the great British self-governing dominions the opportunity for which they are supposed to have been yearning, to cast off their allegiance to the motherland. But what has happened? Not only have Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa reaffirmed their loyalty; they have pledged their resources, as far as they are able, to England's defence!

Then came other miscalculations. They had to do with the British army. It was small and contemptible! Why, it still persisted in keeping the old, outworn voluntary system. The English army merely meant mercenaries. The other day a writer in the Berlin *Vossische Zeitung* claimed:

> In England the morality of private and of public life is utilitarianism. "Let each man do what is of profit to himself"; this principle justifies the basest egotism towards other nations, and the standard of value is the common medium of exchange—money. What costs more is the nobler possession.
>
> Thus Lord Kitchener raises the pay of the English mercenary army in order to increase their patriotism. Mercenary troops are unknown to us and we do not carry on this war as a business transaction. We do not want to

drive any competitor from the field but to defend ourselves from an attack.

Surely the British soldiers do not merit the disdain expressed by German newspapers. Despite the manifest shortcomings of the voluntary system, British soldiers have shown themselves unmercenary in spirit. If not the most numerous and the best organized and the best disciplined they are inferior to none in the essential qualities of coolness, poise, courage, cheerfulness and civilization.

But even if she had a good military system, add some German editors, what can you expect? The Britons, they allege, have become decadent; one has but to see the submerged tenth in Whitechapel and to hear about the upper ten to be convinced of that!

Now it is true that dissipation here is more manifest than in Germany. But to say that the British nation, as a whole, is decadent is absurdly to misjudge the people of these Isles. One need waste no time on that charge.

Then there was another miscalculation. It was found in the iteration and reiteration throughout Germany that "Belgium is merely a pretext: England is entering on the war for purely commercial reasons, as befits a nation of shopkeepers." Says the Berlin *Vossische Zeitung*—good old "Tante Voss"—

We do not carry on this war as a business transaction. *We* do not want to drive any competitor from the field but to defend ourselves from an attack.

The Germans are now revising this widespread error as to the main English motive.

The war has been disgraced by awful atrocities, whether committed by Belgians or by Germans. First we heard about the Belgian. The German papers printed details of outrages to the German wounded which one could not read without putting down the paper and turning one's head away in despair, that such could be possible. But then came other and more dreadful and more inexcusable atrocities alleged to have been committed by German soldiers. Concerning those at Louvain, has the *Frankfurter Zeitung* nothing more to the point to say than this?

The necessity to burn down certain groups of houses from which collective shooting had come resulted in more damage than was meant. The first news of this damage came during the terrible night of trial for Louvain, when it was impossible to measure the catastrophe properly. This was responsible for the error by which our whole Army has suffered. We confess that we regret these events most deeply.

One characteristic specially distinguishes the German press. It is a natural characteristic, for Germany is just now surrounded by foes. It is this.

Nothing like the war of 1914 ever happened to obsess the minds of reporters and editors alike. No matter what subject they touch upon, there is generally some reference to the war and nine-tenths of the subjects they treat have to do directly with the war. The war crowds all other events aside and away to one side. Indeed, the very brains of German reporters and editors seem to have become mere war maps and all their natural impulses changed to artificial impulses for marches, skirmishes, attacks, counter attacks, charges, battles, defeats, victories, sudden death. War penetrates into every mental nook and cranny of reporters and editors until it seems as if they had quite succumbed to the stimulation of thinking and dreaming and talking and writing of nothing but war, war, war.

No ordinary events afford sufficient mental food; the daily ration of reporters and editors has now become so changed that, if they do not get the particular mixture which makes the particular material they want, they become—and their papers in consequence—querulous, liable to make strangely sweeping statements and to go off at a tangent. Even the best papers may be found using such language as this from the *Frankfurter Zeitung:*

Portugal has long been dependent upon England—as dependent as a vassal State, and, if England desires

and orders it, the Republic will join our numerous enemies.

In general, however, such organs of public opinion as the *Norddeutsche*, the *Kölnische* and the *Frankfurter Zeitung* have been marked by much that is worth reading because set forth with a generally unruffled mind and nerve, with good temper and balance.

If we find fault with its political opinions, we must, nevertheless, acknowledge the attractive candor of the German press in the presence of proven fact. This has just been strikingly shown both with regard to Germany's military and with regard to her economic position.

As to the first, the Berlin *Vörwarts* frankly says:

Although after a month of war the position of the German armies is better than one could have dared to hope, it must not be supposed that what is to come will be child's play.

The English Fleet is still unweakened and the fighting off Heligoland has shown that it seeks to attack.

In the east the enemy's troops are still on German soil. But one knows how slow the Russian mobilization is, and what masses of troops the Russians can still bring up. One knows also the difficulties which would arise if it should be necessary to fight on Russian soil.

The formation of the new French Ministry, and the proclamation which it has issued, show that the war is more than ever a war of the whole people, and that it is thoroughly recognized that the national existence is at

stake. History teaches what a tremendous force that gives.

An equal candor characterizes the treatment of economic conditions by the German papers.

As to unemployment, about one in three or four workmen were called to the colors before September 1. Since then the Reserves, the Landwehr and Landsturm, have been called up. And yet, paradoxically, there is unemployment among those left behind! This is largely because you cannot replace skilled labor by unskilled.

Moreover some sixteen million dependents, mainly women and children of course, have been left without their breadwinners. They must be supported. The Government makes grants of aid, it is true, but these grants are insufficient. Though it is a militarist organ, the Berlin *Kreuz Zeitung* frankly calls this "the internal danger" and adds:

If we do not succeed in mitigating the consequences of this unemployment among the masses of the people, and saving those who have not gone to the front from the terrors of starvation, this will be of no less far-reaching importance than the defeat of our army. We have by the help of public means taken up the fight against the spectre of unemployment. But the result hitherto has been very poor. This is the most vulnerable point which we see at the end of the first month of the war.

Then there is the question of raw materials. Though the *Berliner Tageblatt* thinks that there will be enough, we find this candid opinion in the *Frankfurter Zeitung:*

It is true that we have sufficient bread and meat for food, but the danger is that, through the absence of raw material which comes to us from abroad, our factories may be compelled to shut down very soon.

In the same spirit, the Berlin *Vorwärts* says:

It is wise not to underrate the danger of the war lasting a long time. With regard to food, one or two years do not matter, but the supply of raw materials for our industry is not a thing to be regarded lightly. Germany needs an enormous import of wool, cotton, silk, flax, timber, oil, copper, lead, zinc, leather, and rubber if a great part of the country's factories are not to stand still. The English have not dared to blockade our harbors for fear of our mines, torpedo-boats, and submarines. But the international law of maritime warfare gives them other means of cutting off our imports.

Then there is the question of neutral trade. The *Berliner Zeitung* declares that this situation is very serious, but that "trade with the neutral countries must be maintained as soon as the transport is reopened."

Thus the amount of available labor is considerably reduced, available raw materials will probably not be sufficient for a long time and the future of neutral trade is more or less doubtful.

On the other hand, as the Berlin *Vossische Zeitung* reminds us:

Germany has had a remarkably good harvest, so that on the whole the purchasing power of the agricultural industry is relatively big. The same applies to industries which supply the needs of the Army and other public purposes. The problem is to use this purchasing power in such a way as to revive all those branches which supply the needs of the above-mentioned industries. The question is how to build around the sound kernel.

Economically, the English hope to defeat the Germans, claim the latter, in order to rule the world's markets. On this subject the *Kölnische Zeitung* remarks:

That is the basic motive for which the Russian and French Armies are fighting. Day by day every English newspaper is giving some expression to this thought. They are announcing with triumph that Germany will lose this or that market and that it will fall to the English. To this end large organizations have been created to help on the good work, before other countries, especially the United States, are successful in getting ahead of England.

A recent article in the London *Times* moves the *Kölnische* to the following:

The *Times* hopes that disaster to Germany will last not necessarily six *months* or a year but as long as is required to force Germany to give up those departments of trade in which she has had success.

Now one may well doubt whether the *Times's* frank-

ness . . . will be taken with particular favor in France. . . . For Germany's fate would be France's for even more than Germany, French industry is suffering. . . .

England is proceeding with a moratorium; she cannot pay her debts. The proud Bank of England must be helped by the Government. . . .

The *Times* recognizes "the German titanic energy." That energy will find ways and means. . . . England can rest assured that we will conduct the economic war with the same decisiveness as the military.

The Germans are justly proud of the fact that their trade has long been forging ahead of English trade proportionately. The reason for this is that English merchants work five or six hours a day for four days a week and then are not disinclined to take a three-day week-end. German merchants, on the other hand, work ten, eleven, twelve hours a day if necessary, for six days in the week, and are ready to work on the seventh too if they must. As England cannot beat Germany in trade, conclude the Germans, she is playing her trump card, her Navy, the largest in the world.

Now the English *are* a nation of shopkeepers. Incidentally, that is a thing to be proud of! The shopkeepers doubtless do get up too late in the morning. They are paying the penalty for their inertness, since the earlier rising, more economical, more scientifically educated and more persistent Germans have beaten them in many branches of business and in many parts

of the world, including the British colonies themselves. Doubtless, too, after the war, the Germans will win back whatever they have temporarily lost in whatever supremacy they have in trade and transportation. They may even add to that supremacy!

But, in the policing of the world's law and order the British Navy will also, I am sure, be doing business at the old stand!

XIII

RUMANIA AND ITALY

[LONDON, *18th October, 1914.*]

KING CAROL is dead! Who that ever saw him can forget the compact, well-built figure; the pronounced, clean-cut features; the clear gray eye; the modest manner, the quiet but kingly dignity!

He was Prince Charles of Hohenzollern, a member of the senior and Roman Catholic branch of that family.

He created Rumania as we know it. In the interests of civilization the Powers in 1866 took into their own hands the conditions of anarchy prevailing in the outlying Turkish provinces. The Powers chose Prince Charles to execute their mandate. His sagacious father, Prince Charles Anthony, had trained him for service in that enviable region of the Upper Danube where a high state of civilization exists. The Powers called the young Prince to the region of the lower Danube where the condition of the people was wretched, their means of communication primitive, their chances at education meagre, their financial resources slender, their public affairs chaotic. Charles had been summoned to replace Turkish pro-consuls

in governing the Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. They had been horribly misgoverned, like all the provinces over which Turkey was still sovereign.

Out of those provinces Charles developed the strong Kingdom of Rumania. He improved agriculture; built highways and railways; established schools, courts and financial order; fostered an export trade in grain, timber and petroleum; defended his capital, Bukharest, by great forts; created an army and made it one of the most efficient, proportionately, in Europe; commanded the Rumanian forces in the Russo-Rumanian war against Turkey (1877); obtained independence for his country (1878); and, finally, (1881), was crowned King with a steel crown made from a Turkish gun captured by Rumanian troops at Plevna.

But Rumanians will never forget that though Russia won against Turkey because Rumania helped her, Russia took to herself at the close of the war the Rumanian half of Bessarabia, giving to Rumania as an offset the swampy Dobrudja on the Danube, a miserable exchange. At that time Rumania was but an infant nation. She has since matured. She can defend her rights either in Russia or in Hungary. For in Hungary there is an unreclaimed Rumania. In Transylvania and Bukowina live over three million Hungarian and Austrian Rumans.

As a Hohenzollern and German Prince, it was natural for King Carol to bring and keep Rumania within the orbit of the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, Italy. But suppose his people wanted to attack Austria-Hungary, a member of that Alliance, so as to free the three million Rumans there and make them distinctively Rumanians by adding them to the co-racial population of Rumania proper? The King would hardly have been so unpatriotic or unwise as to resist such a national impulse.

At the same time, his death may possibly be followed by some change in the policy of neutrality adopted by Rumania in the present war. This policy has been of manifest advantage to Germany and Austria and of disadvantage—though not proportionately so great—to the Powers of the Triple Entente, Russia, France and England.

[LONDON, *19th October, 1914.*]

Yesterday we heard of the death of the King of Rumania. To-day we hear of the death of another upholder of the Triple Alliance, the Marquis di San Giuliano, the Italian Foreign Minister. There is thus, not only in actual conditions of coveted territory across the respective borders, but also in the coincident deaths of two leaders, a strikingly close parallel

between Rumania and Italy in the matter of fidelity to the neutrality which both have proclaimed.

As a Great Power Italy is unique. Geography and history alike afford her a position of detachment from the other Powers. To these advantages is now added her recent very notable progress in wealth and culture.

Hence, her favor has naturally been sought by the two groups into which Europe has been divided. Diplomatic history reveals perhaps no case of political wooing, comprising more allurements, blandishments, seductions, exhortations, admonitions, covert threats, finely spun intrigues.

Finally, thirty-odd years ago, Italy gave her adherence to the Austro-German group.

The Austro-German group indeed! Here was a surprise to many, even of those who had a close view of the diplomatic deftness with which the game had been played by both groups. For Germany and Austria are Teutonic Powers. Italy is a Latin Power. Did not the Italian people incline rather to another people, the French, of their race than to a people, the German, of an alien blood? Did not the Italian nation incline more to the French nation, which came to its aid when it was unifying itself, than to the Austrian nation which it had fought? Why then this seemingly unnatural alliance?

For two reasons:

1. From it Italy thought that she could obtain the larger assurance of present material security. She would least imperil what she had. She would be able the better to economize in armaments.

2. From it Italy felt that, when the time came for a redistribution of territory on her northeast border, she would more certainly secure what she covets.

What is that? Italia Irredenta—unredeemed Italy.

First and chiefly the Trentino—the region about the city of Trent, in which a great Italian population lives. Who can have journeyed northwards in Austria along the Adige River from just above Verona to just below Bozen; who can have entered Austria from Italy by the Tonale Pass and have proceeded eastward across the Dolomites to Italy again at Agordo or Auronzo, without feeling that, no matter how much Austria has done for the Trentino, it ought really to be Italy's. War or no war, the Italians believe that the Trentino will, in the course of nature, one day be theirs and thus properly round out their northern frontier, now interrupted by this triangular piece of Austria jutting into the great peninsula.

Many Italians also claim that Triest and the little Istrian peninsula, on the western Adriatic shore, form part of Italia Irredenta. But geographically, ethnologically and historically, they are not at all in the

same class of unredeemed Italy as is the Trentino. Though the Italians form the majority in Triest and though the whole district is very largely Italian in race and language, the Slav wave of Croats and Slovenes is overwhelming just behind them. Moreover, Italy is bound to this region by but a fraction of the historical ties which bind her to the Trentino. As to present commerce and military strategy, Italy does not really need the port of Triest to emphasize her dominance of the Adriatic.

Then, farther afield, there is Dalmatia. Its population is only slightly Italian. Despite that, if the Anglo-French fleet should free any Dalmatian ports from Austrian dominion, Italy would not willingly see them pass to the more feared Servians. To the Montenegrin?—that might be another matter.

And then down the coast, passing over always independent Montenegro, we come to Albania. Over it, or a part of it, certain impulsive Italian jingoes have wished to establish a protectorate. But the Conference of London created it into an independent, autonomous State. Nor could any settlement, based on the principle of nationality, give it to Italy.

A week before the war began, the Italian Government, we learn, informed the other Governments that it would be neutral in the approaching conflict between the two groups.

At that time, so some claimed, Italy would not take up arms because she had not been sufficiently informed beforehand of Austria's ultimatum to Servia; indeed, the London *Spectator* alleges that Italy was freed from obligations to the Triple Alliance because that clause of the Alliance Treaty was broken which bound the partners to consult each other before taking steps involving war. The German Government, however, declared that Italy and Germany had been treated in the same way.

The advantages to Germany and Austria of Italian neutrality were evident. They led to the assumption by many observers that a neutral attitude on the part of Italy had long since been agreed upon among the three Powers. This assumption was confirmed when the German Government hastened to declare in the public press that Italy had correctly interpreted her obligations towards the Triple Alliance.

No wonder, nevertheless, that the German and Austrian Governments took measures to maintain Italian neutrality. It was more satisfactory to them than anything else could be; indeed, it was of vital service. This for four reasons:

(1) Its chief importance lies in the fact that Italy can draw immense supplies from the outside world and send them into these countries.

(2) But even were Germany and Austria provi-

sioned for a decade, of what avail would it be if Italy entered the war with them? Not a soldier or sailor could Italy spare, for the whole strength of her military and marine forces would be required to defend the immense Italian coast-line against the English and French, overwhelming in their combined power in the Mediterranean. Indeed, Italy might have to ask aid from Germany and Austria! Thus, instead of helping them, she might be a burden to them.

(3) The French, suspecting that, after all, the Italian Government might suddenly side with the German, have kept a great number of troops along the Italian border; they could not therefore be sent into the field against Germany.

(4) Correspondingly, on the Italian border facing Austria, the Austrian Government, according to its own statement, has been able to leave its frontier open and withdraw its troops thence for service in distant Galicia.

Now quite the contrary statements are made by those who interpret Italy's neutrality as being of benefit to the Triple Entente.

In direct denial to the foregoing, France, they say, has now been able to withdraw from the Italian frontier a quarter of a million men, who have now been sent against Germany.

Still in direct denial, Russia, they opine, would not

have found it so easy to triumph over Austria in Galicia if Austria had not been compelled to keep a large contingent of troops on the Italian frontier for fear that, at some sudden moment, Italy's neutrality might be transformed into an attack against her.

Finally to all this they add—and this is indeed true—the facility which both England and France have enjoyed in naval operations and in transporting troops across the Mediterranean, due to the neutrality of the Italian navy.

It is a poor rule that does not work both ways, and there is benefit to Italy too if we may believe—and why should we not?—Mr. Churchill's propagandist article in the *Giornale d'Italia* of Rome. Speaking of England and France he says:

> We are both great Mediterranean Powers. We do not seek expansion. We have got all the territory that we want. . . . However strong we are, I cannot see how there could be any danger to Italy.

Now Italy's desires as to expansion are known to all the world. It is only natural then that English, French and Russian newspapers should continually harp on these desires in their effort to persuade Italy to abandon her neutrality and join them, thus seriously compromising German and Austrian military chances, if, indeed, the act did not ensure victory to the Entente Powers.

The chief argument in this wooing seems to be that if these Powers did not have Italy's active co-operation, they would naturally feel no claim to their generosity established by such aloofness when the time comes for them to rearrange the map of Europe. As the *Saturday Review* puts it: "It is not conceivable that Italy would be allowed in Istria or elsewhere to profit by the toil and conquest of the Slav armies."

While they would not, they say, drag Italy into a quarrel which is not hers, without regard to her own interests, yet even the papers are drawing a parallel between 1855 and 1914. In 1855, with scarce any support but the King's and Massimo d'Azeglio's, Cavour summoned his countrymen to join France and England in attacking Russia. "Is not Liberal feeling," asks the London *Times*, "as strong and stronger in its approval of these Allies as it was when Cavour summoned his countrymen to rally to it? . . . We have some confidence that when Italy does act, it will be to tread again in Cavour's footsteps. . . . For the two great questions for Italy in the future are her position on the Adriatic and her position in the Mediterranean. The war, and the settlement after the war, will affect both as surely as the Crimean War and the Congress of Paris affected the fate of Lombardy and of the Peninsula."

This argument is put forth carefully and tem-

perately, yet a still more cautious Government deemed it prudent to issue the following statement through its Press Bureau:

> The views expressed in a leading article in the *Times* of October 3 with regard to Italy and Rumania are unauthorized and do not represent the attitude of his Majesty's Government.

What is the sentiment of Italy? The Nationalists, the Republicans and the Reformist Socialists would declare for the Entente Powers. Do the Nationalists remember that they need to consider France as Italy's greatest prospective enemy? Perhaps they correspond to the Bernhardi school in Germany; they seem to be *Real-Politiker*, political realists, that is to say, time-servers, those who will take territorial gains where they can. Just now they think such interests would be furthered by an alliance with the Entente Powers. The other two political parties, the Republican and the Reformist Socialist, seem to be chiefly inspired by hatred of Austria, inherited from their great apostle, Mazzini. On the other hand, the Socialists proper, as shown in their Congress just held, preach neutrality. But these Socialists themselves fall into two classes, those who believe in absolute and those who believe in conditional neutrality. Their organ, the *Avanti*, is interesting reading these days and their leaders, Ferrari, Mussolini, Bissolati, worth hearing.

Popular Liberal opinion in Italy is often reflected by the well-informed, wide-spread and influential *Corriere della Sera* of Milan. It says:

If our neutrality satisfies that part of the public, which either cannot or will not fix its gaze on the future, it preoccupies and agitates all those who realize that *our* future is being fought for on the battle-fields of France, Prussia, Galicia, Bosnia. The opposing hosts call to us, now with flatteries, now with threats. We remain quiet at the window, gazing at the show. . . . It offers us a spectacle of such terrible slaughter, of such griefs and misery, of such ruin and barbarity, that our abstention seems to us doubly precious. . . . But what will become of us when the arms are laid down, when the combatants rearrange the map of Europe, when we shall have to struggle alone against the profound rancours raised by our neutrality?

Many Liberals and Conservatives maintain that the triumph of England, France and Russia, no matter how inspiring for popular rights, would mean the triumph of those who have been Italy's chief competitors in the Mediterranean and who are the protectors of the Slav power which Italy dreads.

In addition there is the feeling that to fight against Germany and Austria would be, in some sense, a betrayal. The other day the Catholics, in congress at Milan, declared that "an attitude of hostility towards the States of the Triple Alliance and in favor of those of the Triple Entente would be, unless imposed by insurmountable necessities of national defence, an

attack on the rights of nations equal to that of the violation of Belgium." This is putting it strong, but it finds recognition here by such organs as the *Westminster Gazette.*

We, for whom the breaking of a treaty by Germany has been a factor of such supreme importance, should do well to respect the sentiment that makes a large section of Italians averse to making war against former Allies. Neither by caresses nor by veiled threats should we try to lure the Italians to our side.

Whatever the position of the Italian people, the Government, like our own, maintains its position of neutrality. One of the King's friends wrote thus to me last week: "The Government is determined to preserve its neutrality at all costs. It will not be moved by threats from one side or flatteries from the other. If it can keep its military and naval forces armed and intact, it can, in the final settlement, greatly strengthen its moral position as a neutral power and, while legitimately attending to its own interests, can more quickly assure justice and peace."

XIV

TURKEY

[LIVERPOOL, *20th October, 1914.*]

THE news came to hand this morning that Turkey is about to enter the war and that she will be against Russia and on the side of Germany.

This news is not unexpected.

It is natural for Turkey to be against Russia. Is not Russia her hereditary enemy? Did not Peter the Great say so?

Who, pray, took the old Turkish provinces north of the Black Sea and made them Russian?

Who chiefly took the old Turkish provinces north of the Danube and made them Rumanian?

Who took the provinces south of the Danube and made them Servian and Bulgarian?

And who united the Balkan States against Turkey?

Russia.

Those who eagerly acclaimed the advent of the Young Turks to power—Enver Bey, who is now attracting great attention, being one of them—and the deposition of Sultan Abdul Hamid II., lost

heart when the Young Turk régime in Macedonia and Albania proved as ruthless as had been its predecessor.

One of the great events of our time was the consequent resolve by the Balkan States of Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, no longer to allow ancient jealousies to separate them, but to unite to deliver the misgoverned provinces.

In this they had inspiring examples—the example of Greece herself when in 1828 she won her independence; of Rumania, when in 1866 she was formed out of the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia and became practically independent; of Servia, becoming so the next year; of Bosnia and Herzegovina which in 1874 set the whole Balkans in a flame; of Bulgaria which, in 1876 appealed with a mighty voice from the Turkish atrocities there; of Montenegro and Servia, which then declared war against Turkey; of Rumania, by whose strength Russia won against the Turks; indeed, of the Congress of Berlin by which Rumania, Servia and Montenegro were made absolutely independent and Bosnia and Herzegovina snatched from Turkey and put under Austrian administration; finally by Italy, which has delivered Tripoli from anarchy. The one Turk who emerged from the Tripolitan War with added fame was Enver Bey.

It is also natural, just now, for Turkey to side with Germany rather than with France or England.

Ever since 1898, when the German Emperor paid a visit to Constantinople and succeeded in getting on a friendly footing with the Sultan and, particularly, ever since Germany indicated an expectation to found in Asia Minor her greatest colony, the whip hand among diplomats at Constantinople has generally been the German Ambassador. This was specially marked during the term of office of the late Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, one of the most remarkable men of our times. Germany has long practically held Turkey in her grasp.

Again, the Turkish defeats of 1912 could not take place without much humiliation and bitterness on the part of the Sultan's subjects throughout his Empire. It is not generally known how near the Arabs in Africa and the Kurds in Asia have been to a revolt.

Just as this time Enver Bey gained renewed popularity. Turkey lay bleeding and dismembered after the first Balkan War. It seemed to be to the interest of Turkey, Russia and Austria alike to stir up mistrust among the Balkan States lest they should become a unified State which would disturb the balance of power in Europe. As it happened the ruler of one of the Balkan States, as well as his people, fell a prey to ambition. Hence it was the easier to cause Bulgaria

to fall out with Servia and Greece. The result was the second Balkan War (1913) in which a weakened Bulgaria lay not only at the mercy of Greece, Servia and Rumania but also of Turkey. And here it was that Enver made good his daring promise to the Turks to win back from Bulgaria for them their holy city, Adrianople. They had captured it in 1361 and had made it their first capital in Europe.

From this time forth Enver's influence was naturally paramount. He had had his military education in Germany. He admired the German training and discipline; indeed, the Turkish army had long been practically commanded by Baron von der Goltz and much army equipment was ordered from Germany. All these things have turned Turkey towards Germany rather than towards France or England. Enver Bey is now Enver Pasha.

Our interest, however, is not so keen concerning immediate as it is concerning future events. For, in the event of Austro-German success, Turkey may dream of regaining Macedonia and Albania—particularly Albania, with its Mohammedan population; possibly Tunis, even Egypt itself! She may not realize, however, that the Austrian desire to advance to Salonika might interfere. The only Turkish dream that might come true is that an Austro-German victory would ensure the present possession to her a

little longer of all that remains of Turkey-in-Europe.

On the other hand, the success of the Entente Powers would not improbably mean the immediate end of Turkey-in-Europe, the abandonment of all the Ægean Islands, together with the control of the Dardanelles, the Bosporus and finally of Constantinople.

Think of Constantinople no longer Turkish and Mohammedan, as it has been since 1453, but Christian and, if not a free city, then under either Slav or Greek control. Have the Greeks ever forgotten the old adage that "When a Constantine marries a Sophia, they shall reign at Constantinople?" And a Constantine and a Sophia are now King and Queen of Greece!

There are other events also intimately bound up in the present situation. With Turkey in the war, will Greece remain out? Will Bulgaria? Will Rumania? Above all, will Italy?

The recent treatment of Greek residents by the Turks nearly brought Turkey and Greece again to war as it was.

On the other hand, Bulgaria is smarting to regain prestige—anywhere.

Rumania, as we have seen, has her own reason for wanting to take advantage of the present opportunity either as against Russia on the one hand or as against Austria-Hungary on the other.

And Italy, so lately at war with Turkey, will find it more difficult than ever to maintain her neutrality, particularly in view of Pan-Islam demonstrations which it is reported, the religious agents of Turkey have been stirring up on the Tripolitan border with their proclamations of a Jehad or Holy War.

If the action of Turkey therefore changes the attitude of some or all of these States from neutrality to belligerency, the scope of the war will be vastly extended. Will it follow that, because of this, the war's duration will be proportionately lengthened?

XV

AMERICA

[QUEENSTOWN, IRELAND, *22d October, 1914.*]

WHAT does the war mean to us?

I

It means that we, non-belligerents, should fulfill all our duties towards belligerents, if we are partners to the same contract.

For instance, our delegates and those of other Powers signed the Hague Conventions or treaties, whose object was to lessen the evils of wars. While the delegates' signatures might have indicated that their respective nations could ratify these treaties, no legal obligation was created. Legal obligation results only from ratification and a country is legally bound from the date of the deposit of ratifications.

The Dutch Government fixed a date for their deposit. The nations which had ratified their delegates' signatures, deposited such ratifications with the Dutch Foreign Minister at The Hague.

One of the Hague treaties provides that the territory of neutral powers is inviolable.[1] Yet, even

[1] 1907 Convention V, Article 1.

before war broke out last summer, diplomats everywhere foresaw it would occur and that there might be violation of neutral territory.

We are the most disinterested of the Powers. Thus any protest from us has proportionate weight. Our State Department knows this. It also knew—or should have known—of the menace to neutrality. We have not learned, however, whether it informed our partners to this particular treaty that we assumed they would adhere to their promise but, nevertheless, asked for an assurance, as otherwise we might have to act as would seem wise in interpreting our own responsibility. We only know that, in harmony with the Hague treaties,[1] our President promptly and praiseworthily offered our mediatory offices to the Powers.

War began. Germany violated the neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium. Japan violated that of China. If, before, the law-abiding should have warned the suspects, should not now the law-abiding have warned the lawless? Yet we have not been informed whether our Government did other than to allow certain of our partners to break their treaty without our protest.

Nor have we been informed of any subsequent protest.

[1] 1907 Convention I, Article 3.

If our Government did nothing, two things might explain its attitude.

First, our delegates signed the Hague treaties, stipulating that we should not be required to depart from the policy of not entangling ourselves in the political questions of any foreign state. Technically, this may seem to clear us. Our Government may hold that we have never acted except in cases directly affecting us. For example, so far as the world knows, we did not protest when the French overthrew the Sultan of Morocco.

Second, the treaty does not apply unless all the belligerents are parties to it.[1] England, Turkey, Montenegro and Servia have not ratified it. Therefore, the treaty is not binding.

Technically again, this clears us. But does it *morally?*

Can we escape moral responsibility by a mere technicality? We solemnly affirmed the principle of neutrality by our delegates' signatures and by a nation's ratification. Does not that affirmation involve duty and responsibility—even if our hands are technically free?

From the standpoint of ethics then have we not missed a great opportunity? Who can estimate the moral effect awakened by an early protest from us

[1] 1907 Convention V, Article 20.

against the violation of neutrality, especially such neutrality as Belgium's. It might even have been compelling.

Quite aside from any influence we might have had in Europe, we have really been assailed on a principle of broad national polity in America. Under the Monroe Doctrine we protect a dozen weak Latin American countries from aggression. Our position as guarantor should give to us a greater concern than has any other nation in protecting weak states from attack.

Thus national interests and international morals alike required a protest from us last summer.

II

Again, what does the war mean to us? It should mean something very definite as to the atrocities involved.

We hear of atrocities committed by Belgians on wounded German soldiers, thus violating the Geneva Convention to which Belgium was a party.[1]

We hear of atrocities committed by Germans in Belgium and France. Germany signed the Hague treaty concerning land warfare with the exception of one of its articles which had nothing to do with the atrocities in question.[2] Though Germany was bound

[1] The Red Cross Treaty, 1864.

[2] 1907 Convention IV, Article 44.

by the other articles, they do not apply unless all the belligerents are parties to the treaty.[1] And all belligerents are not parties. Servia, Montenegro and Turkey did not ratify. The other belligerents did. Hence the treaty binds none of them.

This again, *technically*. But, also again, are the other belligerents not bound *morally?* Their case here is like ours as regards neutrality. Consider the Hague prohibition of the bombardment of undefended towns.[2] For instance, why should it not morally apply to the French aviators if, as rumored, they dropped a bomb into an undefended German town? Should it not have prevented the Germans from bombarding undefended Belgian towns? And should it not have prevented British airmen, if we may believe a London paper, from dropping bombs on Bruges and Thielt? Now France, Germany and England ratified this treaty. Even if they may disregard it technically, ought they morally to disregard it, just because, forsooth, Servia, Montenegro and Turkey have not ratified it?

The same principle applies to the articles prohibiting pillage,[3] the levying of illegal contributions,[4] of

[1] 1907 Convention IV, Article 2.
[2] 1907 Convention IV, Article 25.
[3] 1907 Convention IV, Articles 28, 47.
[4] 1907 Convention IV, Article 49.

collective penalties for individual acts,[1] the demand of goods or services save for the needs of the occupying army,[2] and the prohibition of the damage to municipal property or that dedicated to religion, charity, education and the arts and sciences; as well as to historic monuments;[3] finally the prohibition of mines in the open sea.[4]

The regulations concerning land warfare were agreed upon with the provision that a belligerent who violates them should be liable to pay damages.[5] Certainly every guilty State should pay indemnity. We have a hint of this in the following telling phrases from President Wilson's reply to the German Emperor.

"A day of accounting."

"Where wrongs have been committed, their consequences and the relative responsibility involved will be assessed."

"The opinion of mankind" is "the final arbiter."[6]

This should mean that, at the proper time, we would cause a tribunal of judges from neutral countries to be convoked—from North and South America, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Scandinavia, Holland—to weigh

[1] 1907 Convention IV, Article 50.
[2] 1907 Convention IV, Article 52.
[3] 1907 Convention IV, Article 56.
[4] 1907 Convention VIII, Articles 1, 3.
[5] 1907 Convention IV, Article 3.
[6] See Addenda.

evidence from both sides as to the alleged atrocities and to come to such verdict as shall, as far as possible, vindicate the authority of international law. By such a moral pronouncement the whole world would and should arrive at a just conclusion about matters much disputed at present but impossible to be adjudged save by an impartial neutral tribunal.

III

A moral protest is respected by moral nations. With others, no protest, or even treaty, is worth the paper it is written on unless we are ready to back by arms our word of pen.

Two British opinions on this subject are worth quoting. One well-known statesman said to me: "Over-emphasis on nationalism is an evil. It is seen in America. You talk too much about Old Glory. You wave the flag too much. You are in general too much puffed up with your national self-importance and your self-sufficiency. And so, in particular, you think you must compete with the Powers of Europe in point of arms.[1] You are not Germany, hemmed in on all sides; she has had to be armed to the teeth. You are independent. Your geographical location is your security. No one is going to attack you, not even the Japanese. You do not need, therefore, a

[1] See Addenda.

large army and navy. You need only a few gunboats to protect your citizens in some South American country which may happen to be in the throes of revolution. You do not realize that you are living practically in a fireproof dwelling!"

Quite the contrary opinion was expressed by another English statesman. He said: "The Germans are after us now. They will be after you next! We had a treaty with Germany. How much did it protect us? How much did it protect Belgium? Was it of the slightest use? Where would we be if we were not in a position to sweep the seas? Our Navy has always made us great and always will, no matter how many gallant deeds our little Army is doing. Be warned in time. Make your Navy strong, too. You too have thousands of miles of coast to defend. You too have now oversea possessions to defend. And you always have the Monroe Doctrine to defend. Make your Army efficient too, not only in numbers but in ammunition. Have you enough guns? Who knows? But you ought to know. Be prepared."

Here are two counsels. They come from friends of America, and from men eminent in the work of civilization. The two opinions are contradictory. One must be followed. Which is the better? What is the lesson for us?

The lesson for America is to be the just man armed.

We need a strong navy as a national insurance to protect our coasts and our commerce, and to fulfil our international obligations. It should act as an international police. Yet Congress withholds necessary naval appropriations and sanctions an unnecessary outlay on pensions and public buildings!

We may not need a proportionately strong army, but we do need a more adequate army: First in the military training of all the American youth—more for an education in obedience, self-restraint, endurance, courage, than for any possible use in an exigency. In these respects let us imitate the Swiss, non-militaristic but ever-ready. Our new and deservedly successful system of army camps for college students points the way. Second, we need a close co-operation between our Federal forces and the State militia, and here additional legislation is necessary. Third, we need to fill up the regiments of our present army to their full quota, to place our coast defences in proper condition, and to establish an adequate supply of arms and ammunition. This is not militarism, unreasonable, brutal, destructive; it is reasonable, self-respecting preparedness.

We need to do all this not for military but for civil ends and by civil authority. We need to do it first, so as to uphold our own public law, for no country has ever fully protected the rights of its own citizens

which has not prepared itself for possible defence against foreign aggression. But we need also to be prepared to uphold the public international laws which guard the common life of humanity. To protest against the violations of those laws may even be worth imperilling a nation's existence!

IV

Finally, the war should clinch a greater international fraternity. The Europeans will take care that they get greater liberty and equality. Our part is to emphasize the fraternity—to stimulate a world-patriotism.

National diversities may seem decidedly unfruitful just now. But, like friendships among individuals, so amity among States may be the stronger because founded on such diversities. However war may convulse the surface, world-patriotism means the underlying, deep-down unity and mutual need of all peoples. We try to express their truths through international law. Why not through international love?

The need is for an age of fraternalism, beginning even now when conditions seem at their worst. The need is to take these conditions of fear and hate and transform them into conditions of understanding and trust. For the Germans are not all militarists; the English not all hypocrites! Why not make such facts

known? It is our function sympathetically, spiritually, to interpret all the warring nations to one another. It is our privilege to be the intensive Something meant by Christ when He gave to the world two new commandments.

Whether or not we Americans grasp this particular opportunity of service, the world is becoming one great family. The war may lead us to the contrary conclusion. It is indeed revealing psychological differences. But it is also revealing likenesses and sympathies. And these belong to no one nation or group of nations, but to all mankind.

If we are members of the family of nations, let us act as if we were. To recapitulate:

1. We must be ready to utilize whatever influence or power we have in upholding treaty obligations.

2. We must emphasize the value of neutral tribunals.

3. We must be the just man armed.

4. We must interpret the nations to one another.

XVI

AFTER THE WAR

[S. S. CEDRIC, *30th October, 1914.*]

THE war is nearly three months old. Under conditions as they actually were each nation engaged may have at first acted rightly from its own standpoint. But certain causes of the war stand out ever clearer.

When one thinks of immediate causes, one is of course convinced that even these—let alone ultimate causes—can hardly be brought out at the present time in true perspective. Hence a consequent difficulty in weighing and placing responsibility. Yet White Papers and White, Orange, Blue and Grey Books reveal much.

In their light we think, first of all, of Servia. The first immediate cause of the European conflagration appears to be traceable to the Servian Government. In its own statement it admits that it had not kept its promise to live "in good, neighborly relations" with Austria. And, during the weeks following the Sarajevo murder, there was no indication, so far as I know, of any neighborly co-operation in investigating that murder, even if Servia did comply later to an

unexpected degree with Austria's further demands, doing more, indeed, than most Slavs would countenance.

But Austria, I think, was a more efficient cause of the conflagration and far more to blame, both because higher in the scale of civilization and because holding a more delicate balance as regards the peace of Europe. She had, it is true, received long and extreme provocation from Servia. Yet the nature of Austria's final demands was unprecedented and her manner peremptory. She acted as if any Balkan question were a particular question between two nations; as a matter of fact it is always a European question. She surely knew that she could not press Servia too far without arousing resentment throughout Russia. She surely knew that this would probably drive the Russian Government to arms. But Austria would not give a reasonable respite. Her hasty declaration of war, it seems to me, is more to be condemned than the assassination which preceded it. Thus Austria lit the match for the present conflagration.

As to Russia, who would defend her alleged double dealings in giving the world to understand that she was only partially mobilizing when she was completely mobilizing? Certainly, from the standpoint of expedient military strategy, any crossing of the German border would seem to constitute provocation

for the German declaration of war. If, before that declaration, Russia did cross the frontier in several places and commit deeds of war in Germany, she is also certainly accountable for the European conflagration.

As to Germany, she erred, in my opinion, in supporting all of the clauses in the Austrian ultimatum and in demanding an immediate acquiescence. While she has been blamed for declining Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a Four-power conference, she may have had good reason to deem it "stacked" in advance! Be this as it may, she made a critical mistake when, like Austria, she acted hastily; that is, when she declared war on Russia without waiting to see what would be the moral effect of her own mobilization or whether the renewed Russo-Austrian parleying might not lead to something tangible. Finally, German violation of Belgian neutrality had no moral justification whatsoever and this was by far the most fatal step of all. Thus, from the facts so far disclosed, Austria and Germany may be held chiefly responsible for the present conflagration.

As to France, everyone of course expected her to fulfil her obligation to Russia as an ally. But, aside from this she added fuel to the general flame by yielding to the temptation to take advantage of the Russo-German tension to win back Alsace-Lorraine

and to put an end to the later German attitude, which may have seemed to her one of much arrogance.

Now as to England. Days before Austria declared war on Servia, Russia, relying on the supposed English "isolation policy" towards Germany, appealed for England's support. According to Sir Edward Grey's statements in the House of Commons, England's hands were free. Had she then definitely taken sides, the general conflict, some are convinced, might have been prevented. In my view of the matter, however, Sir Edward Grey was not then sure whether Parliament would back him in pledging the country to war. Later, when Germany appealed to England to hold France neutral, to remain neutral herself and thus keep Germany from war to the west, England's hands, it was seen, were not free. France was a participant. Aside from obligations to France, when Belgium became a factor, England's course was clear and she instantly followed it.

Finally, as to Japan. She caused war with Germany because, as she claims, she had to capture Kiaochau (leased by Germany from China) to preserve peace in the Far East. This Germany denies. But if Japan's plea is justified, her violation of Chinese neutrality in seizing a railway, not on leased German soil but on Chinese neutral soil, and her disregard of China's protest would seem to have little justification. Her

counterclaim, however, is that Germany had previously used the railway for military purposes. In any event, a fundamental principle of international law is that a belligerent must respect a neutral's impartial attitude.

Thus in causing the present war, responsibility of some sort, from very remote to very direct degree, rests on various countries. But none rests on Belgium.

These are *immediate* causes. Others lie back of them. There are *ultimate* causes.

We find one in the longing which Peter the Great implanted in every Russian—the longing to possess Constantinople, to make it again Christian, to hold it as a warm water port and as an outlet for Russia's ships into the Mediterranean; finally to give her a vantage point from which to rule the Balkan States.

We find another ultimate cause in Austria's attempt to extend her influence southwards to Salonika on the Ægean Sea, an attempt directly conflicting with Russia's protection of the Balkan States westward to the Adriatic. The desire to attain the southern sea had been a constant part of Austria's policy, but this plan did not become very active until after 1866, when the loss of Venetia made Austria wish for an offset.

Of course we discover a third ultimate reason for the present war in the remembrance by Europe of

what the Treaty of Westphalia had done to establish and neutralize the small States; of England's action thereafter in upholding Dutch independence, followed by her blameworthy course in not upholding Danish integrity. Both in these positive and in these negative actions can ultimate causes of the present war be found.

In Prussia's wars with Denmark, Austria and France another reason may be found, for, not until after these wars did the Powers begin their suicidal race with regard to arms.

Still another ultimate cause for the present war is the expectation of aid from allied nations. This cause came into being in our time when Bismarck formed the Dreikaiserbund among Germany, Austria and Russia; later, when Alexander II. of Russia laid the foundation for the friendship with France which soon resulted in a hard-and-fast alliance; later, when the Congress of Berlin tore up Russia's Treaty of San Stefano with Turkey; still later, when Germany and Austria formed an alliance; again, when Bismarck fell, and with him the policy of German friendship for Russia; again, when William II. sent his famous telegram to President Kruger, foreshadowing a new alignment; once more, when England allied herself with Japan, the effect of which was seen in the Russo-Japanese war; and, finally, when the Anglo-French

and Anglo-Russian Ententes were formed, even if they were established to deal only with matters outside Europe.

All of the above events may have had rather more to do with territorial than with commercial ambitions. But there have been also distinctly commercial causes of the present war.

If we remember Russia's desire to possess Constantinople and Austria's to possess Salonika, we must also remember Germany's motives. They had something to do with the Prussian seizure of Schleswig in 1864 and the occupation of Alsace in 1871, and now there is an entirely natural desire on the part of Germany to establish a great Teutonic sphere of influence between the Eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. The thought of this has doubtless in recent years been back of Germany's various coquettings with Turkey and of Germany's alliance with Austria.

Commercial causes have also influenced England. The violation of a treaty is by no means, the Germans maintain, the only reason for England's going to war. The real and underlying motive, they allege, is British greed. That is to say, it is the protection and enlargement of British markets, cent per cent. German success in encroaching upon these markets and, still more, the possible challenge to British mercantile

maritime supremacy—these things long since excited a corresponding British jealousy, say the Germans; indeed many signs point to the truth of this charge. And now, as we read English newspapers, and as we hear Englishmen talk, we note the openly and daily expressed expectation of many of them to wage the present war—ostensibly begun to defend a lofty ethical principle—to the complete ruin of their chief commercial rival!

On the other hand, the wisest Englishmen have recognized that war does not in the end bring commercial profit and that competition can be overcome only by greater commercial efficiency. Moreover, while the German markets are open to the British only on the basis of a protective tariff the British markets are open to the Germans, on the basis of Britain's time-honored policy of free trade.

War has now come despite the influence of the great financial institutions, in both England and Germany. That influence has been steadily tending towards a better understanding and co-operation. Silently but powerfully it has endeavored to ensure, as far as it could, the peoples against war. Though it has failed in the present instance, let us not forget the occasions when it has succeeded. It is the material expression of the world's unity.

Indeed, why should not the great financial institu-

tions everywhere also undertake another task? Why should not they, acting mutually and internationally, not only try to prevent war, but also, as far as possible, ensure their clients against war's consequences if war should occur? And, in the last analysis, those clients are the nations themselves.

So much for causes. Now for conclusions. This war cannot go on for ever. Some day peace will come.

On what principle and in what spirit will peace be made? If it is to be a permanent peace, it must be drafted, not in the interest of one side or the other, not even in the interests of both sides, but also, and quite as much, in the interest of the neutral nations.

Again, it must be no ignoble peace—that is to say, it must be no peace-at-any-price. We cannot cry "Peace, peace" when there is no peace. War is infinitely preferable to the slavery of an ignoble peace. We must begin by seeking justice and righteousness first and peace second—a long way second! Otherwise it will not be enduring: it may be a name; it will not be a reality.

The spirit with which peace is concluded must be eminently humane. The spirit, the attitude, to be efficient and effective, must seek neither to wreak vengeance nor to inflict humiliation.

Only so will there be real peace. Only so will peace

be no mere truce, hiding within it the seeds of future war.

What can we do to lessen the chances of a repetition of this war?

It has weakened the world's population in quality as well as in numbers. It has pathetically increased the world's poverty. It has brought incredibly outrageous burdens on the women—always the greatest sufferers by any war. It has crippled all mankind in life, liberty, pursuit of happiness and peaceful progress in civilization. Worst of all it has inspired hate. It has poisoned souls.

Yet shall we permit this world war to have been in vain? Colossal as has been the sacrifice, shall not the present cataclysm quicken and clarify our minds so as to create such international conditions as may bring permanent order out of present chaos?

To secure permanent order, certain principles of democracy should be borne in mind. In their light certain reforms are necessary.

There should be a more assured right of *national self-government*. Only through it can any mutual international trust be developed. National boundaries should be decided not by military conquests or military needs but by the natural division of race

and language. There should be no longer any tearing away of unwilling provinces from a State, as in the case of Alsace-Lorraine, either because of revenge or because of supposed military needs. If so, we should thus have a renewal of what followed the Peace of Westphalia. The rights of the small States should be emphasized and enforced. Just as the independence of Switzerland and Holland was then finally acknowledged, so the nations might even now agree that Finland—especially after its recent betrayals!—had a right to a national self-government and guarantee such a government to it. And why not to a reunited Poland? Even Alsace-Lorraine might become an independent buffer state if the Alsace-Lorrainers vote for it! Why not have a string of neutral states, indeed, Switzerland, Alsace, Lorraine, Luxemburg, Belgium, Holland? a sort of middle empire, such as was the old Lotharingia, which comprised them all.

Next there should be a development of *the rights and security of neutrality*, begun by the Swiss Treaty of 1815 and continued by the Belgian Treaties of 1831 and 1839. The fundamental issue of neutrality must now be definitely guaranteed in such wise that the small States involved can count upon permanent existence. There is plenty of rational good sense

about neutrality—even among those who have violated it! What it needs now is an international insurance of a thoroughgoing kind.

Next, the peoples should rule through really representative *national executives*. It matters little what the Executive is called, Emperor, King, President; the main thing is that he should no longer rule by the grace of some military caste or clique, but by the grace of all the people. In Russia, the monarch has been independent of control by the people, and in Austria and Germany he has been half-way independent. What has been the result? The Emperors of these nations, having at their disposal highly trained armies and immense armaments, have actually been able of their own will to turn the nation's physical force to one side or the other, possibly after consulting an assembly of princes or military chiefs, but without consulting the representative assemblies of the people.

The present rulers of these countries are all benevolently intentioned persons. But why should the respective peoples run the risk of being the tool of some weak, spineless monarch, of some petty busybody, of some ruthless schemer, of some crank, possibly of some madman? In a trice, such a person can give to a slowly won civilization the semblance of

barbarism. When this becomes clear to the minds of peoples, who have not as yet entirely awakened to a complete self-consciousness, a sudden growth in democracy and radical changes in executive government may be expected. The growing vitality will burst its shell.

If national self-government and a really assured neutrality to small States mean, as they do, the reign of greater liberty, surely the more democratic system of national executives would bring about the reign of a greater equality.

In the next place, there should be a proportionate lessening of the aim to create alliances among the nations merely to maintain a so-called "balance of power." An English paper puts this forth as a reason for England's going to war. Now, of course it may be desirable to maintain a balance of power. But consider what the effort to do so has involved. For a generation it has kept the countries of Europe divided into two antagonistic groups, the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. Indeed, for centuries, it has filled Europe with suspicion, jealousy, intrigue, strife. Should not the system be succeeded by something better? What might that be? Why not have *a Concert of the Powers*—a really harmonious Concert this time! Why not secure it by a federal

treaty (no "scrap of paper" if a provision outlined later be observed) embracing small as well as large States? Under it, why not have the federal signatories mutually guarantee their several territories and their sovereign rights. The vanquished could sign such a treaty with no humiliation, because no terms would be enforced which the victors did not equally accept for themselves.

These and all other ends must be accomplished by *a new diplomacy*. We have seen the evils of secretive diplomacy, especially its tendency towards deceit. When Government secrecy must be maintained by disregarding truth, so that when an appeal to force comes, one country may secure an advantage by taking the other by surprise, we have just such a sudden reaction as occurred when Germany discovered that Russia had been mobilizing and not telling the whole truth about it.

This is the age of intelligence and democracy. If so, the time has gone by when the people can be satisfied by the assertion that they cannot comprehend the problems of foreign policy. Certainly the time has gone by when, at the behest of a few ultra-militarists accidentally in power, who mistake violence for strength, the Government at one blow destroys what the people have been long in building.

There must be an end of secret diplomacy, with its power to make issues and determine events. There must be a general adoption of the policy which John Hay established when he took the whole world into his confidence. He knew that his plan to assure China's territorial, administrative and commercial integrity was directly opposed to the autocracy of the Russian Government which fought it. He knew that it rested on the desires of all peoples. Suppose the Foreign Ministers had taken the peoples into their confidence, should we have had this war?

The ideal of those who have inspired the Hague Conferences ought to be realized—*an International Parliament and an International Supreme Court.*

The latter should be the Court of Arbitral Justice, as outlined by Elihu Root, to replace the present Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague—which is neither permanent nor a Court! It should seek justice first, last and all the time, no matter whether peace follows or not. To this end it should be composed of judges from every nation—not of diplomats seeking compromise, but of impartial judges, attending only to the facts of the special cases before them, without a thought of the prejudices of the particular nations involved.

Nor need this court be all-embracing. Excep-

tions might be made of certain subjects which could not be brought up, such as certain domestic affairs; residence, naturalization and citizenship; territorial integrity; the collection of private debts. But the fundamental necessity would be to bring about an agreement that a dispute on any other than the above subjects should be submitted to the court, no matter whether the dispute has to do with the nation thus federated or whether it is a dispute between one of them and any outside nation.

Moreover, and most important of all—visionary as it may seem, *the nations which can back by armed strength the court's decrees should bind themselves to do so*, as well as to abide by those decrees. No paper agreement will protect defenceless nations from injury by others, unless, indeed, the whole body of nations binds itself to uphold by arms the conclusions of international law. In that service, while war would be possible and would be conducted under the rules of honor, there would be a better organization of force and its devotion to a far higher end. For the international force would bind itself to deal with any nation that might suddenly become lawless; its work would be to enforce the laws of an International Parliament and secure obedience to the decrees of an International Court. The armies of the

world would henceforth have as their main characteristic, not aggression but protection.

And the ideal of protection should appeal even more than that of aggression to the innate fighting qualities of mankind. We cannot do away with the fighting impulse. Nor would we. For the will to grow and the determination to overcome any difficulty to legitimate growth is the most invigorating quality in any man or folk. But it needs direction. Let it be used for protection and let it be fully responsible to the civil authority. This new ideal would appeal more to the unselfish natures of the greatest warriors than does the ideal of aggression and responsibility to military authority. More than does the present war-ideal, it would bring out what Moltke said war would emphasize, "man's noblest virtues of courage and renunciation, faithfulness to duty and readiness for sacrifice." In addition, the newer ideal would coincidently bring about a proportionate change in the necessity to rely on force.

We may thus anticipate even *the gradual diminishment of competitive armaments*. We cannot do away with armies and navies as guardians of the peace, it is true. But we must be free from the menace of what we call militarism—that is to say, that unreasonable, brutal and destructive competition in

arms which has imposed a senseless burden upon the countries of Europe. I oppose militarism, not because it may have retarded the realization of social justice for, paradoxical as it may seem, the country, Germany, the most accused of being militaristic, is the one which has made the greatest advance in agricultural improvement, in education, in municipal government and in social legislation. I oppose militarism because it is an economic and moral waste and especially because it forms a ready weapon to all enemies of progress, whether autocratic or capitalistic.

Why then should not the nations one day agree to maintain only such naval and military forces as a supreme federal authority may determine desirable for the common policing and protection of all the signatories to such a proposal? In other words, why should not the nations agree to replace, as far as possible, individual strength by collective strength? Instead of crushing mankind, as now, what we call militarism would itself be in the way to be eliminated. Armies would be combined and changed to the Swiss form, which provides for adequate military training and readiness without military excess. Such a force should be of far less numerical strength and more economical to maintain than are the present separate armies.

The general plan of a judicial organization of peace, will, of course, outrun the limits of Europe. In it, we catch a glimpse of the vision of *a world federation of nations*. And in that federation our own nation will assuredly play its part.

Out of all the welter of war there will doubtless come a variety of counsels as to the future. But no matter what methods be adopted the lesson of the war should check the influence of the selfish man, of the swaggerer, of the bully, of the hypocrite. The spirit of such men is accountable for most international differences. Such men have been mainly responsible for this war. Sordid in their materialism, brutal in their militarism, arrogant in their executive power and secretive in their diplomacy, they have threatened the whole earth.

Yet a better world, let us be sure, will emerge from the horrors of war. The new world must become conscious of itself as a unit of humanity.

THE WAR IN BRIEF

1914.

June 28. The Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian throne, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, murdered at Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia. The crime said to be due to the machinations of the "Narodna Odbrana."

July 9. Results of the Austrian investigation into the crime laid before Emperor Francis Joseph and later communicated to the Press.

" Serious disclosures concerning the condition of the French Army.

July 18. The London *Times* warns Servia.

July 21. The *Frankfurter Zeitung* warns Austria against precipitate action; other papers encourage Servia to friendly positive action.

July 23. Austria presents an ultimatum to Servia.

July 24. Russia, considering the Austrian demands as an indirect challenge to her, begins military preparations. Strike at St. Petersburg.

July 25. Servia replies to Austria. Departure of Austrian Minister from Belgrade, the Servian capital.

" Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Minister, proposes that England, Germany, France and Italy should mediate at Vienna and St. Petersburg.

July 26. Sir Edward Grey proposes that the German, French and Italian Ambassadors at London should meet him in immediate conference for

the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications. Russia announces that she cannot remain indifferent to Servia's fate.

July 27. The London *Telegraph* warns Servia.

" France and Italy accept Sir Edward Grey's proposal, Germany refuses. Austria also announces that she can not be bound by it. Sir Edward Grey appeals especially to Germany.

" General review of the British fleet.

July 28. Austria declares war on Servia.

July 29. Announcement that Russia is partially mobilizing.

" Germany makes a bid for England's support in case of a European conflagration.

July 30. The Austrians bombard Belgrade.

" England declines the German proposal.

July 31. A general mobilization discovered in Russia.

" Mobilization in Belgium and Holland.

" Germany presents an ultimatum to Russia and France.

" Jean Jaurès murdered in Paris.

" Sir Edward Grey asks France and Germany whether they will respect Belgian neutrality.

" France promises to respect it if the other Powers do.

" Germany doubts whether she can make any satisfactory answer.

August 1. William II. telegraphs to George V. saying that, if England and France remain neutral, he will remove his troops from the French frontier and respect Belgian neutrality.

" France orders general mobilization.

" Germany orders general mobilization.

August 1. French aviators alleged to have dropped bombs in Nuremberg, Germany.
" The Russian troops alleged to have crossed the German border in several places.
" Germany declares war against Russia.
August 2. Sir Edward Grey assures France that the English Fleet will protect the French north coast against the German Fleet.
" All British Naval Reserves called up.
" Germany presents an ultimatum to Belgium.
" Germany crosses Luxemburg.
" Claiming that the French had entered Germany the day before by the Schlucht Pass, Germany enters French territory.
" The German cruiser Augsburg bombards the Russian military port of Libau.
" The Russians destroy their own port of Hängö.
August 3. Sir Edward Grey defines England's attitude.
" The Australian Government offers 20,000 men.
" The English Fleet mobilized.
" Italy declares neutrality.
" King Albert of Belgium appeals to King George.
" England announces that she will support Belgium.
August 4. England presents an ultimatum to Germany.
" Mobilization of the British Army.
" Sir John Jellicoe takes command of the Navy.
" The Germans cross the Belgian border.
" England declares war on Germany.
" The German vessels, Goeben and Breslau bombard Bona and Philippeville.
August 5. Lord Kitchener appointed War Secretary.

August 5. The Germans besiege Liège.

" The English cruiser Amphion sinks the German mine-layer Königin Luise; thereafter the Amphion runs over one of the Königin Luise's mines and is blown up.

August 6. The British Parliament votes 500,000 men and £100,000,000 ($500,000,000) for the war.

" The Germans capture Briey in France.

" Austria declares war against Russia.

August 7. New paper currency issued in England.

" The Germans enter the city of Liège.

" The Germans make a second offer to the Belgians, the Belgians refuse it.

" Montenegro declares war against Austria.

August 8. The English invade the German colony of Togo in West Africa.

" The French capture Altkirch in Germany.

August 9. The English definitely retain in England the Turkish dreadnoughts which had been constructed there.

" The Japanese fleet sails for Kiaochau, the German leased territory in China.

" The British cruiser Birmingham sinks the German submarine U. 15.

August 10. France declares war against Austria.

" The Germans invade Cape Colony.

" The Russian dreadnought Peroswanny sunk.

August 11. The French retire from German Alsace.

August 12. England declares war against Austria.

" The Belgians repulse the Germans at Haelen.

" Turkey buys the Goeben and the Breslau.

" The French repulse the Germans at Lagarde, Lorraine.

August 13. France declares war against Austria.

August 13. Russia promises autonomy to Poland.

August 14. The English bombard Dar-es-Salaam, the capital of German East Africa.

August 15. Japan presents an ultimatum to Germany, demanding the evacuation of Kiaochau.

" The Germans in entire control of the Liège fortifications.

August 16. The British land in France.

" The Belgian Government is removed to Antwerp.

August 17. The French destroy the Austrian cruiser Zenta.

August 18. The Germans capture Tirlemont.

" The battle of Sabac in Servia.

August 19. The Russians occupy Gumbinnen in East Prussia.

August 20. The Germans occupy Brussels.

August 21. The Germans levy $40,000,000 on Brussels.

" The Germans, under the Bavarian Crown Prince, defeat the French at the battle, lasting several days, near Dieuze.

" The Germans defeat the Belgians and French at the battle of Charleroi.

" The Germans invade South Africa.

August 22. The Germans attack Namur.

August 23. The Germans defeat the British at Mons.

" Japan declares war on Germany: Japan blockades and bombards the German port of Tsingtau in China.

August 24. Namur falls.

" The Allies retreat into France.

" The Germans, under Duke Albert of Würtemburg, defeat the French at Neufchâteau.

" The Germans occupy Lunéville.

August 24. The Austrians defeat the Russians at Krasnik.

August 25. The Germans destroy much of Louvain.

" The Allies fall back to Cambrai.

August 26. After a siege of 28 days the Germans capture Longwy.

" A new "National Ministry" in France.

August 27. The British ship Highflyer sinks the German Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse off the West African coast.

" The Russians destroy the German cruiser Magdeburg in the Gulf of Finland.

August 28. The British fleet sinks five German warships off Heligoland.

" The Germans bombard Malines.

" Austria declares war on Belgium.

" The Allies fall back to St. Quentin.

August 29. British troops from New Zealand occupy German Samoa.

August 30. The Germans drive the Allies to the line of the Somme, the Oise and the Upper Meuse.

August 31. The Germans drive the Allies to the region between the Marne and Seine.

" The Germans defeat the Russians at Osterode, destroying or capturing three army corps.

September 1. Nicholas II. proclaims that the name of St. Petersburg is to be changed to Petrograd.

September 2. The Japanese land 10,000 troops in China.

" The Russians, after seven days' fighting, defeat the Austrians at Lemberg.

September 3. The Germans advance to Château-Thierry.

" The French Government moves from Paris to Bordeaux.

September 4. The Belgians open the dykes and flood out the German advance towards Antwerp.

" German mines sink the British vessels Speedy and Linsdell.

September 5. German mines sink the British scout gunboat Pathfinder, also the Wilson liner Runo.

" England, France and Russia agree not to treat for peace separately.

September 6. The Germans cross the Marne.

September 7. Germans reach the extreme point of their advance; the tide of invasion begins to turn.

" The Germans finally capture Maubeuge.

September 8. The former White Star liner Oceanic, now a British Government boat, sinks off the North coast of Scotland.

September 9. 70,000 Indian troops sail for England.

September 10. The Germans, failing to break the Allied line at Vitry-le-François, lose the Battle of the Marne.

" The Russians capture Tomaszov.

September 11. An Australian expedition captures the German headquarters of the New Guinea and Bismarck Archipelago Protectorate.

September 12. The German cruiser Emden sinks a number of British ships off the coast of India.

September 13. The Allies force the passage of the Aisne, near Soissons.

" The British submarine E. 9 sinks the German cruiser Hela.

September 14. The British auxiliary cruiser Carmania —the well known Cunarder—sinks the German Cap Trafalgar off the South American east coast.

September 15. The Germans hold the line from Noyon to Verdun.

September 16. The Germans drive the Russians out of East Prussia.

September 17. The Russians rout the Austrian Army in Galicia.

September 18. Parliament is prorogued.

September 19. The Servians and Montenegrins defeat the Austrians in Novibazar.

" The British occupy Lüderitz in German South West Africa, the town where the first German protectorate on the African continent was proclaimed.

September 20. The Germans bombard Rheims and injure the Cathedral.

" The German cruiser Königsberg destroys the British vessel Pegasus in Zanzibar Harbor.

September 21. The critical day of the battle of the Craonne, resulting in advantage to the Allies.

September 22. German submarines in the North Sea sink the British cruisers Aboukir, Hogue, and Cressy.

" The Emden bombards Madras.

September 23. British aeroplanes raid the Zeppelin airship sheds at Dusseldorf.

September 24. A British Expeditionary Force arrives at Laoshan Bay to participate in the Japanese movements against the Germans at Tsingtau.

September 25. The Australians occupy the seat of government of Kaiser Wilhelm's Land.

September 26. The Russians reach vantage points near Cracow but are forced to retire.

September 27. The South African forces under General Botha defeat the Germans.

September 28. The Indian troops land at Marseilles.

September 29. The Emden sinks five more British steamships.

" The British cruiser Cumberland captures nine German merchant steamers in Kamerun River, West Africa.

September 30. After a week's battle at Augustovo the Russians force the Germans to retire.

October 2. The British repulse the Germans at Roye.

October 3. The Russians begin to advance from Bukovina across the Carpathians towards Transylvania.

October 4. A German torpedo sinks the Russian cruiser Pallada and sends her to the bottom with all hands.

October 5. The Chinese protest against the Japanese occupation of their railways as a flagrant violation of neutrality.

October 6. The Japanese proclaim martial law at Tsinanfu.

" The Belgian Government moves from Antwerp to Ostend.

" The Russians occupy Czernowitz, the capital of Bukovina.

October 7. The Japanese occupy the Marshall Islands.

October 8. Announcement of the arrival of Canadian troops off Southampton.

October 9. The Germans take Antwerp after an eleven day bombardment.

October 10. The French win an engagement at Hazebrouck.

October 11. The French place siege guns on Mount Lovchen, dominating Cattaro.

October 12. The Anglo-French fleet, now increased to

forty ships, recommences the bombardment of Cattaro.

October 13. Colonel Maritz in South Africa secedes to the Germans. Martial law proclaimed.

" The Belgian Government transferred from Ostend to Havre.

October 14. Battle of Glassinatz in Bosnia. Glassinatz dominates the fortifications of Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital.

October 15. Announcement that the Canadian troops have landed at Plymouth.

October 16. The Allies' line stretches from Ypres to the sea.

" A German submarine sinks the British cruiser Hawke.

October 17. H. M. S. Undaunted with the destroyers Lance, Legion, Lennox and Loyal sinks four German destroyers off the Dutch coast.

" The Japanese cruiser Takachiho sunk by a torpedo in Kiaochau Bay.

" Death of King Carol of Rumania.

October 18. Death of the Marquis di San Giuliano, Italian Foreign Minister.

" German warships sink the British submarine E. 3.

October 19. The Allies recapture Armentières.

October 20. A British naval flotilla bombards the Germans on the Belgian coast.

October 21. Rhodesia co-operates with the army of the South African Union.

October 22. The German cruiser Emden sinks more ships in the Indian Ocean.

October 23. The Austrians re-occupy Czernowitz.

October 24. The ten-day battle before Warsaw ends in a German defeat.

October 25. The Japanese capture a German destroyer at Tsingtau.

October 26. The British Prince Maurice of Battenberg killed at Ypres.

October 27. An Austrian river-monitor is blown up by a mine on the Save.

" The British superdreadnought Audacious sinks off the Irish coast.

" General Beyers and Christian deWet start a revolt in South Africa.

October 28. Russian ships, according to Turkish statement, endeavor to prevent the Turkish fleet from entering the Black Sea from the Bosporus. In the fight that followed, the Turks sink two Russian destroyers.

" The German cruiser Emden disables French and Russian warships in the harbor of Penang.

October 29. The Turkish fleet proceeds across the Black Sea and attacks shipping in three ports, Odessa, Novorossysk and Theodosia.

" Russia proclaims war against Turkey.

" Italy as the only neutral power to the Conference of London (1912), and assuming the duty of enforcing the decisions of that Conference, sends six warships to Avlona (Vallona).

October 30. Some of the Boer rebels surrender or are driven out of Cape Colony.

" Prince Louis of Battenberg resigns his position as First Sea Lord of the British Fleet. Admiral Baron Fisher succeeds him.

October 31. The proposal to increase taxes by one-tenth caused a split in the Italian Cabinet.

" The French airmen drop bombs upon the

German headquarters at Dixmude near Ostend, destroying the headquarters.

November 1. The German armored cruisers Gneisenau and Scharnhorst, together with some light cruisers, disable the British cruisers Cape of Good Hope and Monmouth off the Chilean coast near Coronel. The Good Hope founders and the Monmouth had not been heard from.

" By extending their mine fields, the British close the North Sea to trade. The neutral Governments involved protest.

" The Turks bombard Sevastopol.

November 2. The Russian fleet bombards Trebizond on the southern shore of the Black Sea.

November 3. A German squadron appears near Yarmouth, sinks a British submarine, shells the torpedo gunboat Halcyon.

November 4. The German cruiser Yorck strikes a mine near Bremen and sinks.

November 5. England and France declare war on Turkey. Great Britain formally annexes Cyprus.

" The Anglo-French fleet bombards the Dardanelles forts.

" The British bombard and occupy the Arabian port of Akaba in the Red Sea.

" The Russians cross the border into Turkish Armenia and defeat the Turks at Id.

" The Turks bombard the Russian port of Batum.

" The Turks seize the British steamers Assiut and Khios at Smyrna.

November 6. New Italian Cabinet. Signor Salandra continues as Premier. Baron Sonnino becomes Foreign Minister.

November 6. The Russians recapture Jaroslav.

" The Russians defeat three Turkish regiments near Erzsrum.

" Under Russian inspiration a native force besieges Van in Turkish Armenia, a hundred and forty miles southeast of Erzsrum.

" The Japanese capture Tsingtau after a 74-day siege.

November 7. The British ships bombard the Germans at Knocke and Zeebrugge on the Belgian coast.

" The Allies capture St. Rémy near Verdun on the heights of the Meuse.

" The Russians cross the Prussian border and occupy Pleschen.

November 8. The Russians occupy Wirballen and Stallupönen on the Prussian frontier.

" The Turks bombard Poti on the Black Sea.

November 9. The Russians also cross the East Prussian border at Soldau.

" The Germans repulse the Russians near Lake Wysztyten, on the East Prussian frontier near Wirballen.

November 10. The Australian cruiser Sydney destroys (?) the Emden near the Cocos Islands.

November 11. A submarine in the English Channel sinks the British torpedo gunboat Niger.

November 12. The Turks defeat the Russians at Koprukeui, thirty miles east of Erzsrum.

November 13. The Germans occupy Dixmude.

November 14. The Belgians open more dykes flooding the country between the sea and Ypres.

November 15. The British and French force the Germans beyond the Yser Canal.

" Death of Field Marshal Earl Roberts.

November 16. Italy votes $80,000,000 to keep her army on a war footing.

" 17. The British Prime Minister announces a war loan of $1,750,000,000.

" 18. The French capture Tracy-le-Val.

" The Turks at Smyrna fire upon the launch of the U. S. S. Tennessee.

" 19. The British House of Commons votes a new army of 1,000,000 men.

" 20. The Germans, advancing in Poland, engage the Russians near Lodz in what may be one of the decisive battles of the war.

DATES REFERRED TO IN THE TEXT

1361. The Turks capture Adrianople.
1453. The Turks capture Constantinople.
1555–1598. Reign of Philip II. of Spain. He oppresses the Netherlands.
1568. The Northern Netherlands (Holland) revolts against Spanish dominion.
1574. The Dutch raise the siege of Leyden.
1643–1715. Reign of Louis XIV. of France. He oppresses the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Alsace-Lorraine and the Palatinate.
1648. The Treaty of Westphalia: the Powers acknowledge the independence of Holland: the Dutch control the Scheldt.
1652. The English Navigation Act leads to war between England and Holland.
1672. England and France invade Holland.
1682–1725. Reign of Peter the Great of Russia.
1713. Treaty of Utrecht: the Southern Netherlands (Belgium) pass from Spanish to Austrian control.
1772. Partition of Poland.
1788. The Triple Alliance of England, Holland and Prussia.
1789. The French Revolution begins.
1792. France throws down her gauntlet to England.
1793. Second Partition of Poland.
France declares war against England and Holland.
1795. Third Partition of Poland.
1796. Napoleon oppresses Italy.
1807. Napoleon oppresses Portugal.

1807. The English oppress Denmark.
1814–15. Congress of Vienna. The Powers confide the Austrian Netherlands (Belgium) to Holland.
1828. Greece revolts from Turkish oppression.
1831. England, Austria, France, Prussia and Russia guarantee Belgian independence and neutrality.
1839. Second guaranty of Belgian independence and neutrality.
1848. Revolutions all over Europe, especially in North Italy against Austrian oppression.
1854–6. The Crimean War.
1860. Garibaldi redeems Sicily; Cavour, North Italy.
1861. All Italy, except Venetia and Rome, united under King Victor Emmanuel.
1863. Poland revolts from Russian oppression.
1864. War between Prussia and Denmark: Prussia seizes Schleswig.
The Red Cross founded at Geneva.
1866. War between Prussia and Austria.
1866. Italy redeems Venetia.
The North German Confederation comes to an end: Napoleon III. proposes to annex Luxemburg to France.
Prince Charles of Hohenzollern called to rule Rumania.
1867. England, Austria, France, Prussia and Russia guarantee the neutrality of Luxemburg.
War between Germany and France.
1870. England, France and Germany make a special agreement regarding Belgian independence and neutrality.
1871. The Treaty of Frankfort, closes the Franco-German War and transfers Alsace-Lorraine from France to Germany.

1871. Thiers proposes to annex Luxemburg to France.
1872. The Dreikaiserbund: alliance of Russia, Germany and Austria.
1874. Bosnia and Herzegovina revolt.
1875. Alexander II. of Russia aids France.
1876. The Bulgarian atrocities.
1877. The Russo-Turkish War. Rumanian help gives Russia the victory. The Treaty of San Stefano. Rumania, Servia and Montenegro made independent.
1878. The Congress and Treaty of Berlin, annulling the Treaty of San Stefano.
1879. Austro-German alliance.
1881. Prince Charles crowned King of Rumania.
1882. The English occupy Egypt.
1883. The Triple Alliance—Germany, Austria, Italy.
1886. A new Law raises the French Army's peace footing to 500,000 men.
1888. Death of the Emperor Frederick of Germany. Accession of William II.
1890. Fall of Bismarck.
1891. Important strengthening of Russo-French friendship.
1893. Germany reduces period of army service from 3 years to 2.
1894. Death of Alexander III. of Russia. Accession of Nicholas II.
1896. Definite alliance between Russia and France.
1898. Nicholas II. violates the Finnish Constitution.
Nicholas II. proposes an International Peace Conference.
William II. visits Turkey.
1899. First Peace Conference at The Hague.

1899. Germany makes her army numerically almost equal to that of France.

1902. Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The Peace of Vereeniging closes the Boer War.

1903. Alexander of Servia murdered. Accession of Peter I.

1904. The Anglo-French Entente.
The French bombard Casablanca.
France reduces the period of her Army service from 3 years to 2.

1904–5. The Russo-Japanese War.

1905. Finland revolts against Russian oppression and regains her stolen liberties.
William II. visits Tangier.
M. Delcassé, French Foreign Minister, resigns.

1905–6. Conference of the Powers at Algeciras, Spain, settling the Moroccan question.

1907. The Anglo-Russian Entente.
Second Peace Conference at The Hague.

1908. Austria annexes Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Russia approves the union of all the Balkan States.

1909. Servia issues formal Note accepting the Bosnian annexation and declaring her desire to live in good fellowship with Austria.
Death of Leopold II. of Belgium. Accession of Albert I.

1910. Death of Edward VII. of England. Accession of George V.

1911. Germany threatens to occupy Agadir, Morocco: England averts war.
The French overthrow the Sultan of Morocco.

1912. Russia again violates the Finnish Constitution.
Italy declares war against Turkey.
The First Balkan War: the Peace Conference in

London of the Balkan States with Turkey interrupted.

1913. The Second Balkan War. End of the Presidential term of M. Fallieres: M. Poincaré elected President of France.

Significant Army Bills in Germany, France and Russia.

1914. Tension between Austria and Servia.

PRESIDENT WILSON'S DESPATCH TO THE GERMAN EMPEROR

[*September 16, 1914.*]

AMERICAN AMBASSADOR,

BERLIN (*via Rome*) 173, *sixteenth.*

Please communicate to His Majesty the Emperor the reply which the President makes to his communication of the seventh:

I received Your Imperial Majesty's important communication of the seventh and have read it with the gravest interest and concern. I am honored that you should have turned to me for an impartial judgment as the representative of a people truly disinterested as respects the present war and truly desirous of knowing and accepting the truth.

You will, I am sure, not expect me to say more. Presently, I pray God very soon, this war will be over. The day of accounting will then come when I take it for granted the Nations of Europe will assemble to determine a settlement. Where wrongs have been committed, their consequences and the relative responsibility involved will be assessed. The Nations of the world have fortunately by agreement made a plan for such a reckoning and settlement. What such a plan cannot compass the opinion of mankind, the final arbiter in all such matters, will supply. It would be unwise, it would be premature, for a single Government, however fortunately separated from the present struggle, it would even be inconsistent with the

neutral position of any Nation which like this has no part in the contest, to form or express a final judgment.

I speak thus frankly because I know that you will expect and wish me to do as one friend should to another and because I feel sure that such a reservation of judgment until the end of the war, when all its events and circumstances can be seen in their entirety and in their true relations will commend itself to you as a true expression of sincere neutrality.

WOODROW WILSON.

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